Book Reviews

Recovering Classic Evangelicalism: Applying the Wisdom and Vision of Carl F. H. Henry. By Gregory Alan Thornbury. Wheaton: Crossway, 2013, 223 pp., $17.99 paper.

Thornbury, who has just completed fifteen years of service at Union University and now been appointed President of The King's College, aims in this book to rekindle some of Carl Henry's theology with a view to strengthening "classic evangelicalism." Compared with the evangelicalism of our day, which in Thornbury's view is insipid, awash in defeatism, confused in theology, and almost destitute of cultural influence, the evangelicalism that Henry led surged with faithfulness and genuine promise. Henry himself was one of several "giants" who led the movement. Today, however, when one surveys the evangelical landscape, "one gets the feeling that we're backpedaling quickly. We are more theologically diffuse, culturally gun-shy, and balkanized than ever before … And how do we find our way back?" (32). By bringing to life some of Henry's thought, Thornbury hopes with this book to promote some of the strengths of our recent past. In other words, Thornbury does not aim simply to provide an evenhanded summary and evaluation of Henry the theologian, but by expounding what one might call the essential Henry to bring robust theology and passionate renewal to a movement that sometimes feels as if it has slipped past its "sell by" date.

After an opening chapter in which he lays out "The Lost World of Classic Evangelicalism," in five further chapters Thornbury successively attempts to show, from Henry, why "Epistemology Matters," "Theology Matters," "Inerrancy Matters," "Culture Matters," and (in a brief concluding chapter) "Evangelicalism Matters." The volume concludes with a selected bibliography of works by Carl F. H. Henry.

Thornbury draws attention to the fact that, although he refers to a number of Henry's works (but not to any archival material), in this book he primarily interacts with only three of them: volumes 2 and 4 of *God, Revelation and Authority*, and *The Uneasy Conscience of Modern Funda-*

mentalism. These focus on the themes he chooses to address. Thornbury convincingly argues that Henry should be seen as an heir of "Reformation epistemology"—that is, a theologian in the heritage of the Reformation who begins with God and God's self-disclosure as the theologian confronts the challenges of modernity. The charge that Henry is himself hopelessly ensnared in the modernity he confronts, frequently leveled against Henry, Thornbury refutes in some detail. McGrath, for example, criticizes Henry's view of revelation, dismissing it on the ground that it is "purely propositional," reduced to the rationalism of the Enlightenment. But many of Henry's critics, including McGrath, have apparently proceeded by isolating a few passages that could be read to support their criticisms, without reading enough Henry enough to understand him or be fair to him. Thornbury wants to resuscitate the priority of God-revealed, cognitive, propositional theology, and he is almost as suspicious of evangelical postfoundational narrative theology as he is of the postliberal work of the Yale school. In my view, Thornbury occasionally resorts to antithetical thinking when a bit more nuance is called for. Nevertheless he is right to argue: "In some ways, one might say that Henry poses the following fundamental questions to evangelicals today: Is the truth the truth because God wills it to be the case? Is God a Deity who speaks in intelligible sentences and paragraphs? If the answer to those two questions is affirmative, then no other church tradition offers a better theological method than Protestant evangelicalism—a movement that at its origin radically committed itself to theological conclusions explicated in the Word of God alone" (57).

Thornbury is equally trenchant when he explains why theology matters and why inerrancy matters. On the latter, he demonstrates how much Henry interacts with Gadamer, Dilthey, and Heidegger and the turn to the "subject" in hermeneutics. While reading Thornbury's book, I was simultaneously reading Luc Ferry, *A Brief History of Thought: A Philosophical Guide to Living*.[1] Ferry is a French philosopher whose survey of the Western philosophical tradition leads him to focus on some of the same figures as Henry. Both Henry and Ferry see Heidegger to be one of the crucial figures of the twentieth century. Ferry, however, holds that Heidegger's contribution brilliantly advanced the discussion toward (what is now called) postfoundationalism, making him one of Ferry's heroes; Henry sees Heidegger as a harbinger of the culture-wide loss of confidence in truth that exists as truth outside the human interpreter's act of interpretation. Simultaneously reading Henry on Heidegger and Ferry on Heidegger is a salutary exercise.

In his chapter on why culture matters, Thornbury briefly expounds Henry's *Uneasy Conscience*. Henry's book, of course, focuses on how evangelicals respond, or ought to respond, to social needs—a debate that has again risen to the fore. Thornbury, however, soon turns to the wider issue of how moral issues can be articulated in a culture that is increasingly secular—and here he engages in a fair bit of debate over natural law theories. He does not always make clear that they are natural law *theories* (plural): the approach to natural law espoused by Princeton scholar Robert P. George, with which Thornbury is sympathetic, does not appeal to most Thomists. The significant point to observe, however, is that in this chapter Thornbury, as he himself acknowledges, goes a long way beyond expounding Henry's thought. Henry becomes little more than the diving board off which he propels himself into the pool of cultural discussion that is Thornbury's real agenda. Some readers will inevitably feel that the book is pulling in two quite different (or, at least, not more than overlapping) directions.

What shall we make of this book? Certainly Carl Henry deserves a sympathetic and informed assessment at the hand of a new generation of scholars who have dismissed him too quickly and often unfairly. Thornbury's book contributes to that end, and so it has done something worthwhile. One could responsibly argue that Henry

paints with a large brush, but in his sweeping canvases he sees the opportunities and dangers developing in Western thought in the twentieth century and beyond more piercingly than most leaders of his generation. If he does not always handle the minutiae of technical argument with the nuance that today's critics prefer, they nevertheless have much to learn from this theologian-journalist who was simultaneously educator, scholar, philosopher, evangelist, fearless lover of men and women everywhere—a Christian who tried to understand his own times even while his vision was drawn to the future, a Christian who loved to encourage the younger generation swelling the ranks behind him, a Christian who was much more concerned for the fame of his Master than for his own.

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Perspectives on Our Struggle with Sin: 3 Views of Romans 7, ed. Terry L. Wilder. Nashville, TN: B&H Publishing, 2011, x+213 pp., $24.99 paper.

This volume is one in a series of books (*Perspectives on*…) that compares alternative views on various issues. The series is analogous, therefore, to InterVarsity's *Views* series, which does a similar thing. Overall, the volume is very successful, on several scores. Each author rightly recognizes the importance of relating Romans 7 to the remainder of Romans, though each does so somewhat differently. Each interacts irenically *with* the others; each clearly distinguishes his view from that *of* the others. Each has some distinctive emphases that do more than merely re-state traditional arguments, such as, e.g., Stephen Chester's interesting grounding of the discussion in the context of Augustine and Wesley, or Grant Osborne's nuanced view that Paul describes Christian existence, but not "the normal Christian life" (30), or Mark Seifrid's rigorous account of how Romans 7 relates to what Paul says about *nomos* elsewhere in Romans.

Grant R. Osborne promotes the view that Paul describes unregenerate experience in verses 1-13, and regenerate experience in the "struggle" of 14-25. Stephen J. Chester promotes the "retrospective" view that Paul describes his own past in light of his present believing experience. Mark A. Seifrid promotes the view that Romans 7 describes all humans (including, but not especially, Paul) confronted by law. Each author writes clearly and compellingly, while acknowledging that no view is without its challenges. Each of the chapters, and the interesting pastoral chapter by Chad O. Brand, is very well written, and the four authors cannot be faulted, but rather thanked. Taken as a whole, however, the volume has several liabilities.

