Persons Beyond *Roe v. Wade*: The Post-Human Age?

C. Ben Mitchell

“The importance of a proper understanding of the *imago Dei* can hardly be overstated. The answer given to the *imago* inquiry soon becomes determinative for the entire gamut of doctrinal affirmation. The ramifications are not only theological, but [for] every phase of the … cultural enterprise as a whole” (Carl F. H. Henry).¹

For the thirty years after *Roe v. Wade*, the debate over human fetal personhood has glowed with sometimes white-hot intensity. While *Roe* arguably focused on a woman’s right to privacy, everyone knew then, and certainly knows by now, that its fundamental question was the nature and moral status of unborn human lives. Post *Roe v. Wade*, the fundamental question facing the world in the twenty-first century remains the question, what does it mean to be human? What does it mean to be “one of us”? Is a human blastocyst one of us? Is a human zygote one of us? Is a human fetus one of us? Would a cloned human embryo be one of us?

The abortion debate resulted in a redefinition of human persons for the sake of personal autonomy. Ironically, the cost of one person’s autonomy was the future autonomy of an unborn baby. Today’s emerging biotechnology revolution challenges us to extend the redefinition of human nature; this time for the sake of technological prowess. Advances in genetic engineering, pre-implantation genetic diagnosis, cybernetics, robotics, and nanotechnology depend in large measure on our willingness as a culture to recast what it means to be human.

The currently regnant worldview, naturalistic materialism, has proved to be an insufficient paradigm for protecting human dignity. Biological membership in the species *homo sapiens*, arguably a necessary condition for human personhood, is neither a philosophically satisfying definition of person nor a sufficient ground for a biblical-theological anthropology.² Not only so, but xenotransplantation and trans-species genetic engineering may produce chimeras—living members of our species who share either discreet organs from another species or DNA from another species. Would an animal-human chimera be a member of our species and, therefore, on a purely naturalistic view, a human person? Would the answer to that question depend on which, or how many, non-human organs were transplanted, or, on what percentage of human DNA was retained?

An alternative might be to define what it means to be human as the possession of human consciousness. Thus, what it means to be human would depend on what is going on “in the head.” Defining human personhood in terms of human consciousness seems a less than satisfactory account of our humanness because, on the one hand, one may continue as a member of our species and be mentally compromised (viz., as a result of brain injury, Alzheimer’s disease, or persistent vegetative state) and on the other hand, some researchers are suggesting that human consciousness

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might one day be possessed by highly sophisticated computer consciousness (e.g., artificial intelligence). Does human personhood persist only in the first instance, only in the second instance, in both instances, or in neither instance? Under some forms of Cartesianism, the human person persists quite apart from embodiment. Yet, Cartesian dualism has been repudiated widely as an unsatisfying philosophical account of our humanity, especially since our identity seems tied so intractably to our bodies.

**The Death of Humanity**

Will the present notion(s) of humanity persevere throughout the century? Is there a truly human future? Cambridge sociologist Margaret Archer has observed that "there has been a full frontal assault upon [the idea of human] agency itself, in which Modernity’s ‘Death of God’ has now been matched by Postmodernism’s ‘Death of Humanity.’"3 That is to say, just as modernity was the age of philosophical deicide, so postmodernity may be the age of philosophical homicide. The death of humanity as we know it will mean a radically different future.

Only a biblical-theological account of human nature and of our common humanity can resurrect and preserve human dignity against the acids of modernity and the demolition project of postmodernity, especially in its techno-utopian version, where human nature needs the improvisations of techno-socio-biological engineering in order to conform to the vision of a more fully evolved humanity.

