“Incommensurable Qualities”?

Recently, it has become somewhat en vogue for evangelicals to engage in an increasing amount of self-deprecation. In First Things, the editor of the magazine, James Nuechterlein, reflected on the penchant that evangelicals seem to have for lament and self-criticism. Although Ralph Wood’s review of Mark Noll’s recent book on evangelicalism was specifically in view, Nuechterlein’s comments were aimed at evangelicals in general. According to Nuechterlein, Wood, Professor of English at Baylor University, bemoaned evangelicals’ lack of ability “to embrace the ecclesial virtues of other Christian bodies, especially those of the [Roman] Catholic Church.”

Nuechterlein, himself obviously sympathetic to much of Wood’s critique, nonetheless observed,

> The problem is that [Wood’s] prescriptions call for, in effect, a squaring of the theological and ecclesial circle. . . . But all systems of thought, religious or otherwise, are partial. They are also all package deals. Their distinctive strengths come together with distinctive weaknesses. Neither in theology or anywhere else can we maximize all good things at once.

Prof. Wood wants an evangelicalism that will be at once individual and communal, fully engaged with the culture, and yet distinct from it, authentically Protestant and authentically Catholic. He wants, in short, an evangelicalism that will no longer be distinctly evangelical—even as he wants a Billy Graham who would no longer be Billy Graham. We cannot blend incommensurable qualities.⁴

Nuechterlein’s observations hit the mark. And they stung. They revealed so much about the identity crisis within evangelicalism, and about the ways in which evangelicals are constantly looking over their collective shoulders, doubting themselves and their theological tradition. Now, at times, lament is certainly an appropriate theme, and clearly it can be done well. But such persistent self-critical navel-gazing discourages a new generation of young evangelicals about the resources of our own intellectual tradition, and leaves them especially susceptible to any other thoughtful alternative systems. And so in the last two decades evangelicals have witnessed a steady stream of defections from the camp to other groups within the broader Christian communion. In the mid 1980s, evangelicals lost Peter Gilchrist and a cadre of former Campus Crusade workers who sought the mysteries and compelling liturgy of Eastern Orthodoxy. Many evangelicals expressed sadness or befuddlement when they lost from their ranks, variously, filmmaker/author Franky Schaeffer (son of Francis!), writer Frederica Mathewes-Green, and journalist Terry Mattingly to Eastern Orthodoxy. Additionally, theologian Robert Webber informed his audience of the many Wheaton students who were leaving the thoroughfare of evangelicalism to merge onto the Canterbury trail.³ And then, of course, there are the string of converts to Roman Catholicism, beginning, most notably of
course, with Richard John Neuhaus, who was subsequently followed by Thomas Howard, Michael P. Shea, Scott Hahn, J. Budziszewski, and many others.

This is not to say that there are not severe theological crises within the evangelical communion. Both open theism and a late-to-the-cultural-dance but unabashed embrace of postmodernism have recently enthused certain self-proclaimed evangelicals, thus sobering even the most upbeat boosters of the cause. The lack of resolve in other quarters to respond clearly and convictionally to crises such as same-gender marriage show just how deep the problems go. A cottage industry of books now consumes itself with various kinds of screeds about the current state of affairs within evangelical churches on matters both theoretical and practical. Trenchant critique certainly has a place in intra-ecclesial apologetics. But the various dirges may be offering, however unwittingly, a better critique of Protestantism than even the New Oxford Review could mount.

Especially in this environment, evangelicals must remind themselves of the glorious advances which were once secured as a result of the Reformation and its heirs. Our shortcomings are often the result of an abandonment of the presuppositions which once made evangelicalism great. As Os Guinness accurately observed,

> At the heart of the Reformation was an insistence on the utter dependability of God and an unrelenting protest against any absolutizing of the created, the relative, and the purely human. . . . Protestant and evangelical are two faces of the same truth. Protestant is the critical stance of evangelicalism, just as evangelical is the positive content of Protestantism.4

Unfortunately, as Guinness concludes, “Yet the Protestant principle is weak in American evangelicalism today.”5 The church certainly needs reform. The very name “evangelical” is derived from the work of the Protestant Reformers; for it was they who challenged the medieval abuses of the church, both theological and practical, by urging a return to the word of God alone.