First, the somewhat-curious title (*Perspectives on Our Struggle with Sin*) appears to beg two questions: Whether the passage is about a "struggle" (two of the interpreters regard it as about defeat—not struggle) and whether the issue is "sin" or "law," since *nomos* appears 23 times in the chapter, whereas *hamartia* appears only 15 times (and *hamartanō* not at all). So the title begs at least two questions that the authors themselves debate, so perhaps the volume would have been more neutrally entitled *Perspectives on Romans 7*.

A second, and more substantive, imperfection in the volume is this: None of the three holds the redemptive-historical view of Chrysostom, Bornkamm, Schleier, Achtemeier, Moo, Johnson (et al.), that the "I" is Israel-at-Sinai (and therefore Paul also, insofar as he was a part of that covenant administration himself at one time), though Osborne mentions it as a fourth view in his summary (12-13). Many of us regard that view as solving the "entirely rhetorical" view of Kümmel et al., and as giving full weight to *nomos* as Israel's distinctive heritage (Rom 2 must control/influence later uses of *nomos*, and there Paul expressly distinguishes those who sin "under the law" from those who sin "without the law.") The volume would have been more thorough if the editor had included some representative of this fourth view,

such as Dennis Johnson's essay in the festschrift for Richard B. Gaffin.[2] In a book that acknowledges the existence of four views but only includes representatives of three, something is missing.

Third, with the possible exception of Seifrid, 7:1-5 is not given enough hermeneutical weight by the essays in this volume. There, Paul steps aside rhetorically from the rest of the letter written to a mixed audience of Jews and Gentiles to say "I am speaking to those who know the law."[3] Any attempt to universalize Romans 7 (Osborne's all believers, Chester's all unbelievers, Seifrid's all humans before the law) fails to appreciate that here, as at Romans 2 and Romans 9:4, *nomos* is Israel's distinctive reality, gift, curse, covenant, or experience.[4] Similarly, 7:1-5 establishes the redemptive-historical (I would prefer to say "covenant-historical") eras of belonging-to-the-law and having-died-to-the-law, two eras that are separated by the death of Christ. Any discussion Paul undertakes regarding *nomos* after verse five is a discussion that has already said that those who belong to Christ have died to the law; therefore whatever he says about *nomos* from then on probably discusses what *nomos* did to or for Israel. People who belong to Christ do not struggle with things they have already died to.

For these three reasons, then, the book slightly fails to introduce its readership to perspectives on Romans 7. A newcomer, approaching the question for the first time, would have only Osborne's brief summary (12-13) to alert that there is another, fourth view on the matter. Such a newcomer might arrive at a tentative decision to embrace one of the three views here without knowing that another exists. The book contains an excellent articulation of three of the four known views, and judicious and irenic criticism of each also. But it surely would have been strengthened by the fourth view, especially since that view appears to be gaining significant traction, and may even be the majority opinion of post-Kümmel scholarship.

An additional note comparing the verb-tenses of verses 1-13 compared to 14-25 is in order. Most interpreters have acknowledged that the reasoning of Romans 7 shifts between verses 13 and 14 (give or take a verse), and that the aorist is more prevalent in the first and the present is more prevalent in the second. However, while I concede that a rhetorical shift occurs here, it is far too simplistic to say that the first deals with "the past" and the second with "the present" on the basis of the verbs employed. As the chart below indicates, there is some shift in verb tense between the first thirteen verses and the last eleven. But the shift is not absolute, nor as thorough as people often suggest. While there are no aorists in the second section, of the twenty-six in the first section, only ten are indicatives; the others sixteen probably have only aspect and no time. Also, there are eleven present tense verbs in the first section, so the first section is actually more varied than is often suggested: Of its forty-eight verbs, twenty-two are *not* aorists. The second section, on the other hand, is dominated by the present tense; of its forty verbs, only four are not presents. So the aorist predominates (but barely, twenty-six to twenty-two) in the first section and the present profoundly predominates in the second.

Tense	**Total**	**Vv. 1-13**	**Vv. 14-25**
Present	47	11	36
Aorist	26	26	0
Perfect	5	2	3
Imperfect	5	5	0
Future	4	3	1
Pluperfect	1	1	0
All	88	48	40

Thus the difference is not nearly as stark, nor as interpretively suggestive, as is sometimes suggested.

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Job 1–21: Interpretation and Commentary. By C. L. Seow. Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 2013, 999 pp., $95.00.

C. L. Seow is Henry Snyder Gehman Professor of Old Testament at Princeton Theological Seminary. He is probably most widely known for his beginning Hebrew textbook (*A Grammar for Biblical Hebrew* from Abingdon Press) and his commentary on Ecclesiastes in the Yale Anchor Bible. *Job 1–21* is the inaugural volume in a new commentary series from Eerdmans called "Illuminations." Professor Seow is the general editor for the series, and it promises to be a massive project, covering the canonical books of the Bible as well as the Deuterocanonical/Apocryphal books.

The commentary is lengthy—999 pages including the introduction, Job 1–21, and the indexes. The introduction, at 248 pages, deals with what one would expect: text and versions, language, structure, genre, provenance, theories concerning redaction history, rhetoric, and message. But over half of the introduction (110-248) concerns what Seow calls the "History of Consequences." This is essentially what most would call the "history of interpretation," but it has been expanded to include not only prior exposition of Job but also the philosophical and artistic impact of the book. Called by some "reception history," this is a new approach to biblical analysis. Seow thus describes how literature, music, and the visual arts through the centuries have represented Job. The history of interpretation is something of a niche interest in biblical studies, and I fear that this material will appeal to only a marginal group of readers. Nevertheless, the depth of research here is nothing short of staggering. Where else could one learn that Odo of Cluny (ca. 878-942) appealed to Job 39:10 in his discussion of the role of the military in Christian society (203-204) or find a catalogue of sixteenth-century musical compositions that made use of Job (222)? We should not be dismissive of Seow's efforts. For students of Job, it is surely worthwhile to learn that the book played a significant role in eighteenth and nineteenth-century debates over theodicy, as reflected in the works of Leibniz, Voltaire, Kant, Hegel, and Kierkegaard (225).

In the more traditional areas of introduction, Seow is thorough and judicious. His analysis of the text and language of Job—the latter being a major problem with this book—carefully explains the data and describes its significance (1-26). For example, the orthography of Job is unusually conservative, spelling many words without the *matres lectionis*. The evidence of a Qumran fragment of Job, 4QpalaeoJob[c], and of the variant manuscripts and the versions, suggests to Seow that the *matres* within the Masoretic Text represent part of the history of the interpretation of the text. This evidence is also significant for textual criticism in Job (17-20). In another area, I found his discussion of the integrity of the book to be helpful (26-39).

On various points, as is inevitable, readers may quibble with Seow's interpretations. He dates the book to the early fifth century, suggesting, for example, that the Chaldean raiders who afflicted Job may reflect conditions around that time. He argues that the raid looks like a military operation (1:17), that Chaldeans whom Nabonidus brought to the area may have carried out raiding expeditions in Arabia and Edom, and that the author of Job, writing some decades later, may reflect the memory of this (39-46). Against this, Chaldeans are known to have lived in southern Babylonia from the ninth century. Job 1:19 does not require a sophisticated military operation, and indeed desert pirates probably did not function as a disorganized mob. One may also doubt whether imperial troops under Nabonidus carried out this kind of brigandage. In favor of Seow's position, Job 1:15 mentions the Sabeans, and only Nabonidus is known to have spent time in Arabia. But the text does not suggest that the Chaldeans and Sabeans were associated with each other. Seow has other arguments in favor of his dating of the book, some of them quite intriguing. Whether the reader agrees with him or not, none can deny that his argument is carefully researched and presented.