What might this evolution look like? Kevin Warwick of the University of Reading believes “The human race as we know it is very likely in its endgame."4 According to researchers such as MIT’s Rodney Brooks, through his own work, *homo sapiens* are evolving into a more perfect species *robo sapiens*.5 Robert Wright argues that this evolution may mean that Constitutional rights may have to be “recalibrated.” Says Wright,

> For all I know, it’s true that in 20 or 30 years these nanobots, by malicious design or by accident, will run so rampant that we’ll be fondly reminiscing about the days of termites. On the other hand, this is basically the same problem that is posed by self-replicating biological agents (i.e., viruses). In both cases we’re faced with microscopic things that can be inconspicuously made and transported and, once unleashed, whether intentionally or accidentally, can keep on truckin’.6

Nevertheless, argues Warwick, machines will not wipe out the human race. Instead, by grafting human consciousness into extraordinarily fast, durable, and intelligent machines, we will become them. "*homo sapiens* will vanish as a biological species, replacing itself with a new race of cyborgs."7 Finally, Steven Grand, developer of the enormously popular computer game “Creatures” maintains that, like Frankenstein, he may be able “to make thinking, caring, feeling beings and that, when these beings exist, it may be reasonable to ascribe to them a soul."8

On whose account of human beings should we rely? Following Reinhold Niebuhr, distinguished professor of systematic theology at Talbot School of Theology Robert Saucy has argued that nontheological anthropologies fall short of an adequate account of humanity for three reasons. “The first,” he says, “is the transcendent nature of the human person.”9 However one understands our nature, human beings are more than the sum of their biological parts. There is something
about being human that is irreducible to mere biology. A second problem for nontheological accounts of human nature is “the problem of human virtue.” Saucy asks, “Is human nature essentially good or bad? The evils of history are difficult to explain if mankind is fundamentally good. If on the other hand our nature is basically evil, it is difficult to explain how we are able from an evil nature to pronounce this devastating judgment on ourselves.”

Finally, personality is difficult to account for in a purely nontheological anthropology. “Nature has place for variety, not true individuality,” according to Saucy. Admittedly, the latter two reasons are more problematic for the naturalist than the first, but Saucy’s points are well taken.

A Biblical Account of Humanity as Imagers of God

When combined, the Jewish and Christian traditions provide a robust theological anthropology that answers these questions. A comprehensive theological anthropology must address not only the questions surfaced by the abortion debate, but the contemporary challenges of the biotechnological revolution as well. Moreover, any comprehensive Judeo-Christian anthropology must draw into its orbit not only the authoritative teaching of the Old and New Testaments but also the early theologizing of the church with respect to the divine and human person, since at the heart of our theology is the affirmation that God is “person.” Below, I attempt to trace the contours of a biblical-theological anthropology.

The first Hebrew text referring to humankind is Genesis 1:26-28:

Then God said, “Let us make humankind in our image, according to our likeness; and let them have dominion over the fish of the sea, and over the birds of the air; and over the cattle, and over all the wild animals of the earth, and over every creeping thing that creeps upon the earth.” So God created humankind in his image, in the image of God he created them; male and female he created them. God blessed them, and God said to them, “Be fruitful and multiply, and fill the earth and subdue it; and have dominion over the fish of the sea and over the birds of the air and over every living thing that moves upon the earth.” (NRSV)

The testimony of scripture is that humankind is the object of the Trinitarian God’s special creative activity. In Genesis 1, ṭādām is used generically for “humankind.” The word is versatile in that it may refer to humankind, to an individual person (e.g., Gen 2:5, 7), or function as a proper name (e.g., Gen 5:1). Furthermore, humankind alone is made in God’s “image” (tselem) and “likeness” (dēmūt).

Tselem is also used in Genesis 9:6 and, in its context, highlights the distinction between humans and animals. While God gives to Noah and his progeny permission to kill animals for food, he declares: “Whoever sheds the blood of a human, by a human shall that person’s blood be shed; for in his own image God made humankind.” More importantly, this passage demonstrates palpably that God requires justice in relations between human beings. Justice is grounded not only in the character of God, but in the character of his human creatures as his imagers.

As James Leo Garrett correctly points out, there are no other direct statements about the image of God in humankind in the rest of the Old Testament. Yet the Apocrypha contains two interesting but non-canonical texts: “For God created man to be immortal, and made him to be an image of his own eternity” (Wisdom of
Solomon 2:23 AV) and “He [the Lord] endued them with strength by themselves, and made them according to his image, and put the fear of man upon all flesh, and gave him dominion over the beasts and fowls” (Ecclesiasticus 17:3-4 AV).

