
The publication of a comprehensive history of Christian doctrine by a Baptist author is in itself a noteworthy event, for Reformed, Lutheran, Roman Catholic, and Methodist authors have tended to dominate this discipline. Roger E. Olson, a Baptist, produced The Story of Christian Theology: Twenty Centuries of Tradition and Reform in 1999.

This work by Allison, professor of Christian theology in Southern Baptist Theological Seminary, originated in a request by Wayne Grudem that Allison produce a treatise on historical theology that would be based on and complement Grudem’s Systematic Theology. Hence in his twelve-year project Allison has treated thirty-three doctrines, having combined some of forty-three chapters by Grudem out of a total of fifty-seven. He has written, says Allison, for an evangelical readership of students and other eager Christians, not for scholars, and has done so to differentiate orthodoxy from heresy and to provide an alternative to today’s “rampant individualism.”

In addition to the dependence on Grudem, the book has five methodological characteristics. First, Allison follows necessarily a “diachronic” (doctrine by doctrine) method rather than a “synchronic” (men, movements, councils, and creeds) method. Allison takes note of John D. Hannah’s Our Legacy: The History of Christian Doctrine (2001) as an example of the diachronic method but not of the better known History of Christian Doctrine (1937) by Louis Berkhof, written to correspond with Berkhof’s own Systematic Theology. Second, the scope of Allison’s study excludes Eastern Orthodox theology after John of Damascus—a decision for which Allison offers no rationale—and broadly includes materials from evangelicalism in the modern period (since 1750). Third, Allison quotes frequently and extensively from primary sources as the basis for his general conclusions. This adds significantly to the useful-
ness and reliability of the book. Fourth, Allison virtually ignores all the secondary authorities in the field (such as K. R. Hagenbach, W. G. T. Shedd, H. C. Sheldon, George P. Fisher, Adolf Harnack, J. Tixeront, Bernard J. Otten, Reinhold Seeberg, A. C. McGiffert, J. L. Neve and O. W. Heick, Paul Tillich, Justo Gonzalez, and Tony Lane), though he once alludes to Jaroslav Pelikan. This omission keeps the author from acknowledging that the diachronic method has been the minority method and from verifying his own reading of the primary sources. Fifth, Allison has been aided by thirty of his students, most often one for each chapter, who have gathered sources, written “first drafts of some of the chapters,” and done editorial work on the “late-stage rough draft” (17, 18). It is impossible to determine whether any specific sentence or paragraph has been composed by Allison or one of his students, but Allison of course must be responsible for the entire final product.

Each chapter consists of four sections: the patristic, the medieval, the Reformation and post-Reformation, and the modern. Few readers will dispute Allison’s use of patristic sources, since the writings of the church fathers are readily to be identified and acknowledged. The use of medieval materials will likely evoke only minor questions; William of Ockham and Duns Scotus could have been more fully treated. With the Reformation and post-Reformation era more questions are needed. Is Philip Melanchthon worthy of greater consideration? Do Thomas Cranmer, John Bunyan, and Andrew Fuller deserve mention? Are not major Anabaptist authors (Michael Sattler, Balthasar Hubmaier, Menno Simons, Dirk Philips, Pilgram Marpeck, Peter Rideman) omitted, when their writings are now in English translation? For the modern period, especially the twentieth century, readers may have some different choices. Omissions may include New England Unitarianism and Universalism, the nineteenth-century evangelical doctrine of the Holy Spirit, twentieth-century American amillennialism, Reinhold Niebuhr on sin, John Stott on the atonement, Dale Moody on apostasy, and George Beasley-Murray on baptism. Roman Catholics will expect more representation of their popes and theologians and likely find the treatment of Vatican Council II too limited. But Allison’s coverage of all four periods compares very favorably with all his predecessors who have sought to write on the entire history of Christian doctrine.

While acknowledging Allison’s success as to the four periods, one needs to address the issue of proportion or balance as to the doctrines treated. Should he have omitted chapters that Grudem included such as prayer, man as male and female, and death and the intermediate state? Should he have reduced Grudem’s three and one-third chapters on the Holy Spirit to one and one-third? What of the resultant proportion to the various doctrines? The content is as follows:

- The Bible: 25 percent
- Ecclesiology: 15.5 percent
- Soteriology: 14.5 percent
- God: 9 percent
- Person and Work of Christ: 8.5 percent
- Creation, Providence, Supernatural Beings: 8.5 percent
- Eschatology: 7 percent
- Man as Creature and as Sinner: 5.5 percent
- Glossary and Index: 4 percent
- Holy Spirit: 2.5 percent

That one-fourth of the book is devoted to bibliology seems to reflect Grudem’s proportion, the battles over the Bible in which evangelicals were engaged during the latter twentieth century, and the fact that Allison’s dissertation was in that field.

Accuracy of interpretation of the doctrines is a mark of Allison’s work. This is partly due to his considerable quotation of primary sources. It has been accomplished without checking his work against that of the secondary authors. Only very rarely would this reviewer question his interpretations. Two examples suffice. The earliest Anabaptists did not uniformly practice baptism by immersion (627). To posit that Swiss Anabaptists
held to a "breaking of bread" view of the Lord’s Supper that was distinct from Zwingli’s memorialist view is dubious (650-52, 655), and to suggest a distinctive but not delineated “Baptistic” view, without noting the minority Calvinist and the majority Zwinglian strands, is questionable (656).

This volume will likely become required reading in evangelical seminaries that have a comprehensive course or courses in historical theology. Pastors as well as scholars will find it to be very useful to consult. Eastern Orthodox and Roman Catholic institutions are quite unlikely to give it serious attention. Schools in the Wesleyan tradition may prefer Olson’s book, which is less comprehensive but uses the synchronic method. Grudem’s non-inclusion of missions in his *Systematic Theology* meant that Allison must follow such a pattern. The fact that no theologian is quoted in this book who has lived outside the Near East, north Africa, Europe, and North America suggests that Allison will retain his market until another author, as prodigious as he, should write a truly six-continent or global history of Christian doctrine.

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Stewart Kelly, professor of philosophy at Minot State University, has written a helpful treatise on historical knowledge and truth in a postmodern age. Kelly divides *Truth Considered and Applied* into three parts, corresponding to three major questions. (1) What is postmodernism? (2) Given postmodernism, is genuine historical knowledge still possible? (3) How should we think about truth?

In Part I, Kelly sets the stage for postmodernism with a brief survey of modernist philosophy. He highlights the problematic Enlightenment emphasis upon the reliability of human reason, with a concomitant rejection of the noetic effects of sin. Postmodernism rightly rejects modernist hubris, but is itself a mixed bag—there are many beneficial elements along with areas of deep concern.

On the positive side, postmodernism doubts the Enlightenment ideal of the omnicompetence of human reason. Postmodernism emphasizes the situatedness of the knower and the effect of worldview upon scientific and historical knowledge. Finally, Kelly praises postmodernism for recognizing that neither science nor historical narratives are as objective as modernists claimed.

On the flip side, postmodernists suggest that reality is socially constructed. Kelly notes that they are rejecting the “givenness” of the external world. He also insists that the postmodern reaction against modernist objectivity is exaggerated. A modest methodological objectivity is possible in both history and epistemology. While Kelly praises postmodernists for highlighting the oppressive nature of many historical metanarratives, he insists that not all metanarratives are inherently oppressive. Indeed, historic Christianity offers a truly liberating metanarrative.