On a more substantive note, I must say that I disagree almost entirely with Seow's interpretations of the speeches of Elihu and of God (31-39, 97-104). But this requires far more discussion than a book

review can accommodate, and it is at any rate unfair to engage him fully on this matter before he has released his commentary on Job 22–42.

The commentary on Job 1–21 works through each chapter of Job individually. After an original translation of a chapter, Seow provides three areas of discussion: "Interpretation," "Retrospect," and "Commentary," and each chapter has a separate bibliography. The translation has no notes attached to it (in contrast to Hermeneia or the Word Biblical Commentary), and the look and feel is similar to the Anchor Bible. Unlike a number of recent commentaries, he does not include separate discussions on the form or structure of each text.

The "Interpretation" section discusses the overall meaning of the chapter and interacts with scholarship on broader issues concerning the function and significance of the text. For example, in the Interpretation for Job 4, Seow gives Eliphaz a more sympathetic reading than one normally sees, and he spends a fair amount of space countering those who interpret Eliphaz as a brittle conservative. Instead, he asserts that Eliphaz reasonably follows the teachings of traditional wisdom and to some extent takes on the mantle of a prophet (381-390). Each "Interpretation" section also includes a small sidebar, "History of Consequences," that summarizes responses to the chapter, especially focusing on the early rabbis and Christian teachers. Thus, the "History of Consequences" for Job 9 notes that Jewish interpreters accused Job of blasphemy, and that they did so as a polemic against Christians, for whom Job was a type of Christ. Against this, Ambrose of Milan argued that Job 9:5 signifies the end of the Old Testament (542).

The "Retrospect" section is generally quite short. It summarizes Seow's view of the chapter under discussion and sometimes adds a few observations gleaned from the history of interpretation. To some extent, this section fulfills the role of a section on "message" or "theology" that one sees in other commentaries.

The "Commentary" section is generally quite lengthy, and it works through the chapter discussing individual words and phrases from the translation. It is to this section that Seow relegates all of his analysis of textual, lexical, and grammatical issues. He discusses at great length the Hebrew text (and often the versions as well). Again like the Anchor Bible, he uses transliteration throughout—there is not a Hebrew or Greek letter to be found. Some will find this inconvenient, since those who do not routinely work with Hebrew in transliteration must do a mental conversion back to Hebrew characters. Indeed, the reader must be aware that a given transliteration may not be Hebrew at all. This problem is most severe where he is discussing a textual or lexical problem and cites data from multiple languages (Hebrew, Greek, Syriac, Akkadian, Arabic, etc.), all in transliteration. On the whole, however, it is not difficult to follow. To give a brief example in full, the Commentary on 19:3 includes the following entry on 811 (the text in bold italics is from Seow's translation of the verse):

"***humiliate me.*** The Hiph. of *klm* is "to shame, humiliate, insult," though the humiliation here is by means of accusations, as in 1 Sam 25:7, Ps 44:10 (Eng 9), and Ruth 2:15 (cf. Klopfenstein 1972, 137-38)."

Seow's comments on a given word are phrase are generally much longer than the above. At times the discussion is complex, with an enormous number of citations of Hebrew and other languages. This material, in contrast to the "Interpretation" section, is intended for reference purposes and not casual reading. Throughout the "Commentary" section, Seow shows himself to have an exceptional mastery of the data in both the primary and secondary sources. He is a seasoned and careful scholar.

Although I have pointed out a few areas of disagreement, I happily confess that this commentary is a remarkable achievement. For the serious student of Job, it is indispensable.

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Living in God's Two Kingdoms: A Biblical Vision for Christianity and Culture. By David VanDrunen. Wheaton, IL: Crossway, 2010, 208 pp., $16.99 paper.

Natural Law and the Two Kingdoms: A Study in the Development of Reformed Social Thought. By David VanDrunen. Grand Rapids, MI: Eerdmans, 2010, 466 pp., $30.00 paper.

Kingdoms Apart: Engaging the Two Kingdoms Perspective. Ed. Ryan C. McIlhenny. Phillipsburg, NJ: P&R, 2012, 284 pp., $24.99 paper.

As a community called to be 'in the world but not of it' (John 17:14-16), disciples of Christ unavoidably wrestle to understand the relationship between Christianity and the broader culture. In his book *Christ and Culture* (1951), H. Reinhold Niebuhr famously categorized five different ways that Christians throughout history have interacted with culture. Within Reformed circles, this same discussion is often framed as a debate between a "two kingdoms" view and a "one kingdom" or neo-Calvinist view. Neo-Calvinists tend to emphasize more strongly the Christian responsibility to influence and even transform society by the living out of an explicitly biblical worldview in all areas of life, including education, politics, and vocation. This view generally corresponds to Niebuhr's category of "Christ transforming culture." The two kingdoms view, by contrast, corresponds more to Niebuhr's category of "Christ and culture in paradox," affirming the God-given responsibility of Christians to participate faithfully in society even while rejecting an unequivocal Christian mandate to transform society or "Christianize" all spheres of life.

This review examines two recent books from one prominent voice on the two kingdoms side of the debate, David VanDrunen, professor of systematic theology and Christian ethics as Westminster Seminary California. This review will also consider a third book, a collection of eleven essays in response to the two kingdoms position, edited by Ryan C. McIlhenny and including authors such as Cornel Venema and Nelson Kloosterman. This review will survey the basic argument of these three books as well as identify points of contention between the two camps, seeking to determine which areas of disagreement are less significant and which areas represent the more fundamental division between the two sides.

VanDrunen's basic argument in *Living in God's Two Kingdoms: A Biblical Vision for Christianity and Culture* is that scripture reveals God as ruling all creation as king, but that his rule is administered by means of two distinct covenants that establish two different kingdoms. The members of one kingdom consist of all humanity—both believers and unbelievers—enjoying the benefits of God's gracious rule expressed in general providence and preservation, temporal blessings shared by all people commonly. This kingdom is a common-grace kingdom administered through the Noahic covenant established by God with all humanity, as revealed in Genesis 9. God governs this common grace kingdom by means of the natural law and general revelation that is written on every human heart by virtue of their creation in the image of God, a law which, though suppressed by sinful humanity to varying degrees, is nonetheless the common point of moral reference between all people, whether believers or unbelievers, living together within broader society.

According to VanDrunen, the members of the second kingdom consist only of true believers who are in Christ, having experienced new birth by the Holy Spirit, enjoying the benefits of God's gracious rule expressed in salvation and in the granting of eternal blessing and life. Believers are therefore members of both of God's kingdoms simultaneously. This second kingdom is a special-grace kingdom administered at one time in history through the Abrahamic and Mosaic covenants, but now administered solely through the new covenant established by God through Christ with his church, a covenant which fulfills the earlier spe-

cial-grace covenants. God governs this kingdom by means of the special revelation of scripture, which, though authoritative for all people, is not accepted as authoritative by non-Christians and therefore can only function as the common point of moral reference and doctrinal truth within the special grace kingdom of professed believers rather than within the common grace kingdom in which believers and unbelievers are mixed.