In the New Testament, two nouns are used for the image of God in humankind. Eikōn (“image”) is used in four Pauline letters with respect to the image of God in humankind: 1 Corinthians 11:7; 16 2 Corinthians 3:18; Romans 8:29; and Colossians 3:9-10. The other noun, homoioiōsis (“likeness”), is found only in James 3:9.

Curiously, nowhere do the scriptures tell us precisely in what the image of God consists. Nevertheless, theologians and biblical commentators are not shy about inferring content to the image of God. Garrett observes, for instance, that theological interpretations of the imago Dei have included (1) humankind’s erect bodily form, (2) human dominion over nature, (3) human reason, (4) human prelapsarian righteousness, (5) human capacities, (6) juxtaposition between man and woman, (7) responsible creaturehood and moral conformity to God, and (8) some composite view. Sherlock notes that the image of God in humankind must involve “relationships with God, one another, and creation.”

Some scholars divide models for understanding the image of God in humankind into two: substantialism and relationalism. The substantialists typically identify that which makes us human as some immaterial aspect of our humanity. For example, many of the early fathers of the church, along with Augustine and St. Thomas, believed that human rationality was the locus of our humanness. This view was doubtless greatly influenced by Aristotle and was more indebted to Greek anthropology than distinctly Christian notions of human nature.

Relationalists include many in the Reformed tradition. Luther, Calvin, and Barth are notable examples. On this view, human beings are in a special relationship with God. Being in that relationship constitutes what it means to be human. The emphasis is placed on the social aspects of the Trinity as a paradigm for the relationality of the divine/human relationship. As Stanley Rudman points out, however, this view should be subject to several cautions. Most importantly, he says, “The doctrine of the Trinity is not part of a campaign to improve human relationships.” That is to say, our understanding of Trinitarian relationality should not be anthropomorphized and psychologized in order to explain our humanity because (1) the fundamental differences between God as Creator and human beings as created should not be blurred and (2) direct inferences between inter-Trinitarian life and human relationships are unwarranted because of the sui generis unity of the Godhead.

Another set of categories for philosophical-theological analysis are functionalism and ontologism. Functionalist definitions of human nature focus on functional capacities of human beings; i.e., on what human beings do or what functions they perform. Contemporary philosophical anthropology, for instance, often stipulates functional capacities as a way of defining personhood, human and non-human. Michael Tooley and Mary Ann Warren, whose work disproportionately influenced Roe and post-Roe notions of personhood, both emphasize functional capacities in their definitions of personhood. Ontological status emphasizes not what humans do.
but who we are—our ontology. One of the more promising efforts to understand the human beings as imagers of God is the project undertaken by John Zizioulas and Colin Gunton.

In his chapter, “On Being a Person: Towards an Ontology of Personhood,” Zizioulas begins with a query:

What does it mean that someone is rather than has a person? It is all too often assumed that people “have” personhood rather than “being” persons, precisely because ontology is not operative enough in our thinking. Personhood in this case becomes a quality added, as it were, to being: you first (logically speaking) are and then act or behave as a person. This assumption rules out a priori an ontology of personhood and is not taken into account here. Instead, we operate with the view that the assertion of personal identity, the reduction of the question “Who am I?” to the simple form of the “I am who I am”, i.e. the claim of absolute metaphysical identity independent of qualities borrowed from other “beings”, is an assertion implied in the very question of personal identity. Personhood, in other words, has the claim of absolute being, that is, a metaphysical claim is built in.26

Because Westerners are so conditioned to thinking of personhood as a value added rather than an ontological category, Zizioulas maintains that “drastic revisions of philosophical thinking” are required. Zizioulas spends several nearly unintelligible pages outlining the philosophical presuppositions that are required to make his view work. His conclusion is most illuminating. When asking the question “Who am I?” we usually receive a “what” rather than a “who” kind of answer. That is, traditional Greek categories point either to a Platonic ideal as the “what” humanity is or an Aristotelian substance as the “what” humanity is. He explains this point more clearly in the following paragraph.