**The Unwitting Reformation?**

In addition to the more overt kinds of self-deprecation, another kind of internece poor-mouthing persists among evangelicals. This kind comes from their own evangelical cultural analysts who, in their attempt to explain what has gone wrong with the modern world, lay much blame (albeit without much fanfare) at the doorstep of Renaissance humanism in general, and the Protestant Reformation in particular. Here is how the story generally gets told. During the High Middle Ages, scholastic theology had achieved a glorious philosophical and cultural hegemony which served as the glue which held Christendom together. At the center of this hegemony lay the philosophy of Aristotle, as interpreted by St. Thomas, with its inherently teleological structure. This teleology gave the universe, and particularly human beings, a sense of place and interpretive scheme for understanding the world, a great chain of being into which everything fit. This epistemology was known as the Via Antiqua (i.e., old path; read also here scholasticism and Aristotelian reason) and under its pedagogical gaze Christendom flourished and all was right with the world. With trusty guides such as Aristotle and St. Thomas, one could glory in a culture produced by and for the Church.
But one day, a philosophical disruption ruined Christendom’s cultural paradise when the scholastic theologian William of Occam (cue the villain music here) began questioning the medieval philosophical synthesis, and suggested a different course subsequently dubbed the Via Moderna or nominalism. Occam dissented from Thomism and basically claimed that St. Thomas had actually gotten Aristotle wrong. One need not, Occam allowed, divine some inherent teleological structure to the physical world in order to understand it. Rather, one could go to the particular things themselves and learn how that thing, in fact, worked. As a result, early modern thinkers like Francis Bacon, influenced by Occam, eventually said that if you wanted to understand what made a frog tick, you need not figure out where the frog fit in a universal scale of perfection—where the frog fit in the great chain of being—and think one’s work was done. No, to understand the frog and its systems, you dissect the frog. The world is made up of particulars, Occam observed, and particulars alone. Contrary to St. Thomas’s interpretation, Occam claimed that he rightly understood Aristotle. Modern commentators largely agree on this point. As Lutheran scholar Bernard Lohse concludes, “Occam has often been charged with epistemological skepticism. But he merely applied the Aristotelian scientific principle more critically than other thinkers.” Furthermore, Occam taught, if you want to understand the universe, you need not guess at some mysterious teleology behind things that is somehow simply given and necessary. Rather, things are the way they are simply because God has willed them to be that way, a truth which has come to be known as voluntarism. Due to this truth, the universe can be studied and understood on its own merits without constantly giving reference to all of the complexities of Aristotelian physics. Hence, Occam developed his law of parsimony, most commonly referred to as the “razor,” which states that entities should not be multiplied beyond necessity. Occam’s razor effectively made modern scientific inquiry as we know it possible, and precipitated huge advances in our understanding of the natural world. Jacques Barzun gives but one example of Occam’s razor applied. He states:

William of Occam’s principle of economy, that the best explanation is the one that calls for the least number of assumptions, was an argument against Ptolemy, in addition to the awkward facts. It impelled Copernicus to revise—not destroy—the system, by supposing the sun to be the center instead of the Earth. He was thereby able to reduce the epicycles from 84 to 30.

Occam’s thought effectively caused a split within medieval scholarship and precipitated a new school of philosophy that emphasized the freedom of the will of God in creation more than its predecessors. In other words, the nominalists/voluntarists said that the universe exists in its present form simply because God wills it to be that way, in accordance with God’s own nature. And it was this idea that attracted a young Augustinian monk named Martin Luther, and, perhaps in a more indirect way, a French humanist named John Calvin. How do we know what the world is all about? We must go to the will of God. And how do we know the will of God? By reading Aristotle? The Church Fathers? St. Thomas? To the contrary, God reveals his will to those whom he wills, and he does this most pre-eminently in his Word. Only by the grace
of God do we understand the full truth about ourselves and about the world. In the spirit of Paul’s words to the Corinthians, the Christian worldview seems like foolishness to the worldly wise and nonsense to religionists (1 Cor 1:18-25). As Luther declaimed in his own inimitable way at the Heidelberg Disputation, “one cannot philosophize well unless he is a fool, that is, a Christian.” And, “He who wishes to philosophize by using Aristotle without danger to his soul must first become thoroughly foolish in Christ.”