In Part II, Kelly defends the traditional historiographical claim that “we have clearly justified knowledge of some past events.” (158) After tracing the rise and fall of objective historiography, Kelly builds a case for modest historical realism. He insists that, contrary to modernist ideals, objective history does not require detachment or neutrality. Furthermore, he maintains a subtle but crucial distinction between the *social construction* of cultural ideals and beliefs and the *objectively present* objects that those ideals and beliefs are based upon. Kelly utilizes the Holocaust as a paradigmatic example, insisting that (1) it occurred, (2) we have justification in saying that it is an objective historical fact, and (3) that Holocaust deniers are objectively wrong.
In Part III, Kelly defends the correspondence theory of truth against alternative (largely postmodern) theories of truth—coherence, pragmatic, and deflationary.

Kelly’s brief volume is particularly valuable to those interested in historiography and epistemology. Throughout *Truth Considered and Applied*, Kelly avoids highlighting radical or extreme postmodernists, choosing instead to focus on mainstream postmodernists who pose respectable and constructive positions. Ultimately, postmodernism is found lacking due to its rejection of objective historical knowledge, denial of the correspondence theory of truth, and acceptance of a broad social constructionism all point in the wrong direction. What is needed, Kelly argues, is a recovery of modest historical realism and a chastened correspondence theory of truth. The postmodern world is crying out for a truly universal metanarrative that does not oppress, but rather provides true liberation for all—the Christian metanarrative.

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Joining several recent books intending to highlight the significance of the Protestant Reformation of the sixteenth century is *Getting the Reformation Wrong: Correcting Some Misunderstandings* by James R. Payton Jr., professor of history at Redeemer University College in Ontario. The bulk of Payton’s book is a careful piece of historical work. He does a fine job of covering much of Reformation’s history, and he also interacts carefully with the most important streams of Reformation interpretation that have arisen in recent decades. Payton frames his book by noting several ways people commonly misunderstand the Reformation and then correcting those misinterpretations. The first way to get the Reformation wrong is to neglect its historical situation. Payton seeks to correct this in the first chapter. In twenty-two pages, he summarizes everything from the plague, to the perceived immorality of higher clerics, to crises in medieval philosophy. This shows that the late middle ages was “a period of crisis” (24) in which the constant call was for a “reform in head and members” within the church (25). The Reformation, then, was addressing long-recognized, real-life questions. Chapter two seeks to correct misinterpretations of the role of the Renaissance on the Reformation. Contra Francis Schaeffer, humanism was not man-centered, needing to be corrected by the reformers. Indeed, except for Luther, all the leading reformers were directly indebted to humanistic training and were dependent on it to a large degree (70). The third chapter argues that Luther did not have an immediate revelation of all of his theology. Instead, he came to a growing understanding of his theology over the course of his life. His theology was more than merely justification *sola fide*. Indeed, a great variety of people, from humanists to revolutionaries, thought they were accurately following Luther, even during his lifetime! His theology was evolving and multifaceted. In the fourth chapter, Payton documents several of the conflicts among the Reformers, seeking to correct the assumption “that the Reformers all agreed with one another, at least for the most part” (89). This is the best chapter of the book, because Payton helpfully shows the manner in which Luther’s scholastic training and intense personality led to differences between him and his Lutheran followers. Reformed theologians, who cared for more than just emphasizing *sola fide*, had their differences also (108). The Reformation was anything but monolithic.

In the fifth chapter Payton moves to doctrinal considerations. He exposits Luther’s doctrine of justification and shows the way in which there
was tremendous agreement between him and his followers, although Calvin developed Luther by emphasizing the role of Christ’s righteousness in our justification (122). The reformers’ agreement that good works were a necessary component of biblical doctrine is one of the main emphases of the chapter. Payton devoted nine pages to it, most of which excoriated modern evangelicals for their propensity not to emphasize the necessity of living Christianly, effectively becoming antinomians in practice. Chapter six deals with authority in the church, especially sola scriptura. Correcting a misunderstanding that the reformers thought that the Bible was good and that tradition was bad, Payton shows that Luther and others taught, rather, that Scripture was the only unquestioned religious authority. Beyond that, the reformers appealed to church history and to reason as aids in coming to decisions in religious matters (156). Significantly for his later argument, Payton here argues that the reformers uniformly held the early church fathers and councils in high esteem, just below the authoritative level of the Bible. The seventh chapter seeks to correct misunderstandings about the Anabaptists: they were not the precursors of Baptists; several sources, not just one, fed into their genesis; the movement was neither Protestant nor Catholic; and it contained several different, and often disparate, streams. Chapter eight outlines the manner in which the sixteenth-century Catholic church sought to reform itself, correcting the misunderstanding that Rome was merely reacting to Protestant attacks. Catholic reform had both internal and external stimuli (173). The final historical chapter argues that the generations after the Reformation proper, so-called “Protestant Scholasticism,” got the Reformation wrong due especially to developing anti-Catholic apologetics in the schools using Aristotelian logic (191). Opposing the thesis propounded by Richard Muller, Payton avers that scholastics like Theodore Beza, Johann Gerhard, and Johannes Wollebius changed the direction of Protestant thought in ways “that amounted to a change in teaching” (195). They changed Protestant doctrine substantially.

Overall, Payton’s historical overview of the Reformation is commendable. He has done careful research and summarizes the state of Reformation scholarship in an admirable fashion. This is the strength of the book. I would quibble with some of his historical judgments, especially in chapter nine. I agree in the main with Muller’s more continuous reading of the relationship between the Reformation and Protestant scholasticism. However, even when I disagreed with Payton’s interpretation of the data, I had to pause and consider his conclusions since he documented them quite well. This is why I think Getting the Reformation Wrong is a nice handbook of Reformation scholarship, one that I will urge students to consult in the future, and one which would serve as a quick entrance into the field of Reformation scholarship for pastors and interested church members.

Readers should be aware of two significant shortcomings that mar the book. The first one gets to the heart of the book’s title. Payton’s premise for writing the book is that most conservative Christians misunderstand the Reformation because they see their heroes as the white-hatted good guys opposing the evil, black-hatted Catholics. He says throughout that most conservative Protestants have significant misunderstandings about the Reformation. His concern, he alerts us, is that many evangelicals have inherited a skewed vision of the Reformation. They have “wrongly held notions” (15), which are usually taught in conservative churches, colleges, and seminaries. It may be here, though, that Payton is guilty of creating a straw man, because other than naming Francis Schaffer, he alludes only to “numerous other books” which he could cite to show the common misunderstanding (53). I suspect that Payton is right in his evaluation of much of his critique of conservative evangelicals’ misunderstandings about the Reformation. Nonetheless, it would have served his purposes better to tell us whose wrong views
he was trying to correct.

The second shortcoming is more serious. Payton’s three concluding chapters display theological and historical naivety, in my opinion. In chapter ten Payton presents many historical reasons to say that the Reformation was not a success, ranging from the anti-trinitarians who arose from among them to the success of the Jesuits in countering much Protestant progress by 1600. But Payton neglects the very doctrine he had covered in the fifth chapter, justification. Surely Luther and other Protestant leaders were discouraged in their day by the disunity in the Protestant churches and by the Catholic resurgence. But they never backed down from asserting that they had been right. If the Reformation was largely about reasserting the biblical doctrine of justification by faith alone, surely it was a success.

Chapter eleven argues that the Reformation should not be considered a norm, because even the reformers knew that they had not lived up to the theology they espoused. Instead, they looked back to the early church as a guide for how they should live and do theology—they looked “to the ancient church as a golden age, as a norm to strive to emulate.” Payton here laments the fact that “the study of Christian antiquity fell off in the generations after the Reformation” (244). Unfortunately, Payton never considers that the reformers might have appealed to the patristic era largely for polemical purposes (to show sixteenth-century Catholics that they, not the Protestants, had diverged from the Christian tradition) or because in comparison to the late medieval church the early church looked pristine. Both of these are better options than Payton’s assertions. Nor is it true that subsequent generations of Protestants abandoned studying the early church. To take just two examples, Beza knew the church fathers as well as Calvin did, and the scholastic John Owen (1616-83) was immersed in the early church while staunchly defending Protestantism against Catholic, Arminian, and Socinian attacks (see Carl Trueman’s John Owen: Reformed Catholic, Renaissance Man).