Absolute uniqueness is indicated only through an affirmation arising freely from a relationship which constitutes by its unbrokenness the ontological ground of being for each person. In such a situation what matters ontologically is not “what” one is but the very fact that he or she is and not someone else. The tendency of the Greek Fathers to avoid giving any positive content to the hypostases of the Trinity, by insisting that the Father is simply not the Son or the Spirit, and the Son means simply not the Father etc., points to the true ontology of hypostasis: that someone simply is and is himself and not someone else, and this is sufficient to identify him as a being in the true sense. This point acquires tremendous existential significance when placed in the context of ordinary human life. In relationships of genuine love, which are the proper context for the “experience” of an ontology of personhood, one does not—and should not—identify the other with the help of their qualities (physical, social, moral, etc.), thus rejecting or accepting the other on that basis as a unique and irreplaceable partner in a relationship that matters ontologically (on which one’s own personal identity depends). The more one loves ontologically and truly personally, the less one identifies someone as unique and irreplaceable for one’s existence on the basis of such classifiable qualities. (In this case one rather loves in spite of the existence or absence of such qualities, just as God loves the sinner and recognizes him as a unique person). Here it is perhaps appropriate to introduce into our terminology the category of ethical apophatism, so badly needed in our culture, with which to indicate that, exactly as the Greek Fathers spoke of the divine persons, we cannot give a positive qualitative context to a hypostasis or person, for this would result in the loss of his absolute uniqueness and turn a person into a classifiable entity. Just as the Father, the Son and the Spirit are
not identifiable except simply through being who they are, in the same way a true ontology of personhood requires that the uniqueness of a person escape and transcend any qualitative *kataphasis*. This does not place personhood in the realm of a “misty” mystery any more than the absence of a positive content in our references to the persons of the Trinity does. Both in the case of God and of man the identity of a person is recognized and posited clearly and unequivocally, but this is so only in and through a *relationship*, and not through an objective ontology in which this identity would be *isolated*, pointed at and described in itself. Personal identity is totally lost if isolated, for its ontological condition is relationship.27

Like Zizioulas, Colin Gunton defines human personhood in ontological terms. Gunton begins his treatise on “Trinity, Ontology and Anthropology: Towards a Renewal of the Doctrine of the Imago Dei,” by noting that the ontological question—what kind of entity is the human being?—has been answered traditionally “in terms of duality: of matter and spirit, body and soul, or the like.”28 Cartesian dualism, despite Descartes’s own disavowals, amounts to a “ghost in the machine” where the mind drives the body as a captain pilots a ship. Augustine’s view of personhood, indebted as it was to neo-Platonism, does not fare much better, according to Gunton. There is little room in Augustine for the importance of embodiment. Where there is room for the body, his neo-Platonism pushed him to eschew the body.

“Where, then,” asks Gunton, “is the image of God to be found?”29 He answers, “To be made in the image of God is to be endowed with a particular kind of personal reality. To be a person is to be made in the image of God: that is the heart of the matter.”30

This reality is expressed in two orientations, the vertical and the horizontal. In the vertical relation, we are imagers of God insofar as we are in relationship with God. “To be in the image of God is to be created through the Son, who is the archetypal bearer of the image. To be in the image of God therefore means to be conformed to the person of Christ. The agent of this conformity is God the Holy Spirit, the creator of community. The image of God is then that being human which takes shape by virtue of the creating and redeeming agency of the triune God.”31 Through creation, and even more completely through redemption, human beings are imagers of God because they are created through God the Son. This is the vertical relation.

The horizontal relation explains the “shape that the image of God takes in time,” according to Gunton. “The human person is one who is created to find his or her being in relation, first with other like persons but second, as a function of the first, with the rest of creation. This means, first, that we are in the image of God when, like God but in dependence on his giving, we find our reality in what we give to and receive from others in human community.”32 Relationship along with what he calls “otherness” are primary categories in Gunton’s understanding of personhood. Otherness accounts for human individuality and freedom, relationship accounts for community. Says Gunton, “Only when both are given due stress is personhood fully enabled. Their co-presence will rule out both the kind of egalitarianism which is the denial of particularity, and leads to collectivism, and forms of individualism which in effect deny humanity to those unable to ‘stand on their own feet.’”33

Moreover, being in the image of God includes embodiment for Gunton, since relations are of whole persons not minds.
or bodies. The relations are reciprocal “so that from all those created in the image of God there is something to be received, and to them something to be given.”