For his part, Calvin headed off the notion that a study of the particulars could be an end in and of themselves. The creation should be studied in consonance with what is revealed in Scripture if we want to understand the world in which we live. For as Calvin commented, “However fitting it may be for man seriously to turn his eyes to contemplate God’s works, since he has been placed in this most glorious theater to be a spectator of them, it is fitting that he prick up his ears to the Word, the better to profit.” Calvin also elsewhere depreciated the notion that Christianity could make sense apart from a central epistemological axiom rooted in divine revelation. In the Institutes of the Christian Religion, the Genevan Reformer wrote that the greatest insights of the philosophers cannot begin to approach the epistemological power of the Scriptures. He surmised that the “human writings” of the philosophers, “however artfully polished” are not capable of affecting us at all comparably. Read Demosthenes or Cicero; read Plato, Aristotle, and other of that tribe. They will, I admit, allure you, delight you, move you, enrapture you in wonderful measure. But betake yourself from them to this sacred reading. Then, in spite of yourself, so deeply will it affect you, so penetrate your heart, so fix itself in your very marrow, that, compared with its deep impression, such vigor as the orators and philosophers have will nearly vanish. Consequently, it is easy to see that the Sacred Scriptures, which so far surpass all gifts and graces of human endeavor, breathe something Divine.

Understandably, Thomists expressed displeasure at the new configuration of the post-Reformation philosophical landscape, and have been understandably complaining about it ever since. Unfortunately for Occam and the Reformers, their critics have only increased in number in recent years. In addition to his Thomist and Roman Catholic detractors, Occam and the residue of voluntarism in the Reformation draw the ire and fire of evangelical philosophers and those who have inspired recent evangelical philosophy. The list includes many admirable writers, including, variously, Richard Weaver, Arthur Holmes, A. J. Conyers, Craig Gay, William Dembski, Daryl Hart, and others. All of these point to Occam and the Reformers as the either witting or unwitting fountainhead for all of the subsequent problems of modern (and now postmodern) philosophy. As Richard Weaver breathlessly (and quite peremptorily) concludes in Ideas Have Consequences, “It was William of Occam who propounded the fateful doctrine of nominalism, which denies that universals have a real existence. . . . the practical result of nominalist philosophy is to banish the reality which is perceived by the intellect and to posit as reality that which is perceived by the senses.”

By focusing on the particulars apart from the traditional medieval synthesis, Occam, or so Weaver and others charge, precipitated an unhelpful empirical turn
in philosophy which gave birth to the subjective turn in philosophy with whose bitter fruit we are still dealing today. Furthermore, these authors intimate that because the Protestant Reformers broadly followed the Via Moderna (i.e., nominalism as opposed to the old medieval realism), they are unwitting accomplices in the demise of the West. If only the poor Reformers would have known better, perhaps we may have never gotten to Nietzsche. Prolific Thomist Ralph McInerny condemns the Reformation to the philosophical ash heap of history with the following observation: “It is not just a well-turned phrase that modern philosophy is the Reformation carried on by other means. Most of the major figures are Protestant or apostate or both. Luther’s attack on reason and his Manichean split between nature and grace poisoned the well of thinking.”

There is, no doubt, some explanatory power to this analysis. Clearly something went wrong in the modern period. Modernity gave way to modernism. To offer a biblical allusion, the Thomist, the Calvinist, and the Postmodernist can all lie down and let a little child lead them together on that issue. But to suggest that the blame and bane of modernism as we now know it is to be laid at the feet of an unwitting group of Reformers is nothing short of ludicrous. The notion lacks a serious amount of perspective and two-dimensionizes intellectual history. Although it lies beyond the purview of the present article to offer a thoroughgoing response to these charges, three observations serve to begin the task.

First, as far as Occam himself is concerned, Occam did not deny the existence of universals quite in the way he is often taken to have done. Rather, as far as this author can deduce, Occam feared positing universals in a way similar to Platonism, universal ideas that superseded even God. In other words, Occam wanted the biblical God who creates ex nihilo, not the demiurge-like craftsman Plato suggests in The Timaeus. This is why, for instance, Occam claimed to be the true heir of Aristotle. Occam did not deny the objectivity of truth, he simply cautioned against adding a fourth or possibly more transcendental(s) or hypostasis(es) than the one God in three persons. To do that would be to commit heresy. As philosopher Ernest A. Moody stated, “Insofar as Ockham is called a nominalist, his doctrine is not to be construed as a rejection of any ontological determination of meaning and truth, but rather as an extreme economy of ontological commitment in which abstract or intensional extralinguistic entities are systematically eliminated by logical analysis.”

