Resurgence vs. McWorld?
American Culture and the Future of Baptist Conservatism
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Political scientist Benjamin Barber argues that the “culture wars” are a global phenomenon. In his view, the American evangelical biblical inerrantist and the Islamic suicide bomber both seek a “jihad” of theological certainty fueled by common anxiety about “McWorld,” a secularizing culture propelled by economic globalism. Thus, for Barber, orthodox religionists of all theological stripes react to the culture, wanting “to be born again so they can be born yesterday,” before the confusion and uncertainty of a frightening postmodern era. Could it be then that the controversy between conservatives and moderates in the Southern Baptist Convention (SBC) grows from similar angst within Baptist conservatives about a secularizing American culture?

Baylor University historian Barry Hankins tests such a thesis in his long-awaited monograph, Uneasy in Babylon: Southern Baptist Conservatives and American Culture. Hankins surveys the key players of the SBC controversy and concludes that the “conservative resurgence” was made possible by Baptist anxieties about the demise of the cultural hegemony of southern civil religion. Thus, for Hankins, the “culture war” activism of SBC conservatives is not the result of their theological convictions. Instead, the “culture war” informs and propels the theological convictions.

While there is much historical value to Hankins’s work, there is much more at stake here. Southern Baptist conservatives cannot ignore Hankins’s central thesis. Resurgent conservatives must ask whether Hankins and others are right to suggest that Adrian Rogers, in 1979, and Ronald Reagan, in 1980, were swept into office by the same forces of cultural reaction. Does the Southern Baptist Convention find its unifying consensus in a common understanding of an evangelically orthodox, distinctively Baptist, and confessionally robust theology? Or does the SBC cohere around its response to the social and political upheaval of the culture wars? The answers to such questions do not simply illuminate the root causes of the controversy, or of the truth or falsity of the moderate critique of the “political” motives of the SBC’s resurgent conservative wing. Instead, the answers to these questions carry far-reaching implications for the future of theology and cooperation among Southern Baptist conservatives.

Baptist Conservatism and the Culture Wars
Hankins does not deny that the SBC controversy was, at least at some level, theological. Hankins’s question, however, is “why did these leaders decide that theology was so important, and why did so many Southern Baptists agree that if the theology of the denomination were not narrowed and more clearly defined, the denomination would lose its ability to function as an instrument of God in the world?” For Hankins, this is because “con-
servative leaders came to believe that America, including the South, was in the throes of a cultural crisis that necessitated a warlike struggle against the forces that were hostile to evangelical faith.”4 Alarmed by an increasingly decadent culture, SBC conservatives moved “to end the harmony between the SBC and its host culture,” which meant capturing the denomination from the moderates “in order to create a new and very different posture diametrically opposed to the dominant institutions of American culture.”5

For Hankins, the culture war explains not only the resonance of the resurgence message among grassroots Baptists, it also explains why, despite longstanding moderate predictions to the contrary, the conservative coalition in the SBC survives beyond the inerrancy controversy. Where inerrancy once served as a cohesive center for conservatives, Hankins contends, now “the cultural program is the glue that is holding conservatives together.”6 In short, conservatives cannot split apart over theological issues—such as predestination or millennialism or church polity—because they are “too busy saving American, if not saving sinners.”7 Thus, for Hankins, Baptist conservatives and moderates might really disagree about inerrancy, religious liberty, gender roles, and church state matters, but all the disputes reveal a more fundamental underlying dispute about how Baptists should relate to the larger culture. The question was whether Southern Baptists would remain “the center of gravity” in southern culture, or whether they would join other evangelicals in their call to a culture war.”

There is much in Hankins’s work with which SBC conservatives will agree. Whatever one’s vantage point, the reader will not be bored by this treatment, thanks to Hankins’s obvious gift for historical narrative. He offers an often riveting portrayal of the controversy, often with intriguing insights on key “battles” along the way, mostly gleaned from interviews with moderate and conservative Baptist leaders. Significantly, Hankins usually avoids the temptation of partisan revisionism, a welcome departure from the “There Once Was a Camelot” genre of moderate Baptist analyses of the SBC controversy.9 While conservatives will disagree with much of what Hankins sees as at the root of their theological concerns, they will appreciate the fact that, unlike other moderate critics, he does concede that inerrancy was more than just a Machiavellian ploy to seize denominational power and execute the culture war.10 Hankins rightly notes that there is a real theological and philosophical gulf between the left and right wings of the Southern Baptist controversy that fit James Davison Hunter’s categories of “orthodox” and “progressive” combatants in the “culture wars” of contemporary American political discourse.11

Thus, for the most part, Southern Baptist conservatives will find serious reflection on the resurgence, not simple caricature, in Hankins’s treatment. Hankins seeks to understand the conservative vantage point on key issues such as abortion, sexuality, gender, race, and church/state relations. At the same time, he notes the theological complexity of the resurgent conservative leadership—a complexity rooted in different doctrinal and cultural influences and presuppositions. It is simply not accurate to say that conservatives—from Albert Mohler to Richard Land to Adrian Rogers—are all in lockstep with the Christian Coalition, or with each other, on every issue.12 Hankins further recognizes, contra much moderate Baptist rhetoric, that the
conservative SBC leadership does not consist of “independent fundamentalists” in the tradition of J. Frank Norris. Instead, Hankins rightly identifies much of the influence on SBC conservatives as coming from contemporary evangelical theologians such as Carl F. H. Henry and Francis Schaeffer.