Conclusion

What I have described as an ontological definition of human personhood has huge implications for a truly human future. If human beings are persons in virtue of their ontological status, then every member of our species is a person. Personhood does not, therefore, rest on human functions or capacities, but in a relational standing before the Creator. Every member of the species homo sapiens stands in that relationship ontologically. That is just what it means to be human. There are other kinds of persons to be sure, but human persons are imagers of the living God. That is just who they are.

Moreover, whatever kinds of beings non-humans may be, whether great apes, dolphins, or computers, they are not persons. That claim does not mean that animals, for instance, should not be protected or that they should be treated cruelly. But it does mean that whatever personhood status entails with respect to rights and responsibilities, applies specifically to humans and not necessarily to animals, contra Peter Singer.

Furthermore, this holistic view of human personhood I have been advancing answers questions which often arise as a result of our having imbibed culturally a very Greek view of humankind. For example, I am often asked the question: “Would a cloned human being have a soul?” My first temptation was to take the question as offered and try to respond. Instead, I now reframe the question. The question really is not “would a cloned human be a soul?” While I prefer not to talk about souls in the first place, when forced to do so, my anthropology leads me to say that souls are not something humans possess but something human beings are. We just are souls. From the moment our DNA lines up in the fertilized egg to form at least one genetically unique individual member of our species, we become souls. We remain souls for all eternity. So, I choose to speak not of the immortality of the soul as if a soul could be dissected from a human being, but the immortality of souls.

This is, in my view, a much more satisfying account of human nature and human personhood than the alternatives. Why? First, because it is consistent with biblical revelation. Nowhere is the imago Dei defined in any constituent parts in scripture. While there are certainly grounds for some inferential theology, I prefer to remain silent where scripture is silent; or, at least hold inferences more modestly than direct affirmations in scripture. Second, the anthropology I have outlined does not permit definition of personhood on the basis of functional capacities. No loss of function makes one less than human or less than a person. A living member of our species is a human person. After physical death personhood persists eternally. Unborn human embryos are persons who should at least not be unnecessarily harmed. We have a prima facie responsibility to protect human fetuses as persons. Alzheimer’s patients who have lost mental capacities or language skills are yet human persons who ought to be treated with respect. Patients in a persistent vegetative state are still persons who ought to be treated with similar respect.

Now, admittedly, my view does not answer all possible questions. For instance, how far should we go in altering the
human genetic blueprint? Many would affirm the warrant for treating or curing diseases by altering a single gene in an individual patient. But what about altering the germline or reproductive cells so that we essentially alter the biological human person and all his or her progeny? Would we eventually alter our humanity? Or, how many genes from other species may be inserted before a species is altered sufficiently to render it another species? Should we insert animal genes into the human genome for therapeutic purposes? Would doing so alter our humanity?

Similarly, how far should we go in modifying humans by adding microchips? Recent experiments using microchips to repair damaged retinas have shown promising results. Reading University’s Kevin Warwick has had a computer chip implanted in his arm and another in his wrist, making him the first human cyborg. Where are the limits in this brave new world?

Finally, in my view, these questions demand nothing less than our best reflection. We need to bring together multidisciplinary teams to consider the implications of these new technologies for a truly human future. Biblical scholars, theologians, philosophers, ethicists, historians, physicians, bench scientists, and others should be enlisted in collaborative research with respect to the emerging biotechnologies. Yet, so few evangelicals seem focused on these concerns. Instead of spending our time on internecine debates, would that we could focus our energies on preserving a truly human future. Only a robustly biblical anthropology will be able to withstand the challenges of the biotech age. Post-Roe, these will not be easy challenges to meet.