A second reply to the charges against Occam and the Reformation listed above includes the fact that Luther and Calvin were hardly faithful or slavish followers of nominalism as it developed throughout the remainder of the scholastic period. Luther’s Disputation Against Scholastic Theology, for example, is replete with references to his significant and sizeable disagreements with Occam and Gabriel Biel, ostensibly Occam’s most famous disciple. Specifically, Luther and Calvin chafed at the Pelagianism of the writings of the Scholastics in general and Occam in particular. Still, the Reformers certainly appreciated Occam’s work insofar as it emphasized the sovereignty of God over his creation. Stated differently, the Reformers focused on the concept of “voluntarism” (i.e., the creative power of God’s will) as an appropriate critique of
the medieval synthesis over and against “nominalism,” a philosophy that certainly did take an unexpected, modern turn. The truth of voluntarism points humanity to our absolute dependence upon divine revelation for true understanding about both God and the created order. The world as we know it is so because God, who never changes, declares it to be so. In his brilliant introduction to Luther’s Bondage of the Will, J. I. Packer beautifully sums up the ethos of the epistemology of the Reformation. Packer writes,

[Luther’s] unflagging polemic against the abuse of reason has often been construed as an assault on the very idea of rational coherence in theology, whereas in fact it is aimed only at the ideal of rational autonomy and self sufficiency in theology—the ideal of philosophers and scholastic theologians, to find out and know God by the use of their own unaided reason. It was in her capacity as the prompter and agent of natural theology that “Mistress Reason” was in Luther’s eyes, the Devil’s whore; for natural theology is, he held, blasphemous in principle, and bankrupt in practice. It is blasphemous in principle, because it seeks to snatch from God a knowledge of Himself which is not his gift, but man’s achievement—a triumph of human brain power; thus it would feed man’s pride, and exalt him above his Creator, as one who could know God at pleasure, whether or not God willed to be known by him. Thus natural theology appears as one more attempt on man’s part to implement the programme which he espoused in his original sin—to deny his creaturehood, and deify himself, and deal with God henceforth on an independent footing. But natural theology is bankrupt in practice, for it never brings devotees of God; instead it leaves them stranded in a quaking morass of insubstantial speculation. Natural theology leads men away from the Divine Christ, and from Scripture, the cradle in which he lies, and from the theologia crucis, the gospel doctrine which Christ sets forth. But it is only through Christ that God wills to be known and gives saving knowledge of himself.17

A third point in response to the criticism of the Reformation as the fulcrum upon which modernism pivoted is that Renaissance humanism and late medieval scholasticism contributed as much, if not more, to the rise of modernity as did the Reformation, and it did so largely under the auspices of Rome’s blessing and supervision. History is not so easily compartmentalized. The results of the collective efforts of humanism, the Reformation, and the Counter-Reformation helped to give rise to modern science as we know it today. The change was inevitable. Fourteenth- and fifteenth-century intellects realized increasingly that certain crucial elements of Aristotelianism could not be rehabilitated. Craig Gay of Regent College, at least a partial supporter of “the Reformation opened up a modernistic Pandora’s box” theory, nonetheless qualifies his discussion of the matter with the following candid observation:

It is important to stress . . . that, quite apart from the actual impossibility of turning the clock back, the attempt to repristinate the medieval social order would not be a very good idea . . . In the first place Aristotelian science is simply not believable any more. Even more significantly, attempting to revitalize Aristotelian teleology by way of Aquinas would not really solve the problem of human individuality and creativity. Whatever the Aristotelian “god” is, it is not personal, and the Aristotelian system does not permit any real space for human freedom and creativity. Indeed, even modern scientific nominalism allows more latitude for personal agency than medieval (Aristotelian) science did.18
Carl F. H. Henry: Heir of Reformation Epistemology

James Nuechterlein’s query toward evangelicals concerning whether we can see our way to remain authentically evangelical in our theological method can be answered with an emphatic “yes.” But to do this, one must begin with the epistemology of the Reformers and their dogged, untiring insistence that human beings rely, as Luther once put it, “upon the poor tokens of the Word of God alone.” But evangelicals seem to have lost their way, both philosophically and theologically, since the Reformation. Furthermore, the Reformers never faced the skepticism of modernity as do their successors in the twenty-first century. To whom can one turn for guidance? Although many worthies might be offered, as the title of this article indicates, evangelicals should turn once more to the model set forth by Carl F. H. Henry, a man who inherited the epistemology of the Reformers, and faithfully applied it to the challenges of modernity.