Living in God's Two Kingdoms is primarily a work of biblical theology, written at a popular level, aiming to establish the two-kingdoms argument, along with its implications for the Christian life in areas such as education, vocation, and politics. By contrast, in *Natural Law and the Two Kingdoms: A Study in the Development of Reformed Social Thought*, VanDrunen attempts a work of historical theology, written at a more academic level, with the goal of demonstrating that from Calvin to Kuyper, Reformed theology consistently and broadly "affirmed doctrines of natural law and the two kingdoms and treated them as foundational concepts for their social thought" (1). VanDrunen acknowledges variations among Reformed thinkers on these doctrines during the first 400 years after the Reformation, but nonetheless identifies a common core of convictions shared by the majority of theologians, including Calvin, writers of early Reformed resistance theory like Knox and Beza, Reformed scholastics like Althusius, Rutherford, and Turretin, colonials like Cotton and Witherspoon, Americans like Hodge and Thornwell, and finally, Kuyper. According to VanDrunen, one key element in this shared two-kingdoms structure was an understanding of "the two mediatorships of the Son of God, over creation and redemption respectively" (76). This doctrine taught that the Son of God "rules the one kingdom as eternal God, as the agent of creation and providence, and over all creatures. Christ rules the other kingdom as the incarnate God-man, as the agent of redemption, and over the church" (177). An implication of this view is that broader human society in this age is rooted in creation, expressing God's preserving grace in a fallen world, but that civil society, unlike the church, is a non-redemptive social order.

After surveying the development and maintenance of the Reformed two kingdoms doctrine in the first 400 years of the Reformation era, VanDrunen then posits that during the twentieth century Reformed theology mostly rejected this traditional two kingdoms doctrine and embraced a view of Christianity and culture that might be described as a one kingdom view. According to VanDrunen, key figures in this rejection included Barth and early neo-Calvinists like Dooyeweerd. Important to note is that although VanDrunen believes he is accurately tracing the history of the Reformed two kingdoms doctrine, he does not see himself as merely siding with the earlier Reformed theologians over the later. Instead, the historical-theological argument of *Natural Law and the Two Kingdoms* is ultimately in service of the biblical-theological argument of *Living in God's Two Kingdoms*. VanDrunen describes his larger project as "not to defend everything that has ever gone by the name 'two kingdoms,' but to expound a two-kingdoms approach that is thoroughly grounded in the story of scripture and biblical doctrine" (*Living in*, 14).

Two years after VanDrunen published these books, a group of theologians responded to his two-kingdoms arguments in *Kingdoms Apart: Engaging the Two Kingdoms Perspective*, a book representing the neo-Calvinist approach. *Kingdoms Apart* is not merely a response to VanDrunen, though all eleven essays interact with him (in particular, his two books reviewed here) and only one of the essays also significantly references additional advocates of the two kingdoms view. Yet, the eleven essays also fall short of a point-by-point response to VanDrunen's arguments, with only minimal engagement with either the exegetical claims of *Living in God's Two Kingdoms* or the historical claims of *Natural Law and the Two Kingdoms*. The most significant historical counterarguments to VanDrunen occur in essays by Cor-

nel Venema and Gene Haas offering an alternative understanding of Calvin's views of natural law and the two kingdoms, both which argue that Calvin does not have two completely separate realms in mind when he speaks of the two kingdoms and that though Calvin affirms the existence and usefulness of natural law, he also maintains its insufficiency apart from scripture.

Ryan C. McIlhenny begins the collection with an introductory essay in which he provides a basic definition of neo-Calvinism. According to McIlhenny, neo-Calvinism's central axiom is the sovereignty of God over all creation, expressed practically in four key principles: the cultural mandate, sphere sovereignty, the antithesis, and common grace. The cultural mandate of Genesis 1 is God's original commission for humanity to be agents of God's sovereignty by the ongoing cultivation of all aspects of creation. While the cultural mandate calls humanity to express God's sovereignty comprehensively, sphere sovereignty qualifies the universality of the cultural mandate with a recognition that God has ordained distinct but complementary and overlapping spheres of cultural authority, such as the family, the church, the state, and other cultural institutions, each intended to operate within God-ordained limits. The antithesis describes the reality that all humanity is divided into two distinct groups—the regenerate and the unregenerate—such that on ultimate issues of belief, there is no commonality between the two groups. The antithesis is then qualified by common grace which recognizes that, in spite of the fundamental antithesis, the two groups also share some universal common ground as humans made in the image of God, including partial agreement in some areas of truth and morality.

The ten subsequent essays explore various additional aspects of the neo-Calvinist position, some essays more historically oriented, others more strictly theological in orientation. While the essays do not agree on every point (cautioning us against interpreting neo-Calvinism as a monolithic position), numerous points of commonality among the writers emerge. Perhaps the most oft-repeated characterization of neo-Calvinism among the authors is its self-identity as the expression of a fully-integrated worldview which requires Christians to take responsibility for cultural engagement and participation in a distinctly Christian way. In contrast, the authors understand the two kingdoms conception as inherently dualistic, restricting the expression of the biblical worldview to the sphere of the institutional church. Cornel Venema describes VanDrunen as teaching that "all human life and conduct" is divided into "two hermetically separated domains or realms" (17). The implication is that Christians who participate in broader society should not use the Bible as their norm of personal conduct since obligation to biblical commands only relates to the church realm (32). Timothy R. Scheuers identifies VanDrunen as teaching that Christians should be active in society but in doing so they should "abandon their unique, scripturally informed perspective," participating "only as a respectable citizen, not as a Christian" (140, 143). Such a view calls for Christians to "live a compartmentalized life," in contrast to neo-Calvinism's emphasis on the "comprehensive lordship of Jesus Christ" (127). Therefore, neo-Calvinism integrates worldview and "world activity," whereas VanDrunen is seen to sever this relationship (128). McIlhenny believes VanDrunen's position makes it difficult to justify the existence and unique mission of Christian colleges and other bodies of Christian learning outside the institutional church (268). Nelson Kloosterman agrees, seeing the two kingdoms paradigm as incompatible with the vital vision for Christian education which has characterized the Reformed tradition during the last one hundred years (81).

Related to the charge of dualism is Kloosterman's critique of VanDrunen's description of the "dual mediatorship" of Christ, which Kloosterman sees as providing the "doctrinal underpinning of Two Kingdoms" (87). As noted earlier, VanDrunen argues that this concept is a long-

standing Reformed doctrine which sees Christ as both the providential ruler over all creation and the redemptive ruler over the church, even while distinguishing these two mediatorships. Kloosterman affirms the distinct creational and redemptive roles of Christ but believes the two-kingdoms approach invalidly separates and isolates the two roles without also integrating them as "the differentiated-yet-unified work of Christ" (87). In maintaining both integration and distinction, Kloosterman argues that a neo-Calvinist view "presents a wholesome biblical alternative to Two Kingdoms Christology" (88).