In the final chapter we finally see where this trajectory has been leading. After admitting that the Reformation was necessary practically and doctrinally, Payton argues that the Reformation was largely a tragedy. The great tragedy is that Christians were and are unnecessarily divided from one another because of the schisms that emerged in this time, in clear violation of Jesus’ prayer in John 17:20-21 (251). Even though he says that doctrine was important, Payton argues that the ensuing flood of Protestant denominations calls the reality of the gospel into question (253). This lament against denominations fails to consider Jesus’ concern in the same prayer that this people must be guided by the word of truth (John 17:17). There are many issues of truth that are worth dividing over.

These shortcomings, however, do not negate the value of Getting the Reformation Wrong. I encourage readers to study it. Just do so knowing Payton’s biases.

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The best thing about this book is its interaction with modern scholarship. The best thing about the book’s interaction with modern scholarship is the final chapter on “Modern Approaches to Paul’s Use of Scripture.” In this chapter Steve Moyise summarizes recent attempts to understand Paul’s use of the Old Testament by describing scholars according to three categories: intertextual approaches, narrative approaches, and rhetorical approaches.

The intertextual approach of Richard Hays seeks to pay close attention not only to the texts Paul explicitly quotes but also to the ways other
texts are alluded to, evoked, or echoed. Moyise reproduces the criteria Hays has set forth for assessing allusions, and he also discusses the work of Timothy Berkley.

The narrative approach of N. T. Wright holds that Paul taught people to read the Old Testament “in the light of an overall narrative framework” (117). This seeks to put the fragments of Scripture that might be echoed or alluded to into the wider storyline that Paul seems to assume. Here Moyise also discusses work done by Ross Wagner, Sylvia Keesmaat, and Francis Watson.

The rhetorical work of Christopher Stanley suggests that Paul’s audience would not have known the Old Testament well enough to make either the intertextual or narrative explanations work, and Stanley seems to hold that Paul is simply trying to “enhance his stature among the Romans and increase their openness to his argument” (122). The work of John Paul Heil is briefly reviewed under this heading as well.

I am convinced that Paul is not simply out to score rhetorical points, and that he is saturated with the Scriptures (Hays), which he does read in light of a typological understanding of the narrative flow of Israel’s history (Wright).

As he discusses modern authors, Moyise is careful to understand what they are saying, and it is clear that he shares their general outlook and thought-world. As he discusses Paul, it is clear that Moyise is not trying to describe Paul’s worldview so that he himself can embrace that worldview and interpret the Bible and life in line with it. The chapters that precede the final one are driven more by the modern scholarly discussion than by a sympathetic attempt to trace the contours of Paul’s symbolic universe.

Moyise appears to think that Paul’s worldview is now defunct, and thus his arguments no longer work. He writes, “the advantage of ‘solution to plight’ for modern readers is that Paul’s arguments might still have value now that the theory of evolution makes it impossible—for most people—to believe in a literal Adam and Eve. If Paul is making deductions about Christ and salvation based on the facticity of the Adam and Eve story, it is hard to see how they can continue to command support” (29). Similarly, Moyise writes, “The early Christians lived in a world that was thought to be governed by gods and spirits” (52).

Moyise not only rejects Paul’s worldview, he rejects Paul’s own understanding of Scripture. Discussing Francis Watson’s views, Moyise writes, “Modern scholars recognize this as a reference to the exile, and written by those who witnessed it. Deuteronomy is not a unified book by Moses but a collection of traditions, some of which date from a much later time. But Paul would have read it as a prophecy that though blessing through obedience to the law is a genuine offer, it will in fact lead to curse” (70).

On a related point, if one were seeking a “rationale for Paul’s use of the Adam–Christ typology,” one might look to the Old Testament itself. That’s not where Moyise looks. He looks to the scholarly guild. Moyise writes, “According to Wright, therefore, the rationale for the Adam–Christ typology is that Jewish tradition had already associated Israel with Adam . . . as far as we know, it was Paul’s innovation to connect Adam with Christ” (21). If Moyise had gone deeper into the Old Testament itself, he would find that the biblical authors themselves viewed Adam is viewed as a prototype. Moreover, the authors of the Old Testament present subtle indications that other characters are installments in the pattern of what happened with Adam. We find these indications with Noah, Abraham, Israel, Boaz, David (cf. Ps 8), and Solomon (1 Kgs 4:24, 33). If David is connected to Adam in Psalm 8 (and cf. Gen 1:26–28 with Ps 8:6–8), then when Paul makes a connection from Adam to Christ, he is simply taking his cues from interpretive moves already made in the Old Testament.

Moyise never says that the ideas of modern scholars are “strange,” “unusual,” or “arbitrary.” Rather than use these kinds of descriptors, he patiently tries to understand what these authors
mean, seeking the inner logic of their claims. He could show Paul the same courtesy. Instead, he writes (italics mine):

- “It is unclear what led Paul to describe Christ as the ‘last Adam’” (20).
- “Paul strangely talks about the effects of Adam’s sin on ‘the many’ . . . (24).
- “God then makes a covenant with Abraham, involving a rather strange ritual of fire passing between the carcasses” (32).
- On Galatians 3:6–9, “What is surprising about this argument, from a Gentile Christian’s perspective . . .” (35). On the next page he presumes to offer Paul some help: “Would it not be more appropriate to say . . . ? Perhaps, but that does not appear to be Paul’s concern here” (36).
- “Such an interpretive move could be seen as arbitrary” (37).
- “Paul uses a quasi-linguistic argument . . . This is a strange argument for two reasons . . . it is fallacious since sperma (‘seed’ or ‘offspring’) is a collective singular, meaning descendants. Not only is it false . . . the context also makes it quite clear that a plurality was intended . . . How can Paul think this argument is convincing?” (41).

If I were reading a book about the way that Virgil made use of Homer, I would not need the author to tell me Virgil’s outlook was different than my own. If I want to understand Virgil, what I am looking for in such a book is an explanation of Virgil’s agenda from Virgil’s perspective. If the author repeatedly told me that Virgil’s views were strange, if he told me that modern mythology is superior to Virgil’s, I might suspect that the modern author operates from the bias that his own way of viewing the world is superior to Virgil’s. This does not advance historical understanding. The modern author does not have to believe that Aeneas was descended from a goddess, but he can explain how that concept fit within Virgil’s worldview, what influenced the idea, and what significance it had in Virgil’s world. I want the scholar to show me how these things made sense to Virgil. I can decide for myself whether I think them strange, unusual, or unclear.

In addition to the issue of historical understanding, there are theological issues at stake for Christians thinking about the use Paul made of earlier Scripture. People looking for an explanation of Paul’s use of the Old Testament that probes the primary sources for the deep structure of Paul’s understanding of the Bible and the world, an explanation that does not jump to the conclusion that Paul’s claims are “arbitrary” and “fallacious,” will have to look elsewhere. These matters are not morally and spiritually neutral. Christians believe that everything depends on the Bible being true. What hope do we have if Paul’s arguments do not make sense?

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In the introduction, which also serves as the first chapter, Gnuse discusses the Bible and political thinkers. In this chapter he notes that the Bible contains both positive and negative views on kingship, but the more that is read the more negative the text appears to be toward both individual kings and the institution of kingship. He also discusses kingship in the ancient world and shows how the criticism of a monarch in the ancient world was a very serious matter. His discussion then goes on to show how kings in the post-biblical era used the Bible to their advantage to establish their divine rights. This however was offset by both the translation of the Bible into the vernacular and by political thinkers who used the Bible to show that it teaches equality and to challenge kings.