Even so, there are several irredeemable flaws in Hankins’s understanding of Baptist conservatism and American culture. Hankins falters when he attempts to prove that biblical inerrancy is important for Baptist conservatives ultimately because of the culture war. Could it be that Southern Baptist engagement in the culture war is instead, at least in part, rooted in the recovery of a theologically-coherent worldview? It is true that, as Hankins notes, the resurgent conservatives within the SBC have sought to confront what they perceive to be a collapsing American culture. Hankins fails, however, to grasp fully that conservatives view these cultural skirmishes as at their root profoundly theological. As such, it is impossible to jump back and forth between biblical inerrancy and the “culture war” flashpoints of controversy mentioned in Hankins’s work. In order to understand the interplay between Baptist conservatism and American culture, one must see the controversy as a struggle to regain a distinctively Baptist confessionalism, rooted in the SBC’s founding era and informed by contemporary American evangelicalism. One must also understand the conservatives’ zeal to protect a distinctively Baptist conversionism, which they believed imperiled by cultural shifts. Finally, one must understand the conservatives’ vision of a distinctively Baptist cooperation, which they believed was destroyed by a theological shift in the SBC illustrated by the denomination’s accommodation to a declining culture. SBC conservatives were concerned, first of all, about epistemology, soteriology, and ecclesiology—concerns that were seen all the more clearly against the backdrop of the “culture wars.” In short, there is little chance that the kind of theological reformation called for by Baptist conservatives could be anything other than countercultural.

**Baptist Confessionalism and the Culture Wars**

Hankins finds the key to the SBC controversy in what may be his most profoundly true assertion in this volume, namely that “Southern Baptist conservatives seek to fashion an identity that is more confessional than tribal.” Nonetheless, Hankins errs by assuming that conservatives started the controversy with a bare commitment to biblical inerrancy, apart from a more comprehensive confessional commitment. This blind spot causes Hankins to argue that conservatives sharply moved from rhetoric about “inerrancy” while out of power to pursuing, when in power, “a certain hermeneutical approach to the Bible, meaning that under conservative rule, only those with very similar interpretations will be eligible for office in the SBC.” And yet inerrancy was never a stand-alone issue. Conservatives were explicit from the beginning about the kind of theologically confessional SBC they believed would reflect the convictions of the churches and the historic mission of the denomination. Indeed, a more politically-subtle movement might have feared that conservatives were too upfront with their agenda, fighting a multi-front battle on issues ranging from women’s ordination to pastoral authority to the sanctity of human life.
An understanding of the role of Baptist confessionalism in the conservative resurgence would help to explain more fully what Hankins rightly identifies as the tremendous influence of the thought of postwar evangelical theologians such as Carl F. H. Henry and Francis Schaeffer on the SBC conservative movement.17 Hankins contends that Southern Baptist conservatives rallied around biblical inerrancy because it was “the central issue of evangelicalism.”18 Thus, he concludes, the “neoevangelical influence became attractive to Southern Baptist conservatives because of its emphasis on cultural engagement.”19 This argument would have more traction if the conservatives sought to impose what Hankins calls the “Henry/Schaeffer grid” of inerrantist orthodoxy on an essentially “creedless” denomination. But the controversy was never about inerrancy as a stand-alone issue. Instead, conservatives insisted that biblical authority was part of a full-orbed theology of confessional orthodoxy that could be traced back to the very beginnings of the Baptist movement. Paige Patterson’s defense of inerrancy, after all, was rooted in his doctoral work on the theology of John L. Dagg, the first writing Baptist theologian in the South, and a dogged biblical inerrantist.20 The first scholarly defense of biblical inerrancy from the conservative camp traced the concept through the confessional theological tradition of historic Baptist theology.21 Timothy George sought to reclaim for conservatives the mantle of founder James P. Boyce, whose views of the inerrancy of Scripture were part of a much larger set of confessional commitments.22 One of the earliest organizations of the resurgence dubbed itself the “Baptist Faith and Message Fellowship” in order to emphasize the continuity with a Baptist confessional theological tradition that recognized Scripture as “truth without any mixture of error.”23 Well into the controversy, Mark Coppenger led the SBC Executive Committee to defend the conservative resurgence via a pamphlet series that connected conservative concerns on a host of theological issues with the historic theological tradition of the SBC.24 The efforts of Mohler to reverse the theological direction of Southern Seminary were set in the context of a return to the confessional commitments of the institution’s founding confession of faith, the Abstract of Principles.25 Conservatives would argue, then, that what attracted them to the Henry/Schaeffer tradition was not, first of all, its cultural engagement, but its defense of evangelical orthodoxy against the contemporary challenges of existentialism, nihilism, and naturalism. In Henry and Schaeffer, they heard first the voices of Dagg and Boyce and Manly and Criswell—voices in continuity with a confessional Baptist commitment to biblical inspiration and authority.26 The contemporary evangelical movement resonated with an already existent confessional Baptist theology.

Hankins is correct to suggest that the “Henry/Schaeffer grid” helps to explain the cultural belligerence of the SBC conservatives. He is less successful, however, in probing just how deeply theological the call to evangelical engagement was. In Henry and Schaeffer, conservatives discovered a worldview theology that explored the implications of evangelical theology for all of life. The postwar evangelical movement, led by Carl Henry’s 1947 manifesto The Uneasy Conscience of Modern Fundamentalism, did not diagnose a cultural problem and seek to find a theology to meet it.27 Indeed, that was Henry’s critique of Prot-
estant liberalism’s failed attempts at a “Social Gospel.”28 The silence of conservative Protestants, for Henry on matters of race and economics, and, for Schaeffer, after Roe vs. Wade, was not a “cultural” matter at all. For Henry, the social and political isolation of Protestant fundamentalism was the result of reducing their theological concerns to the disputed “five points” of the Fundamentalist-Modernist Controversy of the 1920s.29 Fundamentalist withdrawal was based, Henry argued, in an unbiblical theology of the Kingdom resulting in a truncated eschatology of paralyzed pessimism and a truncated soteriology that saw the mission of the church as simply rescuing individual souls from a world hurtling toward Armageddon.30 For Schaeffer, evangelical silence in the face of Roe vs. Wade was tied to an evangelical appropriation of a “Platonic spirituality” that valued the immaterial “soul” at the expense of the body.31 The preeminent issue for these theologians was maintaining the theological cohesion of the evangelical movement. The cultural ambiguities were evidence of an even more problematic theological ambiguity. It is this “worldview” understanding of the relationship between theology and all of life (including culture and politics) that resonated with the confessional orthodoxy of Baptist conservatives.