Another area of broad consensus among the authors in *Kingdoms Apart* concerns natural law within the neo-Calvinist scheme. In agreement with VanDrunen, neo-Calvinism affirms the existence of a natural law on the ground that "all humans are image-bearers [with] the ability to grasp creational truths" and express "a universal moral sense" (xxxiii). But unlike neo-Calvinism, VanDrunen is perceived only adequately to present a *positive* vision of natural law, "dismiss[ing] … Calvin's negative assessment" (62). In the words of Scheuers, the two kingdoms perspective makes "natural law and Scripture two separate, non-overlapping, independent sources of wisdom and knowledge," with natural law functioning as "a wholly sufficient guide for life in God's Kingdom" (134, 135). According to Kloosterman, two kingdoms advocates "divorc[e] the content of natural law … from the person and work of Jesus Christ" (92). In contrast, neo-Calvinism holds to a "much closer relation between the natural and special revelation of God," including giving "a priority to special revelation as a more clear and full disclosure of God's will as Creator and Redeemer for human conduct in every area of life" (18, 19). Because of natural law's sin-induced "insufficiency" for "obtaining a full apprehension of God's will for human conduct," Venema argues that neo-Calvinists—like Calvin but unlike VanDrunen—give "an indispensable and foundational role to special revelation in the discernment of God's moral will for human conduct in all areas of human society and culture," not just within the institutional church (22).

Neo-Calvinists see themselves not only as the rightful heirs of Calvin but also as those accurately maintaining the "two cities" paradigm of Augustine. The neo-Calvinist emphasis on the radical antithesis between the regenerate and the unregenerate corresponds to Augustine's two cities, the city of God and the city of man (or Satan). Branson Parler posits that "VanDrunen sees Augustine's thought as similar to the Two Kingdoms perspective" (185). But Parler goes on to argue that Augustine and VanDrunen cannot be reconciled (195). Interestingly, Parler also argues that Augustine and Kuyper cannot be reconciled either, because like VanDrunen, Kuyper "suppose[s] that humans can be disordered with respect to humanity's ultimate end but still be properly ordered toward penultimate ends" (174). Yet, in McIlhenny's telling, Kuyper's distinction between mankind's ultimate and penultimate ends seems to correspond generally to his distinction between the antithesis and common grace, respectively (xxxv). Since McIlhenny sees Kuyper as the founder of neo-Calvinism and identifies Kuyper's pairing of antithesis with common grace as two of the fundamental tenets of neo-Calvinism, a tension is introduced within *Kingdoms Apart*. On one hand, Kuyper is the exemplar of the neo-Calvinist alternative to the two kingdoms, and on the other hand, Kuyper, like VanDrunen, is critiqued for promoting "a near-dualistic view of common and special grace" (180) and is acknowledged to have "developed a doctrine of the Two Kingdoms—or more, precisely, the twofold kingship of the Son of God" (164), a view which sounds strangely similar to the two kingdoms view of VanDrunen.

In *Natural Law and the Two Kingdoms*, VanDrunen provides a plausible resolution to this tension, arguing that Kuyper fits "squarely and comfortably in the Reformed natural law and two-kingdoms traditions" in that he emphasizes the antithesis between the two groups of humanity on

matters of ultimate and eternal concern while highlighting the common grace shared by all humanity on matters of penultimate or temporal concern (314). Contrary to the claim of *Kingdoms Apart*, VanDrunen also clarifies that the two-kingdoms paradigm is *not* the same concept as Augustine's two cities, though the two ideas are compatible (371). VanDrunen argues that Calvin also made this distinction between two cities and two kingdoms, such that the two-kingdoms paradigm addresses the question of how God rules the world rather than the question of man's ultimate orientation toward God as addressed by Augustine's antithesis. "Calvin perceived a difference between these kingdoms but not a fundamental antithesis. The antithesis lay elsewhere" (71). Like Augustine and Calvin, VanDrunen *does* believe that "a fundamental antithesis exists between believer and unbeliever in their basic perspective and attitude toward God, morality, and eternity" but he also believes that "alongside this antithesis God … ordained an element of commonality in the world" (*Living*, 29). Instead of rejecting or obscuring Augustine's two-cities antithesis, VanDrunen, like Kuyper, pairs the antithesis with common grace. In fact, according to VanDrunen, "in this dual reality of antithesis and commonality lies the origin of the two kingdoms," allowing affirmation of the antithesis of Augustine in reference to a Christian's membership in the eternal kingdom while simultaneously affirming the common grace of Kuyper in reference to a Christian's membership in the temporal, civil kingdom (ibid.). Even in clarifying the compatibility of antithesis in ultimate matters and commonality in penultimate mattes, VanDrunen nonetheless leaves the reader somewhat unsatisfied in regard to just how one goes about determining which matters are ultimate and which matters are penultimate and whether this distinction can always be clearly or simply made.

Kingdoms Apart not only overstates the incompatibility of VanDrunen and Augustine, it also overstates the claims that VanDrunen advocates the sufficiency of natural law apart from Scripture and promotes a radically dualistic vision of the Christian life in which Christians participating in broader society should forego their Christian identity and belief system. Concerning natural law, in *Natural Law and the Two Kingdoms*, VanDrunen fully embraces both Calvin's positive *and* negative assessments of natural law, along with "the consequent necessity of supernatural revelation" (105). Concerning radical dualism, in *Living in God's Two Kingdoms*, VanDrunen repeatedly specifies that the distinction between the two kingdoms is *not* a complete division between the two realms, and therefore Christians should "express their Christian faith through [cultural tasks]" (13), seeking to "live out the implications of their faith in their daily vocations" (14-15). VanDrunen also believes that Scripture addresses matters such as education, work, and politics and "thus provides Christians with a proper perspective on them and clear boundaries for participating in them" (31). In contrast to the radical dualism of which he is accused, VanDrunen states unequivocally, "Christians are Christians seven days a week, in whatever place or activity they find themselves, and thus they must always strive to live consistently with their profession of Christ" (162). Therefore, both VanDrunen and neo-Calvinists affirm a fundamental unity between a Christian's participation in different spheres of life. The difference between the two camps concerns VanDrunen's greater emphasis on identifying distinctions within the unity—careful, scripturally warranted distinctions that are not equivalent to dualistic divisions as "dualism-phobia must not override our ability to make clear and necessary distinctions" (26). This same difference is evident when examining Kloosterman's charge that VanDrunen radically separates the work of the Son of God in creation and the work of the incarnate Son in redemption. Throughout *Natural Law and the Two Kingdoms*, VanDrunen argues for a historically Reformed distinction between the two mediatorships of the Son without an extreme separation or a denial of their "higher unity" (301). VanDrunen and neo-Calvinists agree that the two mediatorial works of Christ are fundamentally integrated, differing only on how properly to understand and state the

accompanying distinctions between these two roles.