In chapters two and three Gnuse begins his discussion on the prophetic view of kingship. He does this by analyzing the prophets Amos, Hosea, Isaiah, and Micah in the second chapter. These prophets “condemned the two sins of oppressing the poor and worshipping other gods” (15). Gnuse believes that these two sins are viewed as one sin and that traditional Yahwism is inherently egalitarian in nature. These prophets were the first to first religious intelligentsia to criticize kings. Chapter three discusses the prophets that he views as carrying on the Deuteronomic Reform. The prophets Jeremiah and Ezekiel continued the tradition of the earlier prophets with their criticism of kings. Gnuse shows how the message of Ezekiel sometimes parallels the message of Jeremiah and how both of their messages have attacks that center on kings, both foreign and Israelite.

Chapters four and five discuss the view of kingship in the Law and in the Moses tradition. In these chapters Gnuse discusses how in the ancient Near East it was the kings who gave the law as a way of solidifying their power. In the Bible, however the law is given through Moses, who was a prophet not a king. Gnuse believes that kingship is discussed in a limited way in Old Testament legal texts and that the king is subordinate to the law. This is complimented by the Moses tradition, which portrays civil disobedience to tyranny and is presented as “a subtle commentary on the nature of kings and the real presence of divine power” (50).

In chapters six through eight Gnuse discusses kingship in light of the Deuteronomistic History. This is done in three phases: the premonarchial period, the united monarchy, and the divided monarchies. In these chapters Gnuse discusses how the king is limited by the prophetic word and that where we would expect discussion of kings there is glaring omission. There are also only three kings that are given good evaluation by the biblical witness, with the overwhelming majority of kings being discussed in negative terms. Even kings like David, however, are given significant negative assessment through editorial comments. In the divided monarchy the critique grows and the institution of kingship is viewed as evil.

In the ninth chapter Gnuse discusses kingship in the primeval history of Genesis 1-11. These chapters present egalitarian themes, especially the equality of humanity, as well as the repudiation of kings, most notably Mesopotamian kings.

Chapter ten discusses antimonarchial polemic in the Joseph novella, Daniel, Esther, and the apocryphal book of Judith. These texts insulted kings and their courts, portraying them as fools who were unable to interpret dreams, who abused their power, and who were generally given to excess.

In the eleventh, and final substantive chapter, Gnuse moves his attention from the Old Testament to the New Testament. Gnuse notes that while the New Testament is primarily concerned with proclaiming the life and resurrection of Christ there is still a prophetic critique of kingship. The New Testament also portrays a heightened sense of egalitarianism and equality of all people.

No Tolerance for Tyrants is a well written work with several admirable features. Gnuse is correct in pointing out that the Bible was a counter-cultural book. Gnuse shows this in several places. His
discussion of how the biblical criticism of kings stands out within its ancient Near Eastern context is very good. He also shows how the biblical text is counter-cultural in pointing out that the king, per Deuteronomy 17, is under the law not above it. This was a foreign concept in the ancient world. Gnuse’s discussion of how the biblical text has been abused and of how political thinkers have used the biblical text is also very helpful and serves as a useful resource in the history of interpretation on this subject. Gnuse’s concern for social justice is also highly commendable. He also does a great job of showing how even the most well-known biblical kings did atrocious things. This serves as a helpful reminder that we should not try to idealize every biblical character.

Despite these admirable characteristics there are some negatives. First, Gnuse does not always provide substantive documentation for his claims. This occurs a few times throughout the book, as when he writes, “Some critical scholarship suggests that the format of the law code in Deuteronomy may subtly imply egalitarianism” (44). When he does this he does not give any examples of scholars who hold to this position. Related to this, there are times when the flow of Gnuse’s argument is not very clear. This is evidenced in the first chapter where he jumps around between several different aspects of his study with little linkage in the argument.

Gnuse is also selective with the texts that he treats. While his thesis did state that he would highlight certain texts there are times when this results in an uneven presentation on the subject. In his discussion of kingship and the Law, for example, he writes that “there was one passage in the legal tradition that spoke of kings” (40). He then goes on to discuss Deuteronomy 17 in some detail. What he leaves out, however, is any discussion of other texts that have a monarchical flavor to them like Genesis 17:6, 16; 35:11; Exodus 19:6; Numbers 23:21 and 24:7. In his selectivity Gnuse also does not sufficiently account for the biblical presentation of the messiah as the coming king. He does make several caveats about the future righteous king, but usually ends with a statement about how the messianic texts are also antimonarchical in that they serve as “yet another condemnation of real kings in real life, most of whom could never and would never act with such nobility” (31). If the institution of kingship is to be viewed as negative, however, then why would the messiah be described as a coming king? If the Old Testament is as antimonarchical as Gnuse states then this surely has implications for messianism.

Gnuse also equates negative statements about individual kings to negativity about the institution of kingship. If this line of reasoning were followed with other institutions then the institutions of priest and prophet would be negative as well.

To compare it to a modern day phenomena we can discuss our displeasure with, and the unfaithfulness of, political leaders such as senators or the president, but this does not necessarily mean that we think that the office of the president is evil.

One of the major parts of Gnuse’s thesis was that political thinkers have used the biblical text to oppose tyranny. He does this well at times, as was noted above, but his presentation of this is scattered and it usually comes as a minor reflection within a chapter. It would have been helpful for this information to have been given a chapter or two that stood alone. As it stands it shows that the Bible has been proof-texted by both the ruling elite to solidify their power as well as by those who want to use the Bible as a sword for liberation theology. Neither of these seem to account for the whole counsel of Scripture and both can be dangerous in isolation.

Despite these negatives No Tolerance for Tyrants is a book that would be a beneficial to the discerning reader who is interested in the subject of kingship. This book finds itself in an area of biblical studies that is once again starting to get attention. It complements prior studies on kingship such as Aubrey Johnson’s Sacral Kingship in Ancient Israel, Tomoo Ishida’s Royal Dynasties in Ancient Israel, Gerald Gerbrandt’s, Kingship According to the Deuteronomistic History, and Martin Buber’s The Kingship of God. It also finds a unique voice among
very recent works including Yair Lorberbaum’s *Disempowered King: Monarchy in Classical Jewish Literature*, and Marty Alan Michelson’s *Reconciling Violence and Kingship: A Study of Judges and 1 Samuel. No Tolerance for Tyrants* currently stands as one of the most comprehensive treatments of the ideology of monarchy in the Bible from a largely antimonarchial perspective.

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Will the real Lottie Moon please stand up? Moon, a Southern Baptist missionary to China from 1873 until her death in 1912, became a legendary figure among Southern Baptists, who named their enormously successful foreign missions offering in her honor. But her symbolic role in the denomination has obscured important historical realities of her life. Regina Sullivan advances the myth of Lottie Moon as a Southern Baptist feminist, and also debunks the myth of Lottie Moon as Southern Baptist martyr. Neither myth is historically accurate.

Sullivan portrays Lottie Moon as a feminist who attempted to lead Southern Baptist women out of their subordination to male oppression. Sullivan claims that Lottie Moon’s real historical character was that of a “female activist who preached” and who “argued for female equality” (160). Moon’s life, Sullivan therefore concludes, has rightly served as a “role model for moderates who believe that women should be allowed to preach and minister,” that is, for moderates who advocate the ordination of women to the gospel ministry (168).

The argument however does not fit the evidence. Moon was a remarkable woman who exercised independence of thought and action, gained considerable influence among Southern Baptists, and wrote with intelligence and force. But Moon was not a feminist. To transform Lottie Moon into a feminist requires Sullivan to ignore Moon’s own explicit statements concerning gender roles. Moon in fact rejected feminism in principle.