Hankins’s confessional myopia here skews his understanding of the battle between moderates and conservatives for The Southern Baptist Theological Seminary after the election of conservative R. Albert Mohler, Jr., in 1993. Hankins contrasts the conciliatory “Christianity Today conservatism” of the “evangelical” faculty members appointed near the end of moderate control at Southern with the culturally-reactionary “World Magazine conservatism” of the Mohler Administration.32 The conservative resurgence, however, from the very beginning was never a “Christianity Today” style of conservatism (unless perhaps one means the early conservative years of Christianity Today under the editorship of Carl Henry).

Even before his election as president, Mohler maintained, along with other conservatives, that inerrancy alone was not enough to sustain theological renewal in the SBC.33 Mohler was clear from the moment of his election that he would pursue a confessional renewal at the seminary that would include a commitment to the exclusivity of Christ, the sanctity of all human life, and a complementarian understanding of male/female relations—an agenda that was met with hostility from the faculty’s old guard from the moment of his election.34 This was consistent with over ten years of the conservative resurgence articulating the exact same concerns on precisely the same issues in publications and Convention resolutions. The “compromise” cadre of pre-Mohler evangelical faculty members was just that—a compromise between two competing visions for the future of Southern Baptist theology. When conservatives rallied against Nash-ville because of liberalism in the seminars, they did not have David Gushee in mind as the answer to the concerns of the churches.35 The confessionally anemic convictions of the “Christianity Today evangelicals” were outside the mainstream of grassroots Baptist conservatism from the very beginning.

Hankins is also wrong to see the “culture wars” as the axis of cohesion among conservatives since the resurgence. Cultural conflicts represent theological issues and fit into a much larger confessional framework of Baptist theology. Hankins is correct that the national media has focused
predominately on the cultural aspects of, say, the *Baptist Faith and Message* revisions of 2000. But the theological clarity achieved in the updated confession of faith was not limited to what Hankins would define as “culture war” issues. Southern Baptists also clarified their stances on a host of issues, such as the substitutionary nature of the atonement, the exclusivity of Jesus Christ, exhaustive divine foreknowledge, and the nature of the baptism of the Holy Spirit. Clearly, the level of theological consensus in the SBC is not limited to issues of “cultural engagement,” even if these issues could be abstracted from their place in Baptist confessionalism. Cable news networks might not be interested in the SBC consensus on the foreknowledge of God, but this does not render this consensus any less significant for the future of Baptist theology.

**Baptist Conversionism and the Culture Wars**

Confessional fidelity was never, however, an end to itself. The concern for biblical orthodoxy is wedded to a conversionism forged in the fires of Southern Baptist revivalism, a conversionism that emphasizes the priority of personal regeneration and forensic justification through faith alone in Christ alone. For conservatives, theological liberalism in Southern Baptist agencies was about more than political control; it centered on whether theological liberalism would destroy evangelism and missions in the denomination by transforming both the content of the gospel message and the urgency of the Great Commission task. The “culture war” served as a warning to Southern Baptists that they were not winning the “Bold Mission Thrust.” While conservatives saw the evangelistic task imperiled by a secularizing culture, they also saw the moderate denominational elite following the culture at some disturbing points.

With such the case, most Baptist conservatives would agree with much of the way in which Hankins describes the resurgence’s approach to issues such as abortion, gender roles, religious liberty, and race. But, they would want to maintain that these fronts were not primarily “culture war” battles, but a theological clash of visions, both with an increasingly hostile secular culture and with that culture’s sympathizers within Baptist ranks. They would likewise agree with Hankins that the culture set the agenda on these issues. Nonetheless, they were issues that could not be ignored. The culture raised the issues, but Baptist conservatism sought to answer them within the context of its own confessional and conversionist theological worldview.

This explains what Hankins cites from moderates as a perceived “obsession” with issues of human sexuality—particularly homosexuality and gender identity. This charge is not unique to conservative Baptists, however. In the current cultural context, it has been leveled against traditionalists in virtually every Christian communion. As *Newsweek* religion editor Kenneth Woodward has observed about the culture’s regnant anti-Catholicism:

> And then there is Sex. The Catholic Church also takes sex and gender seriously—maybe too seriously—which means it holds that here, too, norms ought to be observed. But on matters of sex and gender, our society has by now become normless—a society that, on both the popular and elite levels, also takes sex too seriously, but for very different reasons. Here there really is a culture war—and institutionally, the Catholic Church is the biggest, easiest target.
Much the same could be said for the way the SBC’s resurgent conservatives view their “obsession” with abortion, homosexuality, gender identity, and related issues. But, this is because Southern Baptist theology finds itself against an increasingly insistent—one might even say conversionist—message of sexual, reproductive, and gender autonomy in the larger culture.39 As one contemporary gay rights activist puts it, cultural acceptance of homosexuality “perfectly fits that American social theology, that bedrock belief in liberty and the pursuit of happiness.”40 Southern Baptists are forced, therefore, to confront one theology with another in order to be heard with the message of the gospel.

The conversionist aspect of Baptist conservatism comes into focus here as well. SBC conservatives can never embrace a “welcoming and affirming” attitude toward homosexuality as long as they believe that unrepentant homosexuals “will not inherit the Kingdom of God” (1 Cor 6:9). For conversionist Southern Baptists, such a stance would not just repudiate a clear teaching of Scripture about sexual morality, it would negate the church’s responsibility to warn sinners lovingly of the need for personal regeneration in order to find the life of the Kingdom of Christ (1 Cor 6:11). Indeed, to ignore a culture that deems homosexuality an unchangeable “orientation” would, for Baptist conservatives, be the height of anti-evangelism. Thus, this issue would compare with another of the resurgence’s counter-cultural moves—namely the continued insistence that Jewish people must come to faith in Jesus Christ in order to be saved. Baptist conservatives were roundly condemned by the secular media and by groups such as the Cooperative Baptist Fellowship (CBF) for this “intolerant” move, but the SBC simply restated a Christocentric view of conversion that had been at the heart of the assumed “Grand Compromise” of generations of Baptist Great Commission efforts. This is indeed a “culture war” issue, but it is, first of all, a doctrinal concern that cuts to the core of Baptist identity and mission.