Henry considered the respective trajectories of fundamentalism, liberal theology, and neo-Thomism, and unstintingly found them wanting in the light of a Reformed theological perspective historically, but also lacking theologically in the gaze of a distinctly Hebrew-Christian worldview. To Henry’s level of vision and engagement we would do well to return again, specifically taking into account his full corpus of written work. As Paul House so eloquently reminds his audience in another article in this journal, Henry’s early work especially is impressive in its scope and consideration of the issues. If one has not done so, the author encourages the reading of such early Henry volumes as The Uneasy Conscience of Modern Fundamentalism, Remaking the Modern Mind, The Protestant Dilemma, and The Drift of Western Thought, which engage then contemporary scholarship with an ability that calls to the reader’s attention why the early neo-evangelicals gained the attention and respect of the broader culture in general and the religious academy as well.

Henry espoused a Reformation-inspired voluntarism in the best sense of the term. He stressed the absolute dependence of human knowledge upon divine disclosure, whether natural or particular. In other words, according to Henry, we know what we know, because God wills both the possibility and the content of that knowledge. Henry came to these views early on in his theological career, and never wavered. Defining “the Christian Revelation-Claim,” Henry wrote,

In a sense, all knowledge may be viewed as revelational, since meaning is not imposed upon things by the human knower alone, but rather is made possible because mankind and the universe are the work of a rational Deity, who fashioned an intelligible creation. Human knowledge is not a source of knowledge to be contrasted with revelation, but is a means of comprehending revelation. . . . Thus God, by his immanence, sustains the human knower, even in his moral and cognitive revolt, and without that divine preservation, ironically enough, man could not even rebel against God, for he would not exist. Augustine, early in the Christian centuries, detected what was implied in this conviction that human reason is not the creator of its own object; neither the external world of sensation nor the internal world of ideas is rooted in subjectivistic factors alone.19

Thus, God circumscribes and determines what can be known. Nonetheless, the world remains knowable because
God himself is an intelligent Deity. Contrary to the trajectory of rationalism, no autonomous standard for reason can be offered since reason itself loses meaning apart from the divine character. Since the Divine discloses himself as a person, revelation is personal in nature and can therefore speak to all of humanity. Consequently, revelation both coheres and corresponds to reality because God is one. It is not a truism to say, therefore, that divine revelation is communication that we can trust. Thus, as Henry declares, “Only the fact that the one sovereign God, the Creator and Lord of all, stands at the center of divine disclosure, guarantees a unified divine revelation.”

Every condition of knowledge (i.e., justified true belief), therefore, stems from an allowance of either common or particular grace to the end that we live in the world God has actually created and glorify the agent of said creation, even Jesus Christ. In an address before an emerging evangelical audience at Soong Sil University in Seoul, South Korea, in 1987, Henry summarized his views thus:

The Christian ontological axiom is the living, self-revealed God. The Christian epistemological axiom is the intelligible divine revelation. All the essential doctrines of the Christian world-life view flow from these axioms: creation, sin, and the fall; redemption, by promise and fulfillment; the incarnation, substitutionary death and resurrection of the Logos; the church as the new society; the approaching divine consummation of history; the eschatological verities.

Certainly the most programmatic exposition of Henry’s Reformation-inspired epistemology comes from the panoramic God, Revelation and Authority, Henry’s six-volume magnum opus which is often alluded to, but seldom read with patience. The fifteen theses spell out in brief what Henry delivers in detail throughout volumes two and three of God, Revelation and Authority. In thesis five in particular, Henry happily shows his voluntaristic colors:

5. Not only the occurrence of divine revelation, but also its very nature, content, and variety are exclusively of God’s determination.