Sullivan bases her argument on two claims. She claims first that Lottie Moon considered herself a preacher in deliberate defiance of mission board policy and of Southern Baptist convictions and practices. She claims also that Moon’s insistence that Southern Baptist women establish a national organization was part of an effort to subvert male authority. Sullivan misconstrues the history in order to advance both claims.

Sullivan asserts in several places that Moon was a preacher. Yet Sullivan never explained how Moon herself viewed her gospel activity. She did not often refer to her own activities as involving preaching, but on at least one occasion Moon described her activity as “preaching,” and on another occasion described the personal evangelistic activity of Chinese lay men and women as preaching. Sullivan does not explain that Moon used that word to mean something quite different than what Sullivan means by it. Moon explained that “when I say preach, I include in it talking by the wayside to one or more.” This was the word that the Chinese Christians used. “The women often ask me to ‘kiang’ to them. This is the only word we have for ‘preaching’ and it is applied alike to the pulpit ministrations of the brethren and the informal talks the ladies make to women and children.” (See Keith Harper, ed., *Send the Light: Lottie Moon’s Letters and Other Writings*, 163, 278). Moon disavowed preaching in the sense that Sullivan means it. In her letters Moon in fact expressed her sympathy with the scriptural restrictions. Sullivan fails to mention or discuss passages from Moon’s own writings that suggest opposition to feminism.

Sullivan argues in the second place that Lottie Moon inspired Southern Baptist women to make
“their initial struggle toward eroding patriarchal power and engaging the public sphere” by publishing “forceful articles in favor of defying male authority” (113). In particular, Sullivan argues, Moon urged Southern Baptist women to form the Woman’s Missionary Union as an “overt form of resistance to male domination of the Southern Baptist Convention.” Moon thus inspired Southern Baptist women to exercise power in “ways that directly threatened male hegemony” and “subverted the status quo” (143).

Lottie Moon did urge Southern Baptist Women to organize a national body and to promote a Christmas offering for missions. But this was not an act of feminist defiance of gender roles. The issue had little to do with gender roles. Some men and women opposed establishing a national organization because they feared that it would divide and weaken the denomination by establishing an independent mission board, with its own funding mechanism and its own appointed missionaries. Moon proposed an organization that renounced independent action: “Power of appointment and of disbursing funds should be left, as heretofore, in the hands of the Foreign Mission Board. Separate organization is undesirable and would do harm; but organization in subordination to the Board is the imperative need of the hour.”

Moon was defiant toward evil and inconsideration, but not toward her mission board or her denomination. Sullivan claims that she defied the board’s policy when she decided to move to Pingtu and begin a missionary station there alone. This was hardly defiance, however, since she acted in accordance with the will of the North China Mission. One of the male missionaries recommended Pingtu as a promising place for her to work. The other missionaries voted in approval of her move. And Henry Tupper, president of the Foreign Mission Board, did not apparently believe that the board had a policy against Moon’s actions, since he did not question or censure her for them.

Moon was loyal to her denomination and its male leaders, and abided by their views of gender roles in the church and home, and urged women’s missionary societies to “be subordinate” to the denomination’s mission board. Sullivan claims that Moon urged Southern Baptist women to defy the male authority in the denomination, yet Moon never urged such a thing. Sullivan can only argue that the defiance is implicit, for Moon urged explicitly for loyalty and support. If Sullivan’s argument is correct, Moon was secretly subversive, and her professions of loyalty were disingenuous, or else she acted contrary to her explicit intentions by implicitly advancing feminism.

Sullivan’s argument is disturbing. It either robs Moon and faithful Southern Baptist women of their agency by making them the unwilling heroines of the predestined march of feminism, or it makes them into deceivers who publicly urged loyalty but secretly plotted revolution. Moon and the women urged their missionary causes upon the denomination for the explicit purpose of saving souls. Sullivan claims that they did so in order to gain autonomy and power. Surely we must respect their autonomy sufficiently to credit their own understanding of their actions. A better argument, on Sullivan’s premises, would be that Moon’s actions unintentionally undermined her opposition to feminism.

Sullivan advances a number of historical errors as she seeks to establish the plausibility of her argument. She mischaracterizes the Southern Baptist position regarding gender and rarely quotes the sources when she describes Southern Baptist views of gender roles in society, in the church, and on the mission field. She exaggerates Southern Baptist understandings of the restrictions on women’s roles in order to make Moon appear to be a feminist. In general, for example, Sullivan characterizes Southern Baptist men as committed to subordination of women in all contexts.

Southern Baptists on the contrary held that the Bible defined women’s roles in two specific contexts: wives were to submit to their husbands, and women were prohibited from ordination to the ministry of gospel, serving as a pastor, or exercis-
ing the teaching office of the church.

Other aspects of gender roles derived from arguments about what served the formation of female character to contribute most effectively to the family, church, and society. Scripture considerations informed these discussions, but Southern Baptists disagreed on many of these issues, since they depended not on the Bible but on scripturally informed prudence. So, for example, arguments about what vocations were appropriate for women were decided not by direct appeals to scripture but by appeals to the welfare of families, churches, and society.

Sullivan also conflates opposition to women's preaching with opposition to public speaking by women. Southern Baptists were uniformly opposed to women's preaching but they were pretty evenly divided during Moon's lifetime on the question of whether and when it was suitable for women to speak to public audiences.

Sullivan thus treats Southern Baptist views on gender as rather static and uniform. They were not. They disagreed on many important matters concerning gender roles: whether women ought to vote on matters of church discipline; whether they ought to vote in elections of pastors and deacons; whether women ought to vote as delegates in the meetings of local associations, state conventions, and the Southern Baptist Convention; the character and extent of female education; whether women should be encouraged to work in various professions outside the home; and whether women ought vote in elections of civil rulers.

In general, Baptists in the west of the Atlantic seaboard held less restrictive views of women's roles in the workplace and in public spheres, and supported women voting in various church settings and in civil elections. Baptists in the seaboard states generally held more restrictive views. Lottie Moon's own views concerning such gender roles in society tended toward the less restrictive views of Baptists west of the seaboard.

Sullivan mistakenly states that Southern Baptist female missionary societies began only in the late 1860s (73). In fact, female missionary societies predated the formation of the Southern Baptist Convention. Women organized missionary and benevolent societies in their churches in the early 1800s, especially after the formation of the Triennial Convention in 1814. By 1845 many Southern Baptist churches and associations had such societies.

Sullivan mistakenly states also that Southern Baptist women were excluded from the denomination's business meetings. She means of course that women could not serve as official delegates or messengers, and thus could not participate in debates or vote. But this is misleading. The Southern Baptist Convention decided in 1885 to prohibit seating women as delegates in response to the fact that in such states as Texas, Arkansas, and Kentucky, churches were appointing women as delegates and they were being recognized and seated in the meetings of the associations and state conventions. The state convention in Kentucky began seating female delegates in 1868. Texas did so by 1874 and Arkansas no later than 1882. Such roles for women did not contradict the scripture teachings on gender roles in the church and home.

Sullivan thus interprets every conflict as a struggle between male hegemony and female liberation. So for example, when the denomination debated the propriety of establishing a national woman's missionary society to give leadership to the various local and state women's missionary societies, she treats it as a matter male opposition to feminism.

Sullivan does not explain why so many women opposed the national organization, nor why so many male leaders supported it. She treats the debate over seating female delegates at the 1885 meeting of the Southern Baptist Convention the same way, but does not explain how some women came to be elected as delegates in the first place, nor why their husbands, the two leading Baptist men in Arkansas, favored seating women delegates. A large portion of the male leaders of the denomination in fact supported the proposal to
establish a national Woman’s Missionary Union, from the leaders of the mission boards, Henry Tupper and William McIntosh, to the editors of many of the state Baptist newspapers who wrote editorials in its favor.