With this theological background in mind, it does not take an encompassing theory of American culture to explain why Southern Baptists were outraged by such things as moderate Baptist leader Cecil Sherman defending a “pro-choice” position on abortion because of the Baptist principle of voluntarism, or moderate ethicist Paul Simmons defending abortion rights as an essential element of religious liberty—terms that were precious to Baptists precisely because of their conversionist soteriology.41 The silence, and even support, of moderate Baptists in the face of the “culture of death” caused many Southern Baptists to realize the chilling implications of revisionist theology.42 When conservative Southern Baptists hear Paul Simmons ridicule the rights of the “fetus” to life, they realize that liberalism does not simply kill churches. Sometimes it kills people as well.

The conversionist impulse is likewise seen in Hankins’s one example of Baptist conservatism moving toward the culture: the embrace of racial equality. Some moderate scholars have suggested that the conservatives’ concerns about “pluralism”—abortion, gay rights, feminism, et al.—were grounded in a racist fear of the civil rights movement.43 Such assertions simply do not bear the scrutiny of history, as conservative Southern Baptists have called increasingly for racial reconciliation, even as American culture faces in some important respects increasing racial bal-
kanization. Why do Southern Baptist conservatives, such as Richard Land, repeatedly call for racial justice and the full inclusion of African-Americans in Southern Baptist leadership? Why are African-American churches among the fastest growing segments of the Southern Baptist—conservative Southern Baptist—constituency? Quite simply, this is because they treat race as a theological issue in the context of the Great Commission. Thus, the *Baptist Faith and Message* (2000) grounds racial justice in two gospel commitments—*imago Dei* and the atonement of Christ.44

The civil rights movement served as a prophetic word to southern civil religion. But Southern Baptists carried the seeds of the destruction of segregation in their own conversionist zeal. This is seen in the civil rights awakening of Southern Baptists’ most famous export to twentieth century parachurch evangelicalism, Billy Graham. As Graham biographer William Martin notes, Graham, like other conservative evangelicals of his day, made numerous public statements eschewing social action, usually relating his political inaction to his pessimistic dispensational eschatology and the priority of evangelism over social reform. And yet he was surprisingly progressive on the question of race.45 Graham insisted on the desegregation of his southern crusades, however, not because of an elaborate political theory—and certainly not because of the cultural winds of white southern religion—but because of his theology of the indiscriminate offer of personal salvation. Before Graham could articulate the fact that segregation was socially unjust, he could recognize that it was serving as a stumbling block to the proclamation of the gospel to individual sinners. As Carl Henry notes, Graham’s conversionist zeal led him actually to take the lead on race relations, even before the social activists of the World Council of Churches.46 Henry rightly argued that this meant that evangelicals who resonated with Graham’s Great Commission fervor must ultimately count the one who is “spiritually a brother” as one who is “politically an equal.”47

The same could be said of SBC conservatives with a theological commitment to global evangelization of all people groups. A bigot who claimed commitment to biblical authority could not consistently preach the common condemnation of sinful humanity (Rom 3:23), the common offer of salvation in Christ (1 John 2:2), and the common access to the Father through the Holy Spirit (Eph 2:11-22). One could not consistently raise the biblical mandate of God’s plan to unite in Christ those from every tribe, tongue, and language (Rev 5:9) and still maintain racial injustice at home. Southern Baptist segregationists were condemned as hypocrites, not by social liberalism, but by their own Lottie Moon Christmas offerings.

**Baptist Cooperation and the Culture Wars**

Asking whether inerrancy or concern about cultural decay was the “real” issue behind the SBC controversy is a bit like asking whether justification through faith alone or indulgences was the “real” issue behind the Reformation. In fact, the abuse of indulgences illustrated for Martin Luther and his fellow Reformers just how far Rome had fallen from a biblical doctrine of justification by grace alone through faith alone in Christ alone. Contrary to Hankins’s thesis, conservatives did not rally Southern Baptists around inerrancy in order to fight a battle against abortion, the sexual revolution, feminism, or any other
cultural phenomenon. Instead these issues crystallized the debate over larger theological and missiological questions of biblical authority, the Great Commission, and the prophetic role of the church in protecting those the culture deems not worthy of life. The same can be said of SBC conservatives’ concerns over issues of gender, sexuality, abortion, and religion in the public square.

This is why conservatives rejected what Hankins, citing moderate historian Bill Leonard, calls the “Grand Compromise,” which is defined as “a tacit agreement not to let the right, left, or any other ideological party take control of the denomination.”48 Moderates pointed to the Foreign Mission Board’s “Bold Mission Thrust” as a reason to end the controversy for the sake of evangelism and missions. At the same time, however, Baptist conservatives saw Cooperative Program funds being spent to fund a Christian Life Commission director affiliated with the Religious Coalition for Abortion Rights, a Baptist Joint Committee opposed even to voluntary student-led prayer at graduation ceremonies, and seminary professors who denied that explicit faith in Christ is necessary for salvation. Why “compromise” for the sake of evangelism and missions, conservatives asked, when the “compromise” itself may well be destroying the theological foundations for evangelism and missions? For conservatives, the “culture war” issues crystallized just how far apart they were theologically from the moderates who were in charge of the denomination’s effort to reach the world for Christ. The denomination’s left swing on these issues was indicative for conservatives of an accelerating drift from confessional moorings and from Great Commission passion.

With this in mind, it would seem that Hankins oversimplifies the issue when he writes that biblical inerrancy was “an effective tool in the hands of SBC conservatives as they attempted to convince rank-and-file Southern Baptists that their moderate leaders and denominational employees were too liberal.”49 Because, for Hankins, the rhetorical use of inerrancy was a means to an end in the “culture war” agenda, the conservatives used a “slippery slope” argument that the denial of inerrancy would lead to other grave theological errors.50 Hankins is right that conservatives were alarmed by what they perceived as dangerous trends in American culture, and he is right that they utilized a “slippery slope” argument that linked one’s view of biblical authority to one’s view of issues like abortion and homosexuality. Conservatives, however, believe that history has proven that the slope was indeed as slippery as they warned, if not more so.