God determines not only the if and why of divine disclosure, but also the when, where, what, how, and who. If there is to be a general revelation—a revelation universally given in nature, in history, and in the reason and conscience of every man—then that is God’s decision. If there is to be a special or particular revelation, that, too, is God’s decision and his alone. Only because God so wills it is there a cosmic-anthropological revelation. It is solely because of divine determination, Paul reminds us, that “that which may be known of God is manifest . . . for God hath shewed it . . . For the invisible things of him from the creation of the world are clearly seen, being understood by the things that are made, even his eternal power and Godhead. (Rom. 1:19-20, KJV) It is solely by God’s own determination that he reveals himself universally in the history of the nations and in the ordinary course of human events. He is nowhere without a witness (Acts 14:17) and is everywhere active either in grace or judgment.

With these words, Henry modeled a flowering of the Augustinian/Reformation perspective with a clarity unmatched in modern evangelical theology. What we know, Henry argued, we know because God wants us to know it. In this sense, then, Henry defies the sort of foundationalist label with which some have recently attempted to place upon him, a trend which began with Hans Frei’s response to Henry’s critique of narrative theology.
Unfortunately for the Henry legacy, the impression stuck and has been repeated by other postliberal writers such as George Hunsinger. Certainly, evangelical neo-Thomists such as Norman Geisler and R. C. Sproul might be surprised, to say the least, that Henry is somehow a co-belligerent with them in the realm of foundationalist apologetics and epistemology. For Henry, there was no neutral, antiseptic path to knowledge. Knowledge, properly defined in the way Henry defined it, is permitted, made accessible, and circumscribed by God himself.

In Kuyperian fashion, Henry averred that all knowledge owes its origin to the God who speaks and shows. Henry’s doctrine of creation is not, therefore, deficient on the grounds that it does not appropriate natural theology. On the contrary, Henry distinguished between general revelation and natural theology. Henry gladly affirmed the fact that God speaks in and through creation, but he rightly reminded his readers that general revelation remains precisely that—revelation. And yet for this very reason, Christians have a genuine and meaningful point of contact with the nonbelieving world simply because we all benefit, whether witting or unwitting, from God’s self-disclosure whether in creation, or most preeminently in his written word. If anything, this principle explains simply Henry’s longstanding gripe with the epistemology of Karl Barth. When Barth argued that the imago dei was obliterated in the Fall, Henry repeatedly retorted that Barth summarily closed down the conduit through which God speaks to human beings, whether regenerate or not. Recent attempts to rehabilitate Barth’s legacy on this point in particular and on revelation in general have not yet explained to anyone still appreciative of Henry’s withering critique of neo-orthodoxy how Barth’s acceptance of Kant’s radical phenomenal-noumenal distinction can produce a worldview which simultaneously engages and yet challenges the prevailing secular culture. In sum, as British evangelical theologian Peter Hicks concurs,

Henry’s central thesis is that God reveals and speaks. There is no reason why we should limit God to one form of revelation (through either a person or a book, through either encounter or concept). God reveals and speaks in a number of ways, in his creation, in general revelation, and supremely in Christ, the incarnate Word. But, additionally and foundationally, he is able to formulate and communicate truth in an epistemic word, in which he articulates truth verbally through “intelligible disclosure”; and this, in sovereign grace, he has chosen to do.

Recently, in a spate of books on the future of evangelical theology, an array of authors have criticized Henry’s emphasis and insistence upon propositional revelation in verbal-conceptual form. Although a thorough consideration of the relative merits of Henry’s contribution in that area lie beyond the purview of this essay, a passing word might note that some of the treatments of Henry’s work border on caricature. In Evangelical Futures, for example, Alister McGrath condemns Henry’s understanding of revelation to be “purely propositional” and slavish to Enlightenment rationalism. While Henry certainly took the position that thought is not possible without words, McGrath’s statement overlooks Henry’s own words and clear position that “in both general and special revelation—in nature and in history, in the mind and conscience of man, in written Scriptures, and in Jesus
of Nazareth, God has disclosed himself.”

Such sentiments seem, at least in the estimation of this author, perfectly consistent with McGrath’s own recent emphasis on the history of redemption and the story of Jesus Christ.