And so Sullivan fails to discover the important forces at work in the debate. The powerful interests of the various state conventions opposed the national organization because it was designed initially to raise money for the national convention’s Foreign Mission Board only. The foreign board had been quite active organizing new women’s missionary societies and joining them together in state organizations—all for the benefit of the foreign mission board. The state convention leaders objected that they too deserved the women’s support. State interests defeated the initial efforts at a national woman’s missionary organization in order to get state missions included. When the leaders of the woman’s missionary movement pledged that they would raise money for both the state conventions and for the Southern Baptist Convention, substantial opposition evaporated. Sullivan does not however explain this.

Sullivan also claims that the establishment of a national Woman’s Missionary Union was a move to gain control from the men. But the women had always controlled their own societies. It was merely a question of what organizations they would serve, and during the 1880s, the state convention leaders fought to have their share. The women sought to accommodate their organization to the best interests of the gospel and of the denomination, but they always controlled their own organizations.

The most valuable part of the book is Sullivan’s the section on how the true story of Lottie Moon’s death was transformed into a martyr myth that functioned powerfully as a tool for raising money for missions.

The myth is that Lottie Moon died as a martyr on behalf of missions and the Chinese people. Moon starved herself to death, the story goes, sacrificing her own life in order to give all her money to alleviate the debt of the mission board and to buy food to help the starving Chinese. Sullivan explains well how the myth originated and how the Woman’s Missionary Union and other agencies perpetuated the myth, especially beginning in the 1960s.

Shortly after Moon’s death, Jennie Hatcher published the article in Virginia’s Religious Herald that originated the myth. Hatcher wrote that it was the burden of the mission board’s debt that caused Moon to suffer a nervous breakdown and that Moon refused to eat in order that her resources would be used to feed the starving Chinese around her. The “debt” took her “to the grave.”

The facts, ascertained from letters and testimony of the missionaries who sought to save her in 1912, tell a different story. Moon developed increasing dementia during the final months of her life. It became so severe by October 1912 that she did not always recognize missionaries whom she had long known and she was often unable to apprehend reality. She became convinced that she had no money, and that all the missionaries in China would soon starve to death with their families. At times she seemed to recognize that her mind was abandoning her. She told Jane Lide that it was “troubles in my mind” at the base. Other symptoms of the severity of the dementia included the fact that she could no longer sleep and that she lost all appetite and could rarely be coaxed into eating anything—though there was never any suggestion that her refusal to eat had any other basis than her progressing disease. Her only other symptom was a severe infection on her neck. Everything together caused increasing physical frailty.

The cause of the dementia cannot be known. Her fellow missionaries, including the missionary physicians who saw her at the time, believed that the infection on her neck was probably the cause, though there are many other possible sources of brain degeneration.

The letters of the missionaries who cared for her during her final months make it clear that she did not starve herself by giving away all her food
and money to alleviate famine sufferers. She had always been generous. That year she had given a portion of her retirement contribution to the mission board for alleviating its debt, and a portion of it to help with Chinese famine relief. But she had sufficient food and money, and had not given it all away. As her mind became clouded, she became convinced that she had no money and that the board had no more money, and that the Baptist missionaries would all starve to death.

The story has been promoted since the mid-twentieth century as an integral part of Moon’s legacy. It was easy to believe the story because it was consistent with Moon’s zeal for Chinese souls and her self-denying character. It was easy to believe also because it originated shortly after Moon’s death and was transmitted in the first book about her life. It is nevertheless inaccurate and Sullivan helpfully explains this.

In the final analysis, Sullivan’s interpretation of Lottie Moon as a feminist obscures her real historical character. Lottie Moon was, as one of her missionary colleagues described her, a “very cultured refined lady of unusual ability and strength of character, with a soul on fire to give the pure Gospel of life to the Chinese, and thus uplift them.” This was the real Lottie Moon.

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This is Chadwick Mauldin’s Th.M. thesis written for the faculty at the Southwestern Baptist Theological Seminary. Mauldin’s intention is to examine, particularly for those that hold to Reformed soteriology, as to “whether it is more appropriate for such Baptists to be regarded as Fullerites rather than Calvinists” (12). His chief concern in developing this proposal is the area of missiology, and in pursuit of that the author treats some of the differences between Calvin’s ecclesiology and that of Baptists. Chapter one demonstrates the relevance of his proposal by showing that Calvinist influence in Baptist life is vibrant and growing. He does not say that that is a bad thing, but wants to ensure that Baptist distinctives on some vital issues are not overwhelmed in the quest for Reformed consistency. Chapter two gives a brief survey of English Baptist history focusing on its origin, the Calvinistic impulse among the Particular Baptists and ends with a biographical narrative of Andrew Fuller. Chapter three entitled, “Doctrinal Study of John Calvin,” involves a discussion primarily of Calvin’s missiology. He argues that Calvin’s “missiology was malformed as a result of two important factors,” a defective grasp of the authority of the Great Commission and involvement in the Magisterial Reformation. Calvin depended, therefore, more on the state than the church for the propagation of the gospel and he necessarily approved coercion in matters of religion, leading to the burning of Michael Servetus. Chapter four treats Fuller’s vital importance to the Baptist Missionary Society as a theologian/defender, as an administrator, and as a pastor. Mauldin gives a brief but clear snapshot of Fuller’s theology of duty as expressed in The Gospel Worthy of All Acceptation, including the important discussion that Fuller gives of faith. Faith aims at what is revealed, not at what is not revealed. Fuller’s missiology revolved around the ideas of the urgency of gospel proclamation to all the world, the necessity of the use of means, the certainty of the final triumph of Christ, and the perpetual relevance of the Great Commission. Chapter five summarizes the points made in the main body of the thesis emphasizing points of agreement and disagreement between Fuller and Calvin. On the perpetuity of the Great Commission and the means used for the final triumph of Christ, Mauldin found significant divergence between the two. Calvin treated the great com-
mission as mandate to the apostles and Fuller, like his friend William Carey, interpreted it in terms of “even unto the end of the age.” The one consented to the spread of the gospel through the power of the magistrate, and the other promoted a non-magisterial, non-coercive missionary theology. The book ends with two engaging appendices, (A) an interview with James Leo Garrett about Calvinism and Fullerism, and (B) some vigorous, charming, and informative letters from Andrew Fuller to William Carey.

Mauldin’s pointing to the strategic place of Andrew Fuller in the history of missions and as a (re)turning-point type figure in Baptist theology cannot be called into question. The two points that Mauldin makes as fundamental to the “Fullerism” nomenclature is Fuller’s more robust and comprehensive interpretation of Matthew 28:19-20, and that missions is exclusively a church matter as opposed to a church-state matter (70, 71 et al.). Though Mauldin contends that this is “not peripheral and must be given serious consideration” (70), these differences are more apparent than real. Although Calvin approached the Great Commission differently from Fuller and William Carey, he did not reject the “boundless and unlimited mandate to spread the gospel.” Though Fuller’s Missionary Society did not depend on government funds or positive coercive power in any way, it certainly benefited from the protection of the British government in India and to a large degree worked for the continuation of a government friendly, at least not antagonistic, to the continued presence of Protestant Dissenters in India as missionaries in India (Fuller, Works, 2:763-836). Calvin did not have the advantage of a Geneva that could provide protection for his ministers in any place in the world, and so depended on the good will of magistrates in other countries to allow the preaching of the gospel. Even without protection, though he sought it from Francis, he sent preachers into France and encouraged them to die for the cause of Christ. Though he appealed to Emperor Charles V to take an active role in reforming the church (Calvin, On the Necessity of Reforming the Church), he pledged, nevertheless, to pursue it even without his aid and to die if necessary, knowing that “our blood will be as seed to propagate the Divine truth which men now despise.” He desired that “our ministry may prove salutary to the world; but to give it this effect belongs to God, not to us” (Reforming, 233).

The interview with Garrett generated some question as to whether Calvin, along with Fuller, believed in duty-faith and as to whether he held to the distinction between natural and moral inability. Calvin, though not using the precise language of Edwards or Fuller, embraced the distinction between natural ability and moral inability, including the implication that faith, therefore, is a duty even of the unregenerate, and even of the non-elect. In fact, he viewed it as an undeniable element of Christian orthodoxy. In arguing against Pighius, Calvin stated, “If freedom is opposed to coercion, I both acknowledge and consistently maintain that choice is free, and I hold anyone who thinks otherwise to be a heretic” (Calvin, The Bondage and Liberation of the Will, 68). Calvin wrote forcefully about the will’s maintaining all its created internal capacities for determining its own choice (natural ability), but just as forcefully insisted on the entire corruption of man so choice is not free from “man’s innate wickedness,” and thus “cannot seek anything but evil” (moral inability). This, in substance, is no different from the position that Edwards and Fuller held. “We locate the necessity to sin precisely in corruption of the will, from which it follows that it is self-determined” (hence both moral inability and natural ability; Bondage 69, 70). Pursuing further his argument against Pighius, Calvin noted: “So one who can distinguish between the original creation of our nature and the corruption of it which later supervened as a result of sin will, without much trouble, extricate himself from all difficulty” (Bondage, 213).

The question of a theology of “conversion”
also arose with a tendency to think that Calvin’s view did not quite support the kind of conversion ideas that Baptists had, particularly after the First Great Awakening (81, 82). Baptists, however, had a clearly articulated view of conversion prior to the First Great Awakening. Before the advent of the Separate Baptists, Baptists regularly testified to the operations of the Spirit of God in bringing conviction of sin and then showing Christ to their soul as a sufficient and willing savior. A look at the Baptist Catechism answers on “Effectual Calling” and “Repentance unto Life” as well as the testimonies of John Bunyan, Hanserd Knollys, and William Kiffin should settle any question about that. As for Calvin, he himself testifies that it was by a “sudden conversion” that “God tamed and brought to teachableness my heart” (Calvin’s introduction to his commentary on the Psalms). When explaining how this takes place, Calvin pointed to an initial “sense of individual wretchedness, filling us with despondency as if we were spiritually dead.” The sinner, at that point “overwhelmed and prostrated, despair of all carnal aid.” Second, such a humbled sinner is “animated by the knowledge of Christ” and finds nothing to do but to “turn to Christ, that through his interposition he may be delivered from misery.” Third, convinced that in Christ alone are all the fruits of righteousness and the provers of gratuitous mercy of which he stands in need, such a sinner is then “instructed in the grace of Christ, and in the fruits of his death and resurrection” so that he “rest in him with firm and solid confidence, feeling assured that Christ is so completely his own, that he possesses in him righteousness and life” (Reforming, 134). Christian literature has many testimonies of personal conversion and statements concerning its process, and Calvin’s would be among the most succinct and encouraging.

If by Fullerism all that is proposed is that we take Fuller’s approach to missions as a model for contemporary missiology, then we gladly consent, if the whole be recovered. Fundamental to Fuller’s missiology was his theology, including what he himself described as “strict Calvinism” (Fuller, Works, 1:77), a point fully recognized by Mauldin (66). This makes the discussion between James Leo Garrett and Mauldin as to whether Fuller believed in unconditional election puzzling (74). I assume that they have settled this point since that interview because Fuller is not unclear on it. Among the many places that he affirmed this is in his Reply to Philanthropos. There he utilized the doctrine of “eternal personal unconditional election” as supportive of his doctrine that there was “a special design in the death of Christ” for some persons only, and others, because not elect, are excluded from that special design in Christ’s death. In his conclusion to this discussion, Fuller stated “there was a certain, absolute, and consequently limited, design in the death of Christ, securing the salvation of all those, and only those, who are finally saved” (Fuller, Works 2:493, 494). In his personal confession of faith, Fuller stated unequivocally, “I believe the doctrine of eternal personal election and predestination” (Ryland, Life and Death, 103).

Other issues of Fullerism, important to him for his missiology, would be the affirmation of total depravity, including the bondage of the will, to a prevailing disposition of hostility to the divine law, holiness, and goodness. Faith in the gospel only comes then, by an internally effectual, and thus irresistible, operation of the Holy Spirit. He is the “almighty and invincible agency attending” the preaching of the gospel when it actually is believed to the saving of the soul (Fuller, Works 2:470-71). Those so called certainly will believe and will persevere to the end. By design, Christ has died to procure for them, and them only, all the blessings given them in Christ before the foundation of the world and all the operations and gifts of the Spirit by which they come to see, know, and believe the truth of the Scripture and the certainty of the gospel for salvation.

One cannot, in any recognizable sense, be a Fullerite and refuse the internal coherence of his soteriology. An objective observer seeking to place
Fuller within the framework of historical theology would have to agree with Fuller's own claim, “Fuller was a Calvinist.”

Teasing out areas of opposition is pertinent in only a very limited sphere, and then within a framework to which Baptists have no temptation. Infant baptism and state-churchism are so clearly averse to historic Baptist ecclesiology that it would seem irrelevant to bring them into a discussion of Baptists and Calvinism. That discussion is a soteriological discussion and may be pursued profitably with no justifiable reason to accuse a Baptist Calvinist of a bias toward infant Baptist or union of church and state. Nor can he be seen as inconsistent if he does not acknowledge any necessary connection between these two spheres of doctrine. If he does acknowledge a connection, he will argue that it favors the Baptist position.

On the issue of the atonement and the free offer of the gospel, Fuller claimed to be no doctrinal pathfinder, but aligned himself completely with Calvin and the Synod of Dort (Fuller, Works, 2:712). He claimed specifically to align himself with historic Calvinism and to distance himself from what was “not Calvinism.” “I never met with a single passage in the writings of Calvin on this subject that clashed with my own views” Fuller reported (Fuller, Works 2:713). He was quite content to be called a Calvinist on these issues, and in fact argued that it was so, without feeling that this compromised his views of baptism, the free offer of the gospel, the duty of all men to believe, or the centrality of gospel preaching to the expansion of the church in the world.

Opting for the nomenclature of “Fullerism, as opposed to Calvinism, [as] a superior Baptist theological nomenclature” (71) would, from a purely theological standpoint, give a robust and acceptable heritage for contemporary Baptist life. I for one could wish that the whole of Fuller would be taken seriously and employed in missions, evangelism, church life, and theological discussion. He is not infallible but certainly can lead to a path of edifying practical work supported by a consistently applied doctrinal foundation. Problems of chronology, however, make this proposal a bit awkward. He does not appear until Baptists are a century and a half old. Though his theology provided a correction to an aberrant intrusion, it really provided nothing distinctive so as to justify his being the founder of a peculiar school of thought. He re-asserted a position held by earlier Particular Baptists and the phenomenon of Fullerism in the nineteenth-century came largely, though not exclusively, from the negative response of those that had been swayed into some element of hyper-Calvinism. Among the exceptions to this general rule were Abraham Booth and James P. Boyce who both took exception to some specific formulations of Fuller. Another problem of chronology is the place of Calvin in the systematization of Protestant thought in its most coherent and pervasively transferable form. On the outstanding doctrines of the Reformation, Fuller was himself a Calvinist. That term gives greater continuity and a more universally recognizable identification to a particular stream of thought on issues of the fall and its effects, the person and offices of Christ, the purpose and strategy of the triune God in salvation, the sovereign prerogatives of God in creation, providence, and redemption.

If Mr. Mauldin will present us with a systematized theology of Fuller, which I have heard is his intention, then he will do Baptists and the whole evangelical world an immense favor. When that appears, I will look at it with positive interest and will be willing, even as with Calvin in light of some discreet caveats, to identify myself as a Fullerite.