This is seen in, for example, the controversy over gender roles in the SBC. Hankins points to the 1988 debate between conservative Dorothy Patterson and moderate Jann Aldredge-Clanton on women in the pastorate. He notes that Aldredge-Clanton’s argument “is not based on an analogy from the civil rights movement or any secular progressive ideology but on biblical exegesis and her reading of Baptist history.”51 He thus attempts to refute Patterson’s claim that Aldredge-Clanton was importing a contemporary feminist agenda into her reading of the biblical text. In so doing, however, Hankins ignores the fact that, if anything, Dorothy Patterson underestimated just how slippery was the slope of Aldredge-Clanton’s “biblical” egalitarianism. Since 1988, Aldredge-Clanton has argued that her egalitarianism has led her to reject the notion of God as “Father” and “Lord”—even leading her to
advocate worship of the goddess Sophia.\textsuperscript{52} She advocates the use of the veneration of a Sophia goddess idol—a refurbished Virgin Mary statue with a sun and moon for hands—in a Texas Baptist Sunday school class. With “Sophia” centered around a candle-decked altar, Aldredge-Clanton leads the worshippers in singing to “Mother Hen” while flapping their arms in wing-like motions.\textsuperscript{53} She further grounds her feminist theology in a goddess tradition reaching back to ancient paganism, earth religions, and even witchcraft.\textsuperscript{54} Aldredge-Clanton marvels that when her first book on Sophia worship was published, she did not get fired by Baylor University Medical Center, where she served as chaplain, but instead “I got a book signing party in the elegant home” of some Baylor physicians.\textsuperscript{55} If Dorothy Patterson had suggested in 1988 even one of these things as a possible “slippery slope” outcome of Aldredge-Clanton’s evangelical feminism, Patterson would have been ridiculed by moderates as a hysterical fundamentalist.

Granted, Aldredge-Clanton is an extreme case. But it cannot be claimed that Aldredge-Clanton’s gender trajectory is an isolated incident. In her autobiography, Aldredge-Clanton traces her path from egalitarianism to Sophia worship as one of consistency with her feminist convictions. Her books on her pilgrimage and on Sophia worship are endorsed and promoted by Baptist Women in Ministry and she delivered a convocation address on feminist God-language to the Alliance of Baptists. Furthermore, similar feminist revisionism is advocated by the chief proponent of women in ministry among moderates, Molly Truman Marshall, who now faults even fellow moderates for using masculine pronouns for God and biblical “patriarchal” language such as that of the “kingdom of God.”\textsuperscript{56} This is not to say that gender egalitarianism inevitably leads to feminist revisionism of the doctrine of God, but it is to say that conservatives and liberals both agree that the gender debate is about deeper issues than simply who ordains whom to do what.

In the same way, Hankins quotes Carey Newman’s dismissal of a “consistent linkage of issues of women in ministry and homosexuality.”\textsuperscript{57} And yet conservatives would argue that history has demonstrated that the revisionist arguments for women in ministry used by Baptist moderates are now the same arguments used to support a feminist/liberationist position on issues such as homosexuality and abortion rights. Molly Marshall, for instance, includes sexual orientation along with male/female equality as issues on which contemporary Christians “have moved far beyond the biological and philosophical perceptions of early Christianity” while Baptists have “allowed the Puritan impress to linger,” keeping them from a “clearer, more informed understanding in the realm of human sexuality.”\textsuperscript{58} Institutionally, the exact same arguments used by the last generation of SBC moderates to argue for women’s ordination and higher-critical methods of biblical scholarship are being used by this generation of young moderates to argue for homosexual ordination, a debate that threatens to tear the Cooperative Baptist Fellowship asunder.\textsuperscript{59} Likewise, some of the same former SBC agency heads who used “soul freedom” to fight confessionalism, now argue that “soul freedom” means that pregnant Baptist teenagers should not have to face protesters on the way to the abortion clinic, or that conventions should not refuse to cooperate with churches that “marry” same-sex
Hankins is correct that conservatives were alarmed by the cultural “Babylon” they increasingly saw around them. But conservatives did not use “inerrancy” to suggest an inauthentic link between moderate views of biblical authority and confessional libertarianism and the “culture war” issues of abortion, homosexuality, and the “naked public square.” Instead, they feared that Nashville was slouching toward Gomorrah. The culture pointed them to a foretaste of the outcome of this drift. One may disagree with Baptist conservatives on gender, abortion, sexuality, or other issues, but it is difficult to disagree with their linkage of these issues to larger cultural and theological commitments. I would argue that, if anything, the conservatives themselves have been surprised by just how radically Baptist theology was moving, a movement that is evident in the contemporary state of moderate Baptist theology. The “culture war” served to highlight essential worldview differences that convinced conservatives that the “Grand Compromise” simply no longer existed.

Add to this a distinctively Baptist ecclesiology and the link between culture and cooperation becomes even clearer. Conservatives did not reject the distinctives of local church autonomy and priesthood of believers. Instead, they believed that these concepts meant that the denominational elites must be held accountable to local congregations, and not the other way around. As Hankins demonstrates, moderate denominational leaders were largely “pro-choice” on abortion rights, overwhelmingly in favor of women in the pastorate, and dismissive of biblical inerrancy. While conservatives were forthright about their traditionalist views on abortion, sexuality, and other issues, moderates were more likely to retreat to the “double-speak” of saying one thing in the seminary classroom and another on the denominational “campaign trail.” The moderate leadership seemed to believe that the churches should support the program of the denomination, while the elites determined matters of theology and cultural engagement. Conservatives believed these views were out of sync with those of the congregations that paid the bills. The outcome of the controversy indicates that, at least on this, the conservatives were right.