ENDNOTES


2Of course some ethicists would dispute the claim that membership in *homo sapiens* is a necessary condition for human personhood. Peter Singer famously argues that the claim that only humans may be persons is a form of “speciesism” in which human persons are inappropriately favored morally over non-human persons. See his volume *Animal Liberation* (New York: New York Times, 1975) for an early form of this argument. A robust critique of Singer is found in Gordon Preece, ed., *Rethinking Peter Singer* (Downers Grove, IL: InterVarsity Press, 2002). Moreover, I, myself, must reject that claim that only humans can be persons because personhood transcends the species. God is three persons and angelic beings are persons.

3Margaret S. Archer, *Being Human: The Problem of Agency* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2000) 1. Archer goes on to say, “so now it is our job to reclaim Humanity which is indeed at risk. At least, it is at risk in the Academy, where strident voices would dissolve the human being into discursive structures and humankind into a disembodied textualism” (2).


6Menzel and D’Aluisio, 30.

7Ibid., 31.


9 Robert L. Saucy, “Theology of Human

Ibid.

Ibid. Interestingly, evolutionary models are split on the question of whether humans are essentially good or essentially evil. Two competing studies of apes have contributed to this conversation. See Richard Wrangham and Dale Peterson, Demonic Males: Apes and the Origin of Human Violence (New York: Houghton Mifflin, 1996) versus Frans DeWaal, Good Natured: The Origins of Right and Wrong in Humans and Other Animals (Harvard: Harvard University Press, 1996).

12Saucy, 20.

13Echoes the Psalmist: “When I look at your heavens, the work of your fingers, the moon and the stars that you have established; what are human beings that you are mindful of them, mortals that you care for them? Yet you have made them a little lower than God, and crowned them with glory and honor. You have given them dominion over the works of your hands; you have put all things under their feet, all sheep and oxen, and also the beasts of the field, the birds of the air, and the fish of the sea, whatever passes along the paths of the seas” (Ps 8:3-8 NRSV). Also, the importance of the Trinitarian structure of God’s creative activity must not be overlooked. “Let us make humankind in our image, according to our likeness…” (Gen 1:26). In the creation account, God the Father spoke the universe into existence (Gen 1:3) and the Spirit brooded over the waters (Gen 1:2). The apostle John declares that “all things came into being” through the divine Logos, the Christ (John 1:1-5). Trinitarian theology will, likewise, play an important role in understanding our humanity.

14Paul K. Jewett observes interestingly that “The reason why the concept of the divine image has become so prominent in Christian anthropology is obvious: it confers on the human subject the highest possible distinction, leaving the world of animals far behind. Here is language used of no other creature, language that teaches us to understand ourselves in terms of God rather than in terms of the animals. While we share with them a common morality in the flesh, the Creator has endowed us with uncommon gifts in the spirit. Our mammalian ancestry, whatever it may be, is therefore a matter essentially indifferent so far as a Christian understanding of humankind is concerned. In other words, Christian anthropology is done from above, not from below.” Paul K. Jewett with Marguerite Shuster, Who We Are: Our Dignity as Human (Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 1996) 54.


16“For a man ought not to have his head veiled, since he is the image and reflection of God; but woman is the reflection of man” (NRSV).

17“And all of us, with unveiled faces, seeing the glory of the Lord as though reflected in a mirror, are being transformed into the same image from one degree of glory to another; for this comes from the Lord, the Spirit” (NRSV).

18“For those whom he foreknew he also predestined to be conformed to the image of his Son, in order that he might be the firstborn within a large family” (NRSV).

19“Do not lie to one another, seeing that you have stripped off the old self with its practices and have clothed yourselves with the new self, which is being renewed in knowledge according to the image of its creator” (NRSV).

20With it [the tongue] we bless the Lord and Father, and with it we curse those who are made in the likeness of God” (NRSV).

21Garrett, 394-403.


26John D. Zizioulas, “On Being a Person: Towards an Ontology of Personhood,” in Persons Divine and Human, ed. Christoph Schwobel and
27Zizioulas, 45-56.
29Ibid., 58.
30Ibid.
31Ibid., 58-59.
32Ibid., 59.
33Ibid.
34Ibid.
35Readers can follow Warwick’s “progress” at his website www.kevinwarwick.org.