While charging VanDrunen with radical dualism is unwarranted, critics are right to question the coherence of VanDrunen's presentation of the individual Christian's integration of life in the two kingdoms. Apart from theological education in the local church and pastoral training in institutions that directly serve the local church, VanDrunen places the realm of education fully in the common grace kingdom shared by believers and unbelievers. As VanDrunen explains in *Living in God's Two Kingdoms*, in the common kingdom, he *does* affirm the validity and importance of distinctly "Christian" education (*Living in*, 184-186), even while simultaneously calling it into question since he see education as largely focused on fields of study which are not distinctively Christian and whose "moral requirements … [and] standards of excellence … are the same for believers and unbelievers" (168). While VanDrunen does not condemn "Christian" schools, he nonetheless states that Christians should "not seek a uniquely Christian way to perform … and order [the activities and affairs of the common kingdom, affairs such as education]" (170). VanDrunen undergirds this claim by making a distinction between the subjective motivations, presuppositions, and worldview of believers and the objective standards of evaluation believers follow when participating in common cultural activities like education, objective standards he sees as shared by all people (167-168). But, as VanDrunen himself acknowledges, worldview presuppositions often affect the standards of evaluation adopted within the world of education (179). So, like VanDrunen's distinction between the ultimate and the penultimate, drawing a clear line of distinction between subjective presuppositions and objective standards in the task of education is often difficult to accomplish—as VanDrunen again acknowledges (175). VanDrunen also recognizes that presuppositions in education have more influence in some disciplines compared to others, suggesting that the effects of differing presuppositions "might be felt more intensely in the humanities, which deal more directly and regularly with the evaluation of human conduct and the interpretation of life's meaning than do, for instance, the natural sciences" (181-182). Such acknowledgements seem to suggest that perhaps VanDrunen has drawn his line of distinction between the two realms too precisely, particularly in reference to spheres of activity like education. Contrary to VanDrunen, because of the impact of worldview presuppositions within many of the academic disciplines which deal more directly with metaphysical questions of inquiry and not merely physical ones, Christians should embrace with less hesitancy than VanDrunen the idea of distinctly "Christian" education beyond the confines of the local church. VanDrunen makes a similar mistake in also placing the institution of the family fully in the common grace realm, inadequately recognizing the impact of the biblical worldview on the more "objective" aspects of how Christians live as families, such as "child-rearing methods" (155). VanDrunen's treatment of areas such as education and family are precisely the areas which his critics highlight in their disagreement, demonstrating that some of the disagreement is undoubtedly due to VanDrunen's lack of both clarity and convincing coherence.

Some of VanDrunen's differences with neo-Calvinists as surveyed up to this point have proven to be less significant than may have first appeared. A more substantial difference involves the question of the ongoing validity of the mandate given to Adam in Genesis 1-2. As one of the authors of *Kingdoms Apart* recognizes, "How one interprets the opening chapters of Genesis and their place in the larger canon goes far in determining an approach to the issues of natural law and the Two Kingdoms" (228). Concerning Adam's mandate, neo-Calvinists generally believe that because of Christ's accomplished work of redemption, Christians in this age now resume Adam's work, whereas VanDrunen holds that "the Lord Jesus Christ … has completed Adam's original task once and for all" (*Living*, 15). Such statements lead neo-Calvinists like McIlhenny to conclude that for VanDrunen "the cultural mandate is no longer relevant for Christians today" (xxii), while Scheuers is also convinced that VanDrunen believes "no legitimate cultural man-

date remains" (129, n. 9). Within the same book, Parler comes to the opposite conclusion, portraying VanDrunen as believing that humanity in this age is "well on the way" to "attain[ing] perfect obedience to the original creation mandate" (179). The best explanation for these contrary readings is VanDrunen's own recognition of both continuity and discontinuity between Adam's mandate in Genesis 1-2 and Noah's mandate in Genesis 9, distinguishing between a covenant of works and a covenant of grace, respectively. While sinful humanity cannot take up Adam's role in the covenant of works (discontinuity), in the Noahic covenant, mankind *is* called to "obey the cultural mandate as given in modified form" (continuity) (*Living*, 164). This revised cultural mandate, rather than being a part of the Adamic creation covenant (covenant of works), is the mandate of the Noahic *fallen* creation covenant (a covenant of grace).

In making this distinction, VanDrunen assumes the full validity of the traditional Reformed concept of a covenant of works, including the idea of a probationary period of testing for Adam in which he would work to earn his salvation by perfect obedience, after successful completion of which he would enter into eternal life in a new heavens and new earth (*Living*, 43). Adam failed to achieve the perfect obedience required by that covenant, and his descendants were thereafter also unable to provide such perfect obedience. But Christ, the last Adam, did provide the perfect obedience required and fulfilled the covenant of works, receiving the reward of eternal life, a reward also given to those "in Christ" by grace through faith. VanDrunen then concludes that to advocate for Christians to take up Adam's cultural mandate (as neo-Calvinists do) is to pervert the doctrine of justification by grace through faith by implying that our cultural tasks in some way "contribute to atoning for sin," a version of works-righteousness (*Living*, 51). But this seems an unnecessary conclusion to make about neo-Calvinists, especially since none of the authors in *Kingdoms Apart* come close to advocating such a view. VanDrunen's conclusion assumes the full validity of the covenant of works concept, but if one rejects the concept or perhaps rejects part of it (such as rejecting the idea of a probationary period for Adam even while accepting humanity's inability to take up Adam's task), then the cultural mandate is not necessarily connected to the doctrine of justification in the way which VanDrunen proposes. As well, since VanDrunen himself maintains the ongoing validity of the cultural mandate in its revised, Noahic form, the difference between the two camps seems less serious than a fundamental disagreement over the doctrine of justification.

While VanDrunen does believe that the Noahic revised cultural mandate remains in force, he also believes the Noahic covenant should be understood as a common-grace covenant in contrast to the special-grace covenant inaugurated with Abraham, a theological position VanDrunen shares with his former professor, Meredith Kline, but also with others within the Reformed tradition (*Natural Law*, 413). Since VanDrunen understands humanity's mandate as the Noahic mandate and not the Adamic mandate, and since the Noahic covenant is preservative, expressing common grace for all creation, unlike the Abrahamic covenant of redemption and special grace for a particular people, therefore the revised cultural mandate of the Noahic covenant aims for preservation rather than redemption and is designed to extend preserving grace to all people but not saving grace. This highlights a key difference between VanDrunen and neo-Calvinists since neo-Calvinists understand the cultural work of Christians also to be redemptive work. VanDrunen, in contrast, believes a Christian's cultural work is important but not redemptive. As well, though neo-Calvinists share with VanDrunen an embrace of both antithesis and commonality, only VanDrunen also grounds antithesis (Abrahamic special-grace kingdom) and commonality (Noahic common-grace kingdom) in these two covenants.

Related to the distinction between redemptive versus merely preservative cultural work are the differing ways in which VanDrunen and neo-Calvinists understand the relationship between the

inauguration and the consummation of the new covenant. VanDrunen sees the inauguration of the new covenant to be already realized in the church but not yet realized in all culture and creation, with the in-breaking of the kingdom of God begun solely in the church. In his view, the redemption of broader culture and the natural world will *only* commence at Christ's return, Christians thereby not tasked to *redeem* culture and nature in this age. In contrast, neo-Calvinists generally believe that the inauguration of the new covenant in this age includes the beginnings of the redemption of culture and the natural world, bringing the kingdom of God to these spheres. Therefore, according to McIlhenny, "the Adamic human race perverts the cosmos; the Christian human race renews it" (xxiv). Christians now are entrusted with a comprehensive responsibility to "call back (or buy back, as in *redeem*) the created order to its original state as God intended," "reclaiming God's creation from the totalizing effects of the fall," culture work becoming kingdom work (xxvi, xxviii). De Graaf claims that "both the state and the church belong, then, to the redemptive work of Christ" (115), the civil order now "restored again through Jesus Christ" (122), allowing the "kingdom of God [to] come to manifestation" in both the church and state (123). VanDrunen labels this neo-Calvinist vision as "an eschatological burdening of cultural work," in contrast to his own limiting of the purpose of cultural work to common grace and preservation rather than eschatological redemption (*Natural Law*, 384).