This struggle continues in Baptist life as moderate groups claiming to represent “mainstream Baptist” values contend against confessional requirements for international missionaries, especially on “social issues” such as abortion. In so doing, they marshal the arguments of notorious abortion rights advocate Paul Simmons. Conservatives would argue that Simmons views are all too “mainstream” within the context of contemporary American culture—a culture they seek to confront with a biblical worldview. But Simmons’s views are not at all representative of “mainstream” Baptist thought in the churches of the SBC. Confessionalism and conversionism define the parameters for cooperation. Therefore, for conservatives, issues such as abortion are not merely “culture war” concerns. Pro-life Southern Baptists should not be asked to pay for a missionary to tell a new Chinese believer that she should abort her second child under the lordship of Jesus Christ. If Southern Baptists hold to a theology that affirms the sacredness of all human life, that theology should inform their cooperative efforts across the world. The same would be true for the issue of race. A hypothetical white supremacist would be immediately recalled from the mission field by the
SBC—not just because the bigot is an embarrassment—but because he is outside the parameters of the Southern Baptist confessional consensus and he repudiates the gospel of Jesus Christ.

This explains some of conservative frustration with moderate rhetoric that the controversy was simply a “political” destruction of a harmonious “big tent” built for cooperative evangelism and missions. Moderate Russell Dilday, for instance, makes just such an argument in a recent symposium rejecting confessionalism on the mission field. He then, however, proceeds to detail a list of theological “errors” in Baptist conservatism—ranging from premillennial eschatology to a complementarian view of male/female roles to a “Calvinistic” understanding that God knows the future. Similarly, David Currie argues for a political—rather than a theological—conservative refusal to cooperate with moderates. Inexplicably, Currie then concludes that Baptist conservatives worship a “different” Jesus and that moderates and conservatives have “different, irreconcilable visions of the gospel of Jesus Christ.” Why these moderates would want a “big tent” of missionary cooperation with those who preach a “different gospel” and worship a “different Christ” is difficult for most conservatives to understand.

Nonetheless, this disconnect illustrates a divide seen in the controversy over the relationship between the SBC and American culture—a disconnect Hankins perceives even if at times he explains it inadequately. Conservatives longed for a theological definition of Baptist identity and Baptist cooperation, while moderates longed for a more programmatic definition. The issues raised by the “culture wars” did not define Baptist conservatism.

Instead, these issues demonstrated to conservatives that the tribal basis of cooperation could not provide cohesion to the SBC in what is, after all, the most countercultural of all endeavors—the conversion of the nations to belief in Jesus Christ as the sole sovereign of the cosmos.

Conclusion

Barry Hankins’s Uneasy in Babylon gets several things precisely wrong. The controversy over biblical authority was not a subset of the “culture wars.” Instead, the fact that Baptists had “culture wars” among themselves on issues such as abortion, sexuality, and gender roles indicated that there indeed was a crisis over biblical authority. Even so, the book gets a crucial point precisely right. Hankins argues that the conservative resurgence means that Southern Baptists “have recaptured the Baptist tradition of dissent that was lost when the denomination dominated the South.” Hankins’s insight here offers the SBC’s resurgent conservatives a critical opportunity to chart a course for the next generation.

The temptation for future generations of Baptist conservatives is probably not that they will be too consumed by the “culture wars.” The temptation will be to surrender to the seeming omnipotence of “McWorld.” The next generation of Baptists was not reared in the isolated subculture of “Sword Drills” and “Acteen” camp. They will come of age in the cultural atmosphere of a new moralism—with Planned Parenthood preaching “safety” in their public school classrooms and Will and Grace preaching “tolerance” on the network airwaves. Moreover, they may find that the future of the conservative resurgence is not chiefly in middle-class suburban America, but in the persecuted
congregations of the Third World. There is, after all, little appeal to a “moderate” Baptist social gospel when claiming Christ means literal crucifixion by a despotic Islamic government. In the end, this “mantle of dissent” will be the ultimate test of the conservative resurgence. What will future Southern Baptist pastors say on Mother’s Day if half the congregation has been cloned in a laboratory? What will future Southern Baptists churches do if “Evangelism Explosion” is outlawed as “hate speech”? Indeed, what will conservative Southern Baptist churches do now, when their members divorce and remarry at the same rate as secular America? What will conservative Southern Baptist churches do now when churchgoers would rather hear therapeutic sound-bytes than the preaching of the whole counsel of God? If conservatives will pick up the mantle of dissent in such a cultural context they must maintain their confessional identity, their conversionist missiology, and their cooperative unity. This is something that a “movement” cannot do—only churches can.

Thus, the counter-cultural nature of Baptist conservatism will be seen chiefly in the renewal of Baptist churches through the preaching of a Christ who will one day replace “McWorld” with His own everlasting reign (Dan 7:14). Contrary to liberal Baptist rhetoric, it is increasingly obvious that Baptist conservatives do not desire a “Constantinian” peace with the political and social powers-that-be. Baptist conservatives know they will not find Jerusalem in an idyllic southern culture or in a Republican White House or in a less profane Hollywood—or even in a parachurch evangelical subculture. They must seek to hold back the cultural darkness, but they know they will find a New Jerusalem only in the Kingdom of Christ—a Kingdom that is seen even now in the advance of the gospel around the world. In the meantime, Baptist conservatives will stand where Baptist conservatives have always stood—against the stream. And, like their Baptist ancestors across the centuries, they will be hopeful—but uneasy—in a culture that is looking more and more like Babylon.

ENDNOTES

1 Against the “sickening” contemporary culture of “McWorld,” Barber argues, stand “the yearning of American suburbanites for a literal New Testament” and “the yearning of Arabic martyrs for the certainties of a literal Qur’an.” Benjamin R. Barber, Jihad vs. McWorld: How Globalism and Tribalism Are Reshaping the World (New York: Ballantine, 1996) 213. Barber’s secular analysis is joined by Baptist scholar Charles Kimball, When Religion Becomes Evil (San Francisco: Harper and Row, 2002), who argues that religion becomes politically dangerous whenever it accepts universal truth claims, regardless of whether these claims are Christian, Muslim, or something else. For a quite different take on the relationship between religion and global culture from that of Barber and Kimball, see Samuel Huntington, The Clash of Civilizations and the Remaking of World Order (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1996).

2 Barry Hankins, Uneasy in Babylon: Southern Baptist Conservatives and American Culture (Tuscaloosa: University of Alabama Press, 2002). This thesis builds on earlier analyses by Hankins such as “Southern Baptists and Northern Evangelicals: Cultural Factors and the Nature of Religious Alliances,” Religion and American Culture: A Journal of Inter-

Hankins, Uneasy in Babylon, 10.