When considering Henry’s contribution, the danger for evangelicals is this: In the rush to dismiss the particular subtleties of Henry’s understanding of revelation as the epistemological engine of his theology, something important about Henry’s disposition toward theology is lost in the process—something which is distinctly Protestant. And that distinctive includes no less than the following: God and God alone is the source and dispenser of all wisdom and knowledge, and God himself determines the bounds and limits of all true knowledge. In some ways, one might say that Henry poses the following fundamental questions to evangelicals today: Is the truth the truth because God wills it to be the case? Is God a Deity who speaks in intelligible sentences and paragraphs? If the answer to those two questions is affirmative, then no other church tradition offers a better theological method than Protestant Evangelicalism—a movement that at its origin radically committed itself to theological conclusions explicated in the Word of God alone.

Conclusion

As recently as 1995, Carl Henry was still holding forth articulately for a Reformation worldview in the pages of First Things in his straightforward article, “Natural Law and a Nihilistic Culture.” Essentially, Henry dropped a plumb line before his readers in a refreshingly direct way. Choose ye this day, he seemed to say, which epistemology you will serve: natural law or divine revelation. For his part, Henry cast his lot with the Reformation.

The greatest appeal of natural law theory lies in the claim that it mirrors universally shared norms and moral principles that lift humanity above modern subjectivism and relativism. Yet the Reformers in principle questioned the epistemic viability of natural law theory, whether stated in pre-Christian Greco-Roman terms or on premises pursued by Thomas Aquinas. The Reformers did have a doctrine of transcendent and universal morality, but it is based upon different foundations. Upon the resolution of this conflict may well turn the moral fortunes of the Western world, and beyond that, ultimately, the planet.

Given First Things’ primary audience, Henry’s argument hardly won the award for “most beloved article of the year.” Nevertheless, until his death in late 2003, Henry continued to serve on the Editorial Advisory Board of the journal. One wonders whether Henry, now a titanic figure whose work should be remembered and revisited, was the last authentic Protestant Richard John Neuhaus and James Nuechterlein could find.

ENDNOTES

2 Ibid., 9.
5 Ibid.
6 Bernard Lohse, Martin Luther’s Theology (Minneapolis: Fortress, 1999), 18.

§Martin Luther, _Luther’s Basic Theological Writings_, ed. Timothy F. Lull (Minneapolis: Fortress, 1989), 32.


Ibid., 1.8.1.


Ralph McInerny, _A Student’s Guide to Philosophy_ (Wilmington, DE: ISI Books, 1999), 25.

Plato’s cosmology and theology are contained in his dialogue, _Timaeus_, available in _The Dialogues of Plato_ (vol. 2; trans. B. Jowett; New York: Random House, 1937), 3-70.

Ernest A. Moody, “William of Ockham,” in _The Encyclopedia of Philosophy_, vol. 8, ed. Paul Edwards (New York: The Macmillan Company and The Free Press, 1967; reprint, 1972), 307 (emphasis mine). The notion of eternal, uncreated metaphysical entities that exist alongside God himself is an irreducibly Aristotelian notion that has worried philosophers such as Herman Dooyeweerd that idolatries are created in metaphysical schemes of the Thomistic type.

For example, thesis 56 reads, “It is not true that God can accept man without his justifying grace. This is in opposition to Ockham.” Cf. Luther, _Luther’s Basic Theological Writings_, 17.


Craig Gay, _The Way of the Modern World_ (Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 1998) 278-279. The context for Gay’s comments here relate to a theology of personhood. His consideration of the _imago dei_ includes an ontological definition of person which this author found compelling.

Carl F. H. Henry, _The Drift of Western Thought_ (Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 1951), 104.


Henry, _God, Revelation and Authority_, 2-9-10.


For example, see Bruce L. McCormack, “The Being of Holy Scripture is in Becoming: Karl Barth in Conversation with American Evangelical Criticism,” in _Evangelicals and Scripture: Tradition, Authority, and Hermeneutics_, ed. Dennis L. Okholm, Vincent Bacote, and Laura C. Miguélez (Downers Grove: InterVarsity, 2004), 55-75. To a lesser extent, a similar approach is undertaken by Stanley Hauerwas in _With the Grain of the Universe_ (Grand Rapids: Brazos, 2001).

Peter Hicks, _Evangelicals and Truth_ (Leicester: Apollos, 1998), 89-90.


Henry, _God, Revelation and Authority_, 2:10.