Venema seems to perceive that in proposing this view, VanDrunen does not believe that "Christ's work of redemption involves the comprehensive reordering and renewing of the entire created order" (27). But in reality, the key question for VanDrunen is not *whether* Christ comprehensively redeems the cosmos, but *when* he redeems it. VanDrunen finds it noteworthy that many neo-Calvinists, following Dooyeweerd, portray "the Christian ground motive as creation-fall-redemption," with no clear differentiation between inaugurated and consummated redemption (*Natural Law*, 353). Emphasizing a three-act rather than a four-act conception can create a blurring of the lines of distinction between inauguration and consummation, particularly concerning the question of whether Christ's redemption of all culture and the natural world begins in the inaugurated "already" through his Church or whether Christ begins this universal transformation only in the consummated "not yet."

While VanDrunen is right to advocate for greater discontinuity between inaugurated and consummated redemption than do neo-Calvinists, he overstates his case when he unqualifiedly claims that in the consummation the physical creation (apart from human bodies) will be completely replaced rather than renewed (64-66). He uses this argument to refute the neo-Calvinist contention that Christians will bring "worthy cultural artifacts" from the old creation into the new (67). But VanDrunen's rejection of this view as unwarranted speculation does not also require the rejection of additional physical continuity beyond the two creations. For instance, Romans 8:21 seems to imply additional continuity when it states "*the creation itself* will be set free from its bondage to corruption and obtain the freedom of the glory of the children of God."

As this review has demonstrated, the debate represented in these three books is an important one, with implications for multiple areas of theology, including questions of Christology, anthropology, soteriology, ecclesiology, and missiology. While VanDrunen and his neo-Calvinist counterparts are closer in some of their views than might initially be expected, these two sides also exhibit fundamental and abiding differences regarding their understanding of Adam's mandate, the mission of the church, and the underlying covenantal structure of scripture.

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All Life Belongs to God. By Erkki Koskenniemi. Eugene, OR: Wipf and Stock, 2012, x+64 pp., $10.00 paper.

This extremely slim book by an adjunct professor of New Testament at the Universities of Helsinki and Easking, Finland and at Åbo Akademi University, sheds light on an enormously weighty subject: what does it mean to be human? In many ways, this is the key question that lies at the heart of the whole debate about abortion that has raged in the West for the past forty years or more. And the way forward is by going back, back to some core documents at the heart of Western culture: the Scriptures of Judaism and Christianity. Koskenniemi reminds us that Graeco-Roman culture, a significant part of the context in which the Christian Scriptures of the New Testament were written, was pervaded by as brutal a callousness as any that is regnant in the world today. Common to the Greeks and Romans was child exposure or abandonment, that is, refusal to take care of the child in the first ten days of the child's life (3). The reasons for this varied: fear by a father that the child was not his; if the child appeared to be unhealthy; if the child was a female (this ancient practice of gendercide parallels what is happening in modern nations in Asia [vii–viii]; if the omens at the time of birth were not favorable (4–7).

Jewish texts like Psalm 139:13–16, Jeremiah 1:5 and Ezekiel 16:4–7 present a very different picture. There, God indicates his concern for the unborn and how he even compares his care of Israel in her early history to the taking care of a child that has been abandoned to death (10–11). While, therefore, "the Old Testament does not include a clear ban on exposure," these texts indicate that Jews practiced a different ethic with regard to the newly born than their pagan neighbors. A number of Jewish pseudepigrapha explicitly develop this ethic, like 1 Enoch 99.5, which condemns as sinners those who "abort their infants" and cast out their newborn. Similarly the Alexandrian Jewish exegete Philo "unambiguously condemns exposure … and regards it as murder" (14).

Similarly, while the New Testament does not directly condemn exposure—though Kooennniemi perceives a hint in Ephesians 6:4—a number of very early Christian texts did. The *Didache*, for instance, specified that evil actions in the way of death included abortion and exposure (2.2, at pp. 18–19). Building on such convictions, early Christian apologists such as Justin Martyr, who had to respond to pagan accusations that Christians were cannibalistic and ate babies when they celebrated the Lord's Supper, argued that "to expose newly-born children in the part of wicked men" and was "sin against God" (*Apology* 27.1, at pp. 21–22). The anonymous *Letter to Diognetus*, a pearl among early Christian apologetic writings, similarly said that while Christians have children like their Graeco-Roman neighbors, "they do not expose them once they are born" (*Diognetus* 5.7, at p. 23). With the advent of the imperial church after the Constantinian revolution, much changed for the church, but on this issue of child exposure, there is clear continuity with the pre-Constantinian era (29–34). From the perspective of Basil of Caesarea, for example, whom Koskenniemi rightly regards as extremely influential in subsequent generations, intentional child exposure was tantamount to murder (30).

Now, why did early Jews and Christians take a position so at odds with Graeco-Roman culture? As with reasons for child exposure, the reasons for the Jewish and Christian position are various: there was the conviction that human beings are truly human while still in the womb (35–36); Jews and Christians held a high view of family where to be childless was regarded as shameful (36–38); then there was the firm belief that sexuality existed first and foremost so as to produce children (38–39); finally, child exposure is unnatural and against divine law (43–44 and 48–52). Did Jews and Christians expose their infants despite admonitions like those above? The evidence is slight, but as Koskenniemi argues, if there were regular warnings against this sin, then we can expect a few

Jews and Christian did indeed do it (16).

This is an important work, for, as the Finnish author shows, there is a clear parallel between contemporary arguments to safeguard the unborn with ancient Jewish and Christian arguments against child exposure. As Koskenniemi powerfully concludes: "A human being, including one newborn, even unborn, is a masterpiece of God, and no one has the right to destroy it" (60).

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The Revival of Particular Baptist Life in Ireland 1780–1840. By Crawford Gribben. Dunstable, Bedfordshire, UK: Fauconberg Press, 2012, 20 pp. (available at fauconberg@SBHS.org.uk).

This small booklet, originally given as a lecture by Crawford Gribben, currently Professor of Early Modern British History at Queen's University Belfast, at the Grace Baptist Assembly in May 2011, is extremely helpful in understanding how the Irish Baptists emerged from the doldrums that afflicted them for much of the eighteenth century. Their churches had begun well in the previous century, but what Gribben calls a "heady cocktail of congregational isolationism … with theological ambiguity and increasing wealth" led to a precipitous decline (8). Rescue, by God's grace, came through two preachers, both English: the remarkably godly Samuel Pearce (1766–1799) and his friend Andrew Fuller (1754–1815), the theological mainspring behind the formation of the Baptist Missionary Society. Pearce's six-week trip to Dublin and its environs in the summer of 1796 and Fuller's later trip in 1804 proved to be catalysts of prayer and church-planting, as Gribben ably documents. Amazingly in the forty years after 1814, when the Baptist Society for Promoting the Gospel in Ireland (later simply the Baptist Irish Society) was formed, "Particular Baptist churches [were] planted at the remarkable rate of almost one per annum" (17). The geographical locus of these churches also began to shift from Dublin to the northeastern counties that later constituted Northern Ireland. This advance was accomplished in the face of significant challenges, for, as the nineteenth-century preacher C. H. Spurgeon once put it: "They who wear soft raiment will never win Ireland, or Africa, or India, for Christ" (18).

Albeit a relatively small community, Irish Baptists have played an important role in the advance of the Gospel in places as diverse as Ontario, Peru, and India, and Gribben's booklet is a helpful study of how God revitalized this Baptist community. Let us hope that it will be a spur to a deeper study of Baptist life in the emerald isle.