Ibid.

Ibid., 274.

Ibid., 276.

Ibid., 277.

For a discussion of the SBC’s role as the “established church” of southern culture, see Edward L. Queen II, ed., In the South the Baptists Are the Center of Gravity: Southern Baptists and Social Change, 1930-1980 (Brooklyn: Carlson, 1991).


This is contra the arguments of, for example, moderate biblical scholar Alan Culpepper, who contends that biblical inerrancy served as mere political “badges of identity” for conservatives. From Culpepper’s viewpoint, the “real issues often were power and control of the denomination and contemporary social issues, but the political shorthand of the controversy was how we talk about the Bible.” R. Alan Culpepper, “Scripture,” in A Baptist’s Theology, ed. R. Wayne Stacy (Macon, GA: Smyth and Helwys, 1999) 80.


Hankins recognizes that some SBC conservative leaders, such as Mohler, have been influenced by a tempered form of the Reformed worldview theologies of Abraham Kuyper and Carl F. H. Henry. Others, such as Patterson, draw more from a conservative appropriation of Anabaptist theology. Others, in a more populist vein, articulate a “Christian America” understanding that is quite similar to that of the new Christian right political movement. Hankins, Uneasy in Babylon, 41-73. Hankins’s taxonomy of differing positions on issues ranging from the posting of the Ten Commandments to the definition of voluntary school prayer to the idea of “faith-based” federal funding for churches is helpful in underscoring the diversity in the conservative coalition on some of these questions. For a further exploration of these issues, see Hankins, “The Evangelical Accommodationism of Southern Baptist Conservatives,” 54-65.

Russell Dilday, former president of Southwestern Baptist Theological Seminary, for instance, castigates conservatives as “pseudo-Baptists, rogues inside the family who either never knew or have forgotten what our true identity is.” Larry Chesser, “Authenticus Baptistus’ Growing Extinct, Dilday Tells American Baptists,” Baptists Today, 13 July 1995, 5. During the controversy, moderate SBC agency heads often pointed to Norris as the prototype of the Pressler/Patterson coalition, often referring to moderates as “moderate-conservatives” and conservatives as “independent-fundamentalists.” As Hankins points out, however, the ideological leadership of the conservative movement came from “moderate Baptist stock.” Paige Patterson’s father was the executive director of the Baptist General Convention of Texas (BGCT). Mark Coppenger’s father was a moderate Baptist professor at a state Baptist university. R. Albert Mohler, Jr., served as assistant to the moderate president of The Southern Baptist Theological Seminary during the most heated years of the controversy. Hankins notes that, of the conservative leaders, “only Timothy George was influenced significantly by independent fundamentalism.” Hankins, Uneasy in Babylon, 40.

Ibid., 273.

Ibid., 4.

When moderate theologian Fisher Humphreys devoted the spring 1988 issue of New Orleans Seminary’s theological journal, The Theological Educator, to the controversy, for example, he included a
broad range of issues to be debated by combatants on both sides, issues ranging from inerrancy to women’s ordination to school prayer to the authority of the pastor in a congregational church government.

17Hankins, Uneasy in Babylon, 14-40.

18Ibid., 38.

19Ibid., 39.


23See the minutes of the organizational meeting and statement of purpose of this group in Leon McBeth, A Sourcebook for the Baptist Heritage (Nashville: Broadman, 1990). The Fellowship was led initially by conservatives such as North Carolina’s M. O. Owens and Kentucky’s Laverne Butler, who argued that the 1963 doctrinal statement was an inerrantist statement. Interestingly, when the conservative-led SBC passed a revised Baptist Faith and Message statement in 2000, the word “inerrancy” was not included. This was because SBC conservatives still maintained that the movement’s early voices had been right all along—“truth without any mixture of error” means verbal inerrancy of Scripture.

24Coppenger’s pamphlet, “We Thought You’d Like to Know” includes quotes from well-known figures in Baptist history, ranging from Dagg and Boyce to Lottie Moon and Herschel Hobbs, on issues such as biblical inerrancy, women in the pastorate, and the priesthood of believers. The pamphlet seeks to argue that the conservative resurgence was in fact a “resurgence” of historic Baptist theology and not a “takeover” by “independent fundamentalists.”


29This doctrinal reductionism, Henry argued, led to fundamentalism’s “increasing failure to comprehend the relationship of underlying theological principles.” Carl F. H. Henry, “Dare We Renew the Controversy? Part II: The Fundamentalist Reduction,” Christianity Today, 24 June 1957, 23.

30For a discussion of the theological concerns behind Henry’s jeremiad, see Russell D. Moore, “Kingdom Theology and the American Evangelical Consensus: Emerging Implications for Sociopolitical Engagement” (Ph.D. diss., The Southern Baptist Theological Seminary, 2002).

31For Schaeffer’s theological diagnoses of what he viewed as the collapse of Western culture, especially as it relates to the abortion issue, see Francis A. Schaeffer, A Christian Manifesto (Westchester, IL: Crossway, 1982); and Francis A. Schaeffer and C. Everett Koop, Whatever Happened to the Human Race? (Old Tappan, NJ: Revell, 1979).

32Hankins, Uneasy in Babylon, 74-106.

33In 1992 Mohler wrote: “Biblical inerrancy must be posited within the context of a holistic recovery of the Scripture principle within the Christian tradition.” He defined this framework as a confessional theology in the classical Christian, evangelical Protestant, and distinctively
Baptist traditions. He argued furthermore that Southern Baptists must return to the confessional task of seeking to articulate the tension between “what can be assumed and what must be articulated.” R. Albert Mohler, Jr., “Has Theology a Future in the Southern Baptist Convention? Toward a Renewed Theological Framework,” in Beyond the Impasse? Scripture, Interpretation, and Theology in Baptist Life, ed. James B. Robison and David S. Dockery (Nashville: Broadman, 1992) 100-105. I would argue that the Mohler Administration’s positions on the exclusivity of Christ, homosexuality, abortion, and the pastorate as a male office were previously “assumed” aspects of Baptist theology that must now be “articulated” against the revisionism of the Baptist left and the secular culture.

34 Hankins unfairly characterizes Mohler’s opposition to hiring gender egalitarian faculty in Machiavellian terms. “Mohler has acknowledged that the Bible does not make opposition to women in the pulpit nearly as important as some other issues, yet the Firm has decided to make it central anyway.” Ibid., 103. Such a statement reveals a fundamental misunderstanding about the kind of theological confessionalism held by conservatives. The Bible does not make believers’ baptism by immersion nearly as important as issues such as justification through faith. Nonetheless, a paedobaptist faculty member would never be hired, even under the previous moderate administrations. Mohler has described the levels of confessional unity needed for cooperation in terms of a “theological triage.” See R. Albert Mohler, Jr., “Has Theology a Future in the Southern Baptist Convention?,” 108-109.

35 This is only further illustrated by Hankins’s recounting of Gushee’s response to the Molly Marshall resignation at Southern Seminary, a resignation that was due to Marshall’s inclusivist understanding of salvation and feminist revisionism of the doctrine of God. Hankins writes: “Gushee believes that while theology is important, so are human considerations such as friendship, loyalty, and concern for the careers and dreams of those whom the conservatives were finding theologically unacceptable.” Ibid., 95. One might wonder whether self-identified evangelical Gushee takes Marshall seriously as a theologian at all. If her ideas about theism and salvation will shape a generation of pastors, and if those ideas are seriously flawed, then how can that be in any substantive way “balanced” against her “dreams” for her career?

36 This is why, as Hankins notes, Mark Coppenger compared the baptism statistics of moderate congregations with those of conservative churches, and found the moderate churches flagging. Coppenger, along with many conservatives, came to the conclusion that the difference was a theological one. Moderate churches had given something away that should engender Great Commission fervor among the people of God. Ibid., 36. This critique was present from the very beginning of the resurgence. Adrian Rogers, for instance, in his 1979 Pastor’s Conference sermon blasted the idea that theology and evangelism could be separated. “Your zeal is never any greater than your conviction,” Rogers said. “And your convictions come out of the Word of God. Now, don’t you let anybody tell you that what I’m saying is not true because you mark it down. You look and you see the churches that are reaching and winning and baptizing people in this day of sagging statistics, and every one of them, and I say every one of them is a conservative fundamental Bible believer. Every one of them!”

37 Mohler’s outspoken stance on the issue of homosexuality, an issue he confronted early in his tenure as president, Hankins writes, “Led to the charge by some moderates that Mohler had an obsessive preoccupation with homosexuality.” Hankins, Uneasy in Babylon, 46.


39 For a study on the SBC’s sense of incongruity between biblical authority and the assumptions of the abortion culture, see Michele Dillon, “Religion and Culture in Tension: The Abortion Discourses of the U.S. Catholic Bishops and the Southern Baptist Convention,” Religion and

41 In perhaps the most famous Baptist sermon on religious liberty, George W. Truett defended the concept based on a prior commitment to the necessity of personal regeneration. Forced conformity “might make men hypocrites, but it can never make them Christians,” Truett observed. George W. Truett, Baptists and Religious Liberty (Nashville: Sunday School Board of the Southern Baptist Convention, 1920) 13. Here Truett is in continuity with the conversionist argument for religious liberty going all the way back to Thomas Helwys, Isaac Backus, and John Leland.

42 Hankins does recognize the theological nature of the abortion debate when he notes Timothy George’s eloquent response to the assumptions of Enlightenment autonomy found in Simmons’s defense of abortion rights. Hankins, Uneasy in Babylon, 192-193.


44 The Baptist Faith and Message (2000) thus ends the article on the doctrine of humanity with the following statement: “The sacredness of human personality is evident in that God created man in His own image, and in that Christ died for man; therefore, every person of every race possessed full dignity and is worthy of respect and Christian love.”


46 Henry writes: “In Copenhagen, when evangelist Billy Graham opened his crusade, a heckler interrupted him with the cry: ‘Why didn’t you march in Selma?’ But Graham had been integrating meetings in the South long before the marchers had become existentialized and, moreover, had done so in the context of biblical Christianity.” Carl F. H. Henry, The God Who Shows Himself (Waco: Word, 1966) 67.

47 Ibid., 71.

48 Hankins, Uneasy in Babylon, 4.

49 Ibid., 5.

50 Ibid., 6.

51 Ibid., 208.

52 Jann Aldredge-Clanton, Breaking Free: The Story of a Feminist Baptist Minister (Austin: Eakin, 2002). See also Aldredge-Clanton’s monographs on Sophia worship and feminist God language, In Whose Image? God and Gender (New York: Crossroad, 1980); God, a Word for Girls and Boys (Louisville: Glad River, 1993); In Search of the Christ-Sophia: An Inclusive Christology for Liberating Christians (Mystic, CT: Twenty-Third, 1995); and Praying With Christ-Sophia: Services for Healing and Renewal (Mystic, CT: Twenty-Third, 1997).

53 Ibid., 228-232.

54 Ibid., 208.

55 Ibid., 213.


57 Hankins, Uneasy in Babylon, 87.


60 Grady C. Cothen and James M. Dunn, Soul Freedom: Baptist Battle Cry (Macon, GA: Smyth and Helwys, 2000) 35-37; 53; 105-106.


Russell Dilday, “A Serious Look at the Baptist Faith and Message Revisions,” in Stand with Christ: Why Missionaries Can’t Sign the 2000 Baptist Faith and Message, ed. Robert O’Brien (Macon, GA: Smyth and Helwys, 2002) 33-54. While the former Southwestern Seminary president’s critique of the affirmation of God’s exhaustive foreknowledge was surprising to many conservatives, it can perhaps be chalked up more to Dilday’s lack of familiarity with contemporary theological movements such as “open theism” than to an outright rejection of God’s foreknowledge.


Hankins, Uneasy in Babylon, 275.

The “Constantinian” charge is made against conservatives in, among other places, the “Baptist Manifesto” of 1997 signed by moderate Baptist theologians such as Stanley Grenz, Curtis Freeman, and James McClendon.