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This twenty-fifth addition to the outstanding series “New Studies in Biblical Theology,” edited by D. A. Carson, examines a major topic of systematic theology—the atonement—from the standpoint of biblical theology. The title indicates that Cole intends to show that peace/shalom is a fundamental goal of and integrates much of the Bible’s teaching about the atonement.

The biblical-theological orientation of the book is evidenced by its organization around “the Bible’s own plotline from the story of creation to the fall to redemption to consummation” (28). To provide the context for the biblical narrative and teaching surrounding the atonement, Cole begins with a chapter on God and two chapters on biblical anthropology and hamartiology. The Creator God is righteous and holy in his love, attributes that are especially revealed in the cross of Christ. His righteous, holy love necessitates wrath against sin, but the cross demonstrates there is a fundamental unity in what might seem like contradictory orientations (love and wrath) to humans. Because of human sinfulness, the real contradiction lies with us—we are “the glory and garbage of the universe” (ch. 2). Though made in God’s image, a tragic rupture (56) has occurred in humanity’s relations with God and one another. Because of originating sin, human nature is now corrupted by originated sin (59), so that humans now have no peace, either with God, with each other, or within the cosmos. Cole defends God’s wrath against sin, but argues that it “is not an essential attribute of God,” but is simply how holiness expresses itself against sin (72). In addition, human life is characterized by interpersonal hostility and malevolent subjection to the dominion of Satan and his forces.

Christ’s atonement is the divine resolution of the human conflict, based in the love of the triune God and foreshadowed in God’s curse on the serpent, promises to Abraham, and establishment of the Mosaic covenant with Israel, along with its detailed sacrificial system. The Son of God entered within that framework to become the messianic Prince of Peace and the faithful Son (in contrast to Adam and Israel). The center of his faithfulness was the fulfillment of his Father’s commission to become the atoning sacrifice for the sin of the world. Pointing to the protoevangelium in Genesis 3:15, Cole begins his discussion of the atonement per se with its overcoming of Satan and the principalities, but skillfully shows how Christ’s victory was grounded in the satisfaction of “divine desires, longings, expectations and wants as well as realizing divine purposes and intentions” (132). Consequently, God’s righteous and holy love was satisfied through an expiatory and propitiatory sacrifice, which also established a (new) covenant of peace between God and his people. Christ’s resurrection was the vindication of the faithful Son.

That atonement resulted in a massive “peace dividend” for all who believe, that includes union with Christ, the forgiveness of sins, cleansing from sin, justification, adoption, reconciliation with God and one another, the disarming of the principalities, and the establishment of a new way of faithful living. This life of faith does not live by sight, is Christ-centered and other-centered, pursues holiness and fights against sin, is willing to suffer, resists the devil, makes peace, and witnesses to others. The main goal of the atonement project, according to Cole, is that humans glorify God by being transformed into “little Christs” (per C. S. Lewis). At the end of the book is a fine appendix that somewhat briefly critically analyzes, evaluates, and organizes the various “models of the atonement” around the penal substitutionary model, which Cole argues is central.

In addition to its main contribution as a biblical-theological framing of the systematic doctrine of the atonement, the book’s strengths include its broad array of citations and insights. He refers to classic and contemporary Christian theologians of various stripes, numerous biblical studies specialists, and a few surprising modern figures (like
Bertrand Russell). Solidly reformed, Cole is not afraid to criticize those with whom he disagrees, or to quote those in other locations theologically, when they say something he thinks has merit. Some interesting nuggets I picked up included his citations of Ellul’s reference to the Fall as the “primal rupture,” to underscore its relational cost; of Hiebert’s “law of the excluded middle” (183), the tendency of Westerners to ignore the powers and principalities in their theology; and of Newbigin’s contrast between “wheel” religions (Eastern “cycles” orientation) and “road” religions (the teleological, historical orientation of the Judeo-Christian faiths); as well as his own reference to the imago Dei as a “master concept” (55), and the distinction between God’s “three commissions”: the creation commission (the cultural mandate), the Great Commission, and the “moral commission” to love God and neighbor (218).

The weaknesses of the book were neither serious nor numerous. Perhaps most jarring was the use of the term “garbage” as a metaphor for sinful human beings. Though the general tenor of his assessment of fallen humanity is sound, the connotations of that particular word just seem unable to convey the remnants of created goodness that the corrupted imago Dei still retains.

Also, while I respect his desire to maintain the axiological priority of love over wrath in the nature of God, I question Cole’s rejection of wrath as an essential attribute of God (72). Would it not be better to say that the eternal God possesses essentially all of the emotions that he manifests in relation to sin in human history, even if they do not characterize his eternal Trinitarian relations? The author also exhibited in the footnotes a rather peculiar manner of chastising contemporaries with whom he is otherwise in fundamental agreement (e.g., after mentioning Bruce Ware’s suggestion that the Trinity is characterized by an asymmetry of mutual glorifying, he wrote, “I find this extremely problematical unless its speculative nature is duly acknowledged and the dogmatic weight Ware gives to it is moderated dramatically,” 227). He is free to disagree, of course, but such phrasing strikes me as odd.

Nonetheless, there is much profit in this book and it should be widely read.

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Anthony Chute, associate professor of church history at California Baptist University, has provided a valuable introduction to the life and thought of one of the most important leaders in the history of Baptists in America. Jesse Mercer (1769-1841) shaped Baptist life extensively in the nineteenth century by leading Baptist churches in their support of missions, education, and publishing. His fellow Baptists recognized his wise and faithful leadership by electing him the president of the Georgia Baptist Convention from 1822 to 1840, and president of the denomination’s general mission board from 1830 to 1841. He led Georgia Baptists to establish Mercer University. He gained a high reputation for his scriptural wisdom in theology and ecclesiology. This is Chute’s second book on Mercer.

Chute provides an interesting account of Mercer’s life and labors in the first portion of book. Mercer pastured three or four churches simultaneously—they met one Sunday per month, as did most Baptist churches at that time. He rose to prominence in the denomination by his growing reputation for scriptural wisdom and insight in theology, ecclesiology, and by his remarkable leadership. Chute describes well Mercer’s ability in practical church leadership, especially regarding church discipline, his publishing efforts, including a popular hymnbook and the weekly Christian
Index, his involvement in politics, his dedication to evangelism and missions, his commitment to education, and his personal change of habits regarding the consumption of alcohol.

Chute explains at some length Mercer’s efforts to unite Baptists in the support of missionary organization while at the same time seeking to prevent a rupture in the denomination. He largely succeeded in the first—he led Georgia Baptists to establish and support several missionary organizations, above all, the Georgia Baptist Convention—but he failed in the second, as a minority of churches withdrew fellowship from the “missionary” Baptists and formed a Primitive Baptist group.

Chute also explains Mercer’s commitment to Calvinism, including his defense of the doctrine of particular redemption or limited atonement, when Georgia Baptist preacher Cyrus White published his arguments against it and in favor of a general atonement. Mercer’s Ten Letters on the atonement argued that the limited design of the atonement was scriptural and was fully consistent with the zealous and active proclamation of the gospel to all persons.

In the second portion of the book Chute publishes an interesting variety of selections from Mercer’s writings. The selections illustrate Mercer’s piety, pastoral counsel, missionary leadership, personal ethics, denominational statesmanship, congregational leadership, and theological understanding. Such writings provide insight into the depth and character of Mercer’s life that cannot be obtained by biography alone.

Chute’s labors are much appreciated. Mercer’s example of faithful pastoral labor and energetic denominational leadership deserve to be recalled in every generation until the Lord returns—not for Mercer’s sake, but for ours.

—Gregory A. Wills
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