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Four Views on the Apostle Paul. Counterpoints: Bible and Theology. Edited by Michael F. Bird. Grand Rapids, MI: Zondervan, 2012, 236 pp., $17.99 paper.

In line with the Counterpoints series, *Four Views on the Apostle Paul* is an attempt to provide the reader with a sense of the wide variety of viewpoints on Paul and his theology. The volume achieves its goal in part simply by choosing a radically diverse group of scholars: Thomas R. Schreiner (Reformed view), Luke Timothy Johnson (Catholic view), Douglas A. Campbell (post-new-perspective view), and Mark D. Nanos (Jewish view). A diverse group indeed! Each contributor was given the task to answer four questions regarding Paul's views on: 1) salvation, 2) the significance of Christ, 3) his theological framework, and 4) his vision for the churches.

Schreiner argues that Paul's theological framework consists of the "already/not yet" fulfillment of the Old Testament's promises in Christ. Indeed,

Christ is at the center of Paul's theology, for Paul views Jesus as Lord of all, and his cross as central for salvation. All humanity needs salvation, for God's wrath against sin will finally be displayed on the Day of Judgment. Yet, God graciously sent his son to die as a substitute for all who believe in him (2 Cor. 5:21). Not everyone will be justified (defined in forensic terms), but only those who have faith in Christ (*pistis Christou* as an objective genitive). For those who are believers, in Christ, they comprise the true Israel, the new temple, and the body of Christ.

Johnson argues that there is no "center" to Paul's theology, but that Paul's framework derives from his own experience, the experiences of his readers, and the early church traditions already in place. Like Schreiner, he acknowledges the centrality of Christ, whose death is seen as a sacrifice, a demonstration of God's love, and Jesus's own faithfulness to God (*pistis Christou* as a subjective genitive). Salvation is deliverance from the power of sin and participation in the life of God, although salvation is mainly oriented toward the present, for Paul's primary concern was with "building a saved community," not "saving one's [individual] soul" (89).

Campbell focuses on Romans 5-8, for he contends it most clearly expounds Paul's gospel. Paul's framework stems from his Trinitarian convictions. In other words, God had revealed himself as Father, Son, and Spirit, and Paul's mission was to participate in this trinitarian life, which explains the centrality of Paul's "in Christ" formulation. It is not proper to ask what people need to be saved from, for this distorts the solution. Rather, one should focus on the priority of God's electing grace, for only then does one see the problem in its proper light. God's election indicates his universal mission of love, and all humanity, who at one time were caught up in Adam's sin, are now caught up in the grace of God in Christ.

Nanos argues that Paul's perspective was fundamentally a Jewish one. Even after his Damascus road experience, which was not a conversion but only a calling, he taught believing Jews to observe Torah. His negative statements toward the law are explained by his resistance to believing Gentiles coming under the law, not by a problem with the law itself. His opposition to circumcision did not indicate opposition to Torah observance in general, for circumcision was only the initial rite for proselytes to Judaism. Thus, Paul's churches were a subset of the synagogues within Judaism, and unbelieving Jews were in danger not of eternal condemnation but only of missing out of Israel's end time proclamation of salvation to the nations.

Although this summary is brief, one can readily see how divergent the contributors' views on Paul are. Space allows for a few observations concerning what this volume can teach us about the importance of one's interpretive method in approaching Paul. First, what letters a scholar deems to be authentically Pauline significantly influences his reading of Paul. For instance, Schreiner and Johnson agree that all thirteen letters in the New Testament that bear the name of Paul are genuinely Pauline. It is no wonder, then, that, even though Schreiner is Protestant and Johnson Catholic, they find significant agreement. On the other hand, Campbell—and to an extent Nanos as well—does not hold to Pauline authorship of all thirteen letters, which leads him to a radically different interpretation of Paul. For instance, Campbell alleviates Johnson's perceived tension in the Pauline literature regarding the role of women in the church by suggesting that Paul did not write 1 Timothy (103). Or again, Campbell's emphasizes Romans 5-8 to the extent that one wonders whether his Pauline "canon within a canon" has not actually limited Campbell's ability to see God's retributive justice earlier in the letter (1:18; 2:15-16; 3:5-6) or elsewhere (e.g., 1 Thess. 2:13-16). In other words, the parameters one sets on the Pauline corpus determines in large part the way one reads Paul.

Second, *Four Views* demonstrates how one's cultural assumptions can influence the way one interprets Paul. Of course, no interpreter can lay aside his biases entirely, but the goal is to be as objective as possible in one's interpretation. Again, Schreiner

and Johnson model this approach well by grounding their statements in a variety of texts. In a sense, Campbell and Nanos also evidence a desire to read Paul with the historical and cultural background in mind. Nevertheless, Campbell, like many post-Holocaust interpreters of Paul, reads Paul in light of the Holocaust, arguing that (what he calls) the "Melanchthonian" reading of Paul (i.e., that Paul was fighting legalism, and that Jews must believe in Christ to be justified) must be wrong because it puts Judaism in a bad light (113-14). Campbell, while providing no textual evidence for his assertions, thinks such a reading is "ghastly" and "harsh" (207), and that "Paul just could not have been this nasty and misguided" (208). Similarly, Nanos, as a Jew himself, does not think Paul considered the wrath of God to be stored up for unbelieving Jews. Accordingly, he reinterprets Paul's anathema in Galatians 1:8-9 not as an eschatological curse but as a curse only for the present (61). But surely this underestimates what for Paul was the serious problem of another gospel. Nanos also thinks Romans 11 shows that Paul considered even unbelieving Jews to be in a covenant relationship with God (192-93). But this is unlikely, since Paul wished himself to be cursed by God for the sake of their acceptance (9:3; cf. 1 Cor. 9:20, 22). It is likely that Nanos does not think Paul considered unbelieving Jews to be under God's wrath because Nanos himself is an unbelieving Jew. In short, this volume teaches us that if we are to read Paul aright, we must read him on his own terms.

In conclusion, *Four Views* is a good introduction to the wide array of Paul's interpreters. With few footnotes, it is not overly technical and suits well the individual seeking an entrée into the various views on Paul. And, although Campbell calls Schreiner's views on Paul "Arian" (55), the contributors by and large exhibit the model of respectful interaction intended in the volume.

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ENDNOTES

[1] The French edition appeared a few years earlier, with the title *Apprendre à vivre: Traité de philosophie à l'usage des jeunes générations* (Paris: Plon, 2006).

[2] "The Function of Romans 7:13-25 in Paul's Argument for the Law's Impotence and the Spirit's Power, and Its Bearing on the Identity of the Schizophrenic 'I,'" in *Resurrection and Eschatology: Theology in Service of the Church* (Essays in Honor of Richard B. Gaffin Jr.; Lane Tipton and Jeffrey C. Waddington, eds.; Phillipsburg, NJ: P&R Publishing, 2008), 3-59.

[3] Paul even disrupts the ordinary word-order: *ginōskousin gar nomon lalō*, "To those who know the law I speak," suggesting he is not speaking to others about other concerns.

[4] Elsewhere I suggest that the covenant at Sinai was no bargain for the Israelites, even though it was distinctively and exclusively made with them. See my "Getting Out and Staying Out: Israel's Dilemma at Sinai," *Pittsburgh Theologial Review* 3 (2011-2012), 